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3Abstract
This dissertation presents an analytical study of the evolution of the right of political self-
determination and the influence of the principle of non-interference on promotion of this 
right. The intellectual and legal interests in democracy, good governance and social justice 
have contributed to the development of this right and its realisation for peoples lacking the 
least degree of good governance. The right of political self-determination is strongly 
associated with international intervention because governments facing popular demands for 
this right often resort to repression and military means to suppress such claims. Such 
interventions have also been driven by contemporary interest in supporting collective rights 
through international organisations that monitor and identify violations of various political 
rights. Thus, this dissertation focuses on the tension between the principle of non-interference
and the modern legal trend to promote the political rights of all peoples. This research 
contributes considerable insights into the transformation of the principle of non-interference 
from an absolute obligation into a flexible concept by tracing the contributing legal changes 
both in international practices and in emerging rules and principles in international law. It is 
concluded that the promotion of the right of self-determination has resulted in international 
practices that have dramatically influenced and caused tension with the principle of non-
interference.
Keywords: right of political self-determination, democracy, statehood, the principle of non-
interference, international intervention, sovereignty.
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Introduction
1. General Background:
In the post-World War II era, the right to self-determination became paramount as a key tenet 
of international law.1 The emergence of the principle includes two popular demands: 
Independence from colonialism and Secession from existing sovereign entities.2
Subsequently, after the end of the Cold War era, populations, and especially those living 
under dictatorships, began demanding their political rights to good governance and 
democracy. Democracy thereby became the gold standard aspiration for the right to self-
determination.3
The right to political self-determination is the cornerstone of attempts to end dictatorships 
and crucial to contemporary human thought. It enables people to participate in the decision 
making process essential to the establishment of rights and choosing the type or style of 
governance that will run a country. Theoretically, it is widely accepted by the international 
community, which supports democracy (a system of government in which the supreme power 
is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of 
representation usually involving periodically held free elections), as a model of good 
governance.4 This support has been expressed through international conventions and 
conferences, such as: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, 
and other pronouncements by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) particularly
Resolution 792 of 1992 which called for a free and fair elections in Cambodia.5
                                               
1 Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law ,Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 53-
54. See also Helen Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1998) Vol. 47,pp. 537-572.
2 Anne Bayefsky, Self-determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned : Legal Opinions, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, p. 283. See also Milena Sterio, The Right to Self-determination Under 
International Law: "selfistans", Secession and the Rule of the Great Powers, Routledge, 2013, pp. 9-21
3 Simone van den Driest, 'Pro-Democratic' Intervention and the Right to Political Self-Determination: The Case 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Netherlands International Law Review, Volume 57, 2010. See also Jure Vidmar, 
The Right of Self-determination and Multiparty Democracy: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Human Rights Law 
Review (2010) Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 239-268.  See also Jure Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law : 
The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War Practice ,Hart Publishing Limited, 2013,pp 10-38.
4 Anna Jarstad, From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 5.
5 UN, Security Council, Resolution 792 (Nov 1992).
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The right to political self-determination has also been a major factor instigating the Arab
revolutions that began in 2011 referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’. Agitations in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Yemen, Libya and Syria called for an end to dictatorial regimes, the establishment of good 
governance, respect for freedom and the implementation of true democracy. Meanwhile, anti-
revolutionary efforts have driven regimes to suppress such claims and thus perpetrate 
international crimes in attempts to remain in power and preserve the status quo. Such forms 
of systemic repression push the international community to intervene, in order to put an end 
to human rights violations and tyranny.
In recent years, developed Nations have intervened in country’s political activities overtly 
and or covertly, to support the oppressed people and promote the development of democracy 
and good governance. This trend was reflected in David Cameron’s (the British Prime 
Minister) decision to intervene in the uprising of the Libyan people against the government of 
Muammar al-Gaddafi. Cameron stated, ‘I think it is the moment for Europe to understand we 
should show real ambition about recognising that what is happening in North Africa is a 
democratic awakening, and we should be encouraging these countries down a democratic 
path’.6
However, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter7 does not allow the organisation to intervene in 
matters that essentially fall within the internal sovereignty of a country.8 This restriction 
reflects a core principle of international law: the principle of non-interference. The principle 
of non-interference applies not only to the relationship between the UN and independent 
                                               
6 Joe Murphy. ‘EU Leaders Fail to Agree Action Plan for Libya’ London Evening Standard (London, 11 March 
2011) <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23931030-give-up-power-immediately-eu-prepares-
gaddafi-ultimatum.do> accessed11 March 2011.
7 Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) (24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI art 2(7).
8 Sovereignty has been associated with both traditional and historical concepts and is viewed primarily in two 
dimensions. First is internal sovereignty in which the legislative, judicial and executive governmental 
institutions can exercise their rights without oversight from high-level authorities. Second, external 
sovereignty leaves nation-states free to handle their international relations and participation posts and make 
related decisions. Since the seventeenth century, the international system of sovereign countries has 
developed around a number of customary or written rules. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia formed a 
foundation of international law outlining the core features of sovereignty. However, the concept of 
sovereignty today is not restricted by the specific settlements of Westphalia. The objective criteria used in 
international law to establish the concepts of jurisprudence and sovereignty were formed largely in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During those centuries, the concepts of territorial sovereignty, formal 
equality among countries and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries gradually formed the 
basis for the notion of international legal obligations, which has become a fundamental principle of the 
international community.
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countries, but also to relationships among all countries.9 Its validity is confirmed in many 
documents and international agreements created after the Second World War, and in 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly such as Resolution 2131, which calls for non-
interference in the internal affairs of countries.10 Its validity is confirmed in other documents 
and international agreements created after the Second World War, and in resolutions of the 
UN General Assembly such as Resolution 2131, which calls for non-interference in the 
internal affairs of countries.11 Therefore, it has become difficult for any specific international 
body or a member of the international community to carry out military attacks (contrary to 
Article 2 (4) UN charter on use of force),12 economic or rhetorical interventions without 
being subjected to challenges and questions regarding the legality of such interventions and 
the motivations underpinning any such actions. Therefore, this thesis will consider the 
implications of these core principles of international law.
2. The Scope of Study
This thesis examines the impact of the principle of non-intervention on the operation in 
international law of the right to political self-determination. The arguments behind these 
theories are that the right to political self-determination is based on the claims of the 
populaces within dictatorial states, which ought not to be suppressed. The international 
community, on the one hand should support such demands and protect the people from 
repression, human rights abuses and violence within the framework of international law, on 
the other hand, such promotion, support and protection could be contrary to the principle of 
non-interference. Thus, a conflict exists in international law, between the need to promote the 
peoples’ rights of self-determination and the principle of non-interference, enshrined within 
the UN Charter. This thesis will therefore critically evaluate all relevant principles and 
proffer ambitious solutions in line with recent developments within the committee of Nations 
and the ever emerging Public International Law principles.    
                                               
9 Anthony F. Lang, Just Intervention, Georgetown University Press 2003, p. 64.
10 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
Their Independence and Sovereignty, United Nations General Assembly Res 2331 (1965) <http://www.un-
documents.net/a20r2131.htm> accessed13 July 2011.
11 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
Their Independence and Sovereignty, United Nations General Assembly Res 2331 (1965) <http://www.un-
documents.net/a20r2131.htm> accessed13 July 2011.
12 UN Charter (1945).
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3. Aims of Study
The main objective of this research is to study the impact of the principle of non-interference 
on the remarkable development of the right to political self-determination. Although, the 
Principles of rights to self determination and non-interference border between law and 
politics, the Aim of this study is to approach these concepts from a legalistic viewpoint;
discuss an overarching perspective, by analysing in what ways does self determination fall 
short of international law in theory and practice and how can we regenerated the right to 
guarantee a wider enforcement/acceptance?
In so doing, examining contemporary situations of the principle of non-interference within 
the scope of international practice and modern legal rules to determine the rigidity of this 
principle and the extent to which it is incompatible with international trends in the promotion 
of the political rights of peoples living under a range of repressive regimes.
The right to political self-determination has several critical points of tension with 
international law, but the demand for democratic rights and freedoms emerges from
dictatorial states or repressive regimes that resist the merits and suppress all demands to 
facilitate them to the advantage of the principle of non-interference essentially for reasons of
incompatibility. With this in mind, this thesis further aims to uncover the truth in the issues 
arising from the conflict between the right to political self-determination and the principle of 
non-interference and to validate whether a global/uniform standard of international law is 
attainable by the hierarchical relationship between international and national legal 
frameworks.
4. Research Question
The central question of this research is: ‘Does the principle of non-interference impact on the 
path of the right to political self-determination in international law?
Other relevant sub-questions within this thesis are as follows:
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(1) Is there a legal basis for popular claims that dictatorship can be ended and the highest 
degree of good governance achieved through effective public participation in national 
decision-making?
(2) If the legal basis described in question 1 exists, is there harmony or dissonance between 
the right to political self-determination and the criteria of statehood in international law?
(3) If the right to political self-determination is linked to international intervention, because 
dictatorial governments resort to repression and military means to suppress popular demands, 
how can ‘international intervention’ be legally defined?
(4) If international intervention promotes the right to political self-determination in a manner 
that conflicts with the principle of non-interference, what is the current status of the principle 
of non-interference, given the contemporary focus on human rights?
(5) Are there special criteria for international interventions to promote the right to political 
self-determination?
(6) What is the outcome of the conflict between the right to self-determination and the 
principle of non-interference? What debate surrounds these issues?
5. Methodology
Whilst this thesis generally considers two main areas of international law: the right to 
political self-determination and the principle of non-interference, to effectively understand 
the influence of these principles and arrive at evidence-based results, the thesis will engage a 
doctrinal approach combining textual analysis with case studies of international interventions 
involving emerging issues on the right to political self-determination. Theoretically, the 
research progresses towards analysing the uncertainty in implementing, interpreting and 
applying international laws and relevant human rights instruments, through the examination 
of the extent of practice of the principle of political self-determination and the doctrine of 
non-interference, the research further examines the scope of state sovereignty theoretically 
and practically on the parameters and duties of States to honour the right to self-
determination by identifying arguments within primary and secondary sources on the topic, 
locating determinative facts and legal issues.
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The data used for analyses consists of Treaties, Resolutions, statutes, judicial 
pronouncements, relevant journals, leading texts, legal reviews, other materials 
predominantly from judges, lawyers, practitioners and legal scholars have been reviewed and 
examined including legal principles which govern the practice of international and human 
rights law. The thesis therefore stresses the need for nationalisation of international laws. 
Finally, this study is multi-faceted, while it is majorly a legalistic argument it does embrace 
aspects of socio-political science, political / economic empowerment and philosophy, with 
proper analyses conducted and conclusions reached.
6. Thesis Outline:
Chapters 1 and 2 aim to address the importance of ensuring that the right of political self-
determination in international law is a legal right in the framework of the legal concepts of 
self-determination for all people. These chapters will also address the concern that the legal 
concept of statehood has no effect on the claim of this right.
The first chapter reviews the innovative development of the right of political self-
determination in international law. The chapter begins by examining the right of self-
determination in general in order to understand the differences and similarities between the 
popular demands that affect this right. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to investigate whether 
the popular demand for this right is consistent with the legal concepts of self-determination. 
This chapter will serve to clarify the scope of the right to political self-determination in legal 
concepts, both in terms of external self-determination and internal self-determination. Thus, it 
seeks to provide an understanding of the factors that influence the emergence of this right in 
terms of the place and circumstances surrounding it. Additionally, it looks at the factors that 
influence the deactivation or termination of the popular demands of this right, which 
contributes to understanding the phenomena and concepts that encourage the international 
community to strengthen this right through international intervention.
Chapter two looks at the dynamics between the right of political self-determination and the 
concept of statehood in international law. Because this right cannot be achieved without any 
change in the internal shape of the state, this change or the popular claims of this right must 
be consistent with the criteria of statehood in international law. Moreover, this chapter 
provides an objective analysis of the new elements in the international recognition of the 
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change in internal forms of the state and it demonstrates the direct impact that the right of 
political self-determination has on the development of those elements. This analysis examines 
the ability of this right to be consistent with the ideology of contemporary international law in 
order to ensure that this claim does not depart from that ideology, which is based on a 
concern for human rights and the rights of all people.
Chapter three will provide a critical analysis of the concept of intervention in international 
law. The aim of this analysis is to identify the legal restrictions that prevent international 
intervention. This chapter will be divided into two basic sections. Part I will examine the 
concept of international interventions in international conventions and customary 
international law. Part 2 will examine the principle of non-interference as the main constraint 
that prevents the international community from intervening if doing so interferes with 
contemporary legal thought. The most important part of this chapter will be devoted to the 
study of the current status of the principle of non-interference; this section will consider the 
rigidity of this principle in light of contemporary interests in human rights and the rights of 
all people.
Chapters 4 and 5 present specific studies that have examined the concept of international 
intervention. In particular, they will examine if the concept has been used to promote the 
right of political self-determination. The information presented in these chapters will reflect 
the contemporary interest in the promotion of the right to political self-determination through 
international intervention within the framework of jurisprudence of international law and 
international practices.  Therefore, these chapters will present an analysis of the results of the 
confrontation between this promotion and the principle of non-interference.
Chapter 4 will provide a legal analysis of the concept of international intervention to promote 
the right of political self-determination. It will achieve this through the study of this type of 
intervention in international law. This chapter will also clarify the differences and similarities 
between interventions that aim to strengthen the right of political self-determination and 
interventions that aim to protect against human rights violations. Moreover, this chapter will 
discuss the legal pillars upon which this type of intervention is based, as well as the legal 
restrictions that affect the validity of this intervention in the framework of international law.
Chapter 5 will examine actual cases of international interventions and practices that promote 
the right of political self-determination. This study is an important contribution to the 
endeavour to clarify the application of international efforts to promote the right of political 
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self-determination. Additionally, it is necessary to explore the results of the confrontations 
that have occurred between the right of political self-determination and the principle of non-
interference around the issues that have emerged in the effort to claim this right. This chapter 
will illustrate the stability of the support to promote this right in customary international law. 
This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will examine some of the 
international interventions that were used to promote this right during the Cold War. The 
second section will examine some of the international interventions that were used to 
promote this right after the end of the Cold War, in order to understand the evolution and 
expansion of the support and promotion of the right to political self-determination in 
international law after the end of the Cold War era.
Chapter six is the final chapter and summarises the previous five chapters, with a focus on 
the outcome of this thesis. More importantly, this chapter highlights the contributions that 
this research makes to the field of study and recaps the findings of the research that emerged 
throughout the study period.
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Chapter one
The Right of Political Self-Determination in International Law
1.1 Introduction
Modern legal climates have contributed to the development, spread, agitation and emergence 
of the right of political self-determination.13 Despite the existence of the right of political 
self-determination in many international conventions, a rapprochement is when people are 
calling for the independence of the state, a criterion of popular demand which appears mainly 
to be regarded as a call for political self-determination.14
Thus, the new approach of self-determination is centred on the claim of political self-
determination to end the dictatorship and the people’s participation in decision making and to 
choose the type and style of government in running the country.15 However, this approach has 
not received a lot of attention from legal studies. Most studies examining political self-
determination have focused on human rights in general and have looked more specifically at 
democracy. There are still many questions to be answered about the sources of the right to 
political self-determination in international law, including the standards on which this right is 
based and their connection to the concept of self-determination.
In addition, one must know the difference between traditional claims to self-determination 
and the new approach to political self-determination. This approach differs in terms of the 
importance of popular demand through its association with dictatorial governments and 
repressive regimes. This links to another legal area, which is the concepts and legal principles 
for international intervention, in particular the principle of non-interference. Because these 
regimes will not hesitate to repress or kill citizens who demand access to the right of political 
                                               
13 Simone van den Driest, 'Pro-Democratic' Intervention and the Right to Political Self-Determination: The Case 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Netherlands International Law Review, Volume 57, 2010. See also Jure Vidmar, 
The Right of Self-determination and Multiparty Democracy: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Human Rights Law 
Review (2010) Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 239-268.  See also Jure Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law : 
The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War Practice ,Hart Publishing Limited, 2013,pp 10-38.
14 Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 20, 
65.
15 David J. Galbreath, ‘Dealing with Diversity in International Law: Self-Determination and Statehood’, The 
International Journal of Human Rights (2005) Vol. 9, No. 4.
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self-determination. International law criminalizes this repression and supports the political 
rights of all people. How does the right to political self-determination arise within the state, 
and what are the characteristics that link this right to the concept of international 
intervention?
The primary focus of this chapter is to examine the right to political self-determination in 
international law and to determine whether there exists any legal way for international 
legislation to impact the path of this right. This chapter also looks at the legal consistency 
required to strengthen the right to political self-determination within the framework of 
international law. In addition, this section analyses the link between this right and the concept 
of international intervention.
Consequently, this chapter provides a legal analysis to understand the correlation of the 
political rights of peoples with the concept of self-determination, through the study of the 
right of self-determination in international law. It traces the emergence of the right of 
political self-determination to ensure that it is proven in international law. In addition, this 
chapter clarifies some of the fundamental characteristics that play a part in the interaction 
between the right to political self-determination and the concept of international intervention.
1.2 The concept of self-determination
Broadly stated, the right of self-determination is one of the most important rights established 
in the jurisprudence of modern international law. The right of self-determination can be 
defined as ‘the right of all peoples to determine their political future and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural rights. This is reflected through independence as well as local 
self-government and autonomy and integration, association, or some other forms of 
participation in government, all working externally and internally to ensure democratic 
governance’.16
The right to self-determination is fundamental to the popular demands of citizens, whether 
intellectual, regional or ethnic, and finds realisation in the people’s ability and freedom to 
determine the overall shape of their state. In this sense, self-determination refers to the 
                                               
16 A. A. Idowu, Revisiting the Right to Self-Determination in Modern International Law: Implications for African 
States, European Journal of Social Sciences (2008) Vol. 6, No. 4.
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freedom of the members of a group to determine their political status and thus to pursue 
social, cultural and economic development.17
Thus, the right to self-determination complements the right of free speech, upon which the 
freedom of the people is based. The importance of language to self-determination suggests 
that self-realisation of the people can be in line with the desire to achieve a sense of 
nationalism, either politically or culturally. It is important to note that realising the claim to 
self-determination is an on-going process which does not cease until the people achieve their 
desired freedom. It does not depend directly upon individual concerns but is driven primarily 
by the popular desires of the population of a state or province.18
The moral theory of international law has contributed to the development of this right 
because this theory ranks justice high as a standard of respect for fundamental human rights 
and dignity and of equality among all human beings.19 In addition, the remarkable modern 
developments in the rules of modern international law aided in the formulation of the 
essential features of this right, particularly freedom of association, belief and thought and 
freedom from persecution, murder and displacement. These freedoms are reflected in much 
relevant legislations and the common interest in collective action to establish and develop 
self-determination in a growing number of countries.20
1.3 The rise of self-determination in international law
Before studying the legal framework of self-determination, we need to review the history of 
this right to its current stage in order to understand the causes of the various threads of this 
right and its broader applications. Despite the tendency of scholars and researchers to 
consider self-determination as a novelty and to link it to international covenants and 
conventions, this right has been enshrined in the literature of customary law for a long period 
of time. The genesis of this right in the Middle Ages can be seen as a revolutionary reaction 
to the concept of divine right and to governors of provinces who dominated their inhabitants 
                                               
17 James Summers, The Rhetoric and Practice of Self-Determination: A Right of All Peoples or Political 
Institution, Nordic Journal of International Law (2004) Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 323-361.
18 Ibid.
19 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 16-19.
20 Hawraman Ali, Self-determination for the Kurds? Coventry Law Journal (2011) Vol. 16, No.1, pp. 29-41.
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and held authority above the law.21 Over time, these conditions have pushed the development 
of this ring in the direction of ever-greater popular authority, taking the possession of state 
authority from individuals such as governors. This historical shift can be seen to crystallise in 
the United States’ Declaration of Independence in 1776, the outbreak of the French 
Revolution in 178922 and subsequent documents pronouncing human rights to be an element 
of just government.23
During the nineteenth century, a significant shift occurred regarding this right when US 
President James Monroe declared that South American countries had a right to self-
determination in response to a fear of European interference in the internal affairs of those 
states.24 At the same time, Europe saw a similar movement against the tyranny of kings and 
the ruling classes (e.g., the French Revolution) which solidified concepts of this right and its 
implications for the rights of individuals and peoples. Put briefly, these rights include the 
rights to enjoy freedom, resist oppression and define, according to one’s own principles of 
governance, the internal and external construction of the state.25 From this movement 
emerged democratic governance and the concrete concept of the right of self-determination.
In 1914, Vladimir Lenin wrote the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, the first scientific 
work dealing with this right which caused a significant shift in its conception.26 During the 
explosive conflict of World War I, the Allies, in response to a letter from US President 
Woodrow Wilson, asserted that they were fighting for the freedom and independence of Italy 
and the Czech Republic and to liberate the oppressed peoples of other various European 
countries from foreign control.27 However, at this time, the right of self-determination 
conflicted with other established legal rights and consequently was rejected in the 
international consultations and negotiations during the period. 
                                               
21 Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 166.
22 Shyamon Jayasinghe, The Future of Self-Determination, Contemporary Review (2002) Volume 28.
23 Anne F. Bayefsky, Self-determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned: Legal Opinions, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, p. 387.
24 Andrew Gray, Indigenous Rights and Development: Self-Determination in an Amazonian Community, 
Berghahn Books, 1997, p. 48.
25 Joshua Castellino, International Law and Self-determination, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, p. 11.
26 Omar Dahbour, Illusion of the Peoples: A Critique of National Self-Determination, Lexington Books, 2003, p. 
48.
27 David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict, Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 8.
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In short, during most historical periods, the right of self-determination has been in opposition 
to the aspirations of major countries. During the period under discussion, the spread of 
colonialism had marginalised the right to self-determination. Consequently, it was not 
addressed in the negotiations of international legislation or included as an established right in 
the charter of the League of Nations.28
The process of implementing the right of peoples to self-determination did not stop with 
efforts to redress colonialism which prevailed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries29 but 
extended to responses to the outcome of World War II and to the Cold War. This process can 
be seen in the establishment of the Federation of Germany, the disintegration of the 
Yugoslavian Federation and, most significantly, the emergence of many independent states 
countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. These events all stand as good 
examples of the application of the right of peoples to self-determination.
Despite the denial of the right to self-determination during the era following the First World 
War, it did play a certain role after the Second World War during negotiations by the Allied 
Quartet of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union, held in San Francisco in 
1945. At this time, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Union’s minister of foreign affairs,  
proposed this right be included in the texts of the UN Charter.30
The conference endorsed these amendments, which then became paragraph (2) of Article I of 
the first chapter of the UN Charter setting out the objectives and principles of the 
organisation: ‘to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace’. In addition, Article (55) of the UN Charter has described the 
organisation as founded ‘with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being, 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples’.31
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Thus, it is clear that the right of self-determination has become increasingly sophisticated, 
which has forced governments to support more broadly the legality of people’s demands for 
this right. Furthermore, the historical legal and political practices of the international 
community, by both states and international organisations, have confirmed the right of self-
determination as one of the most important means of exercising the rights established by the 
principles of contemporary international law.32
1.4 The right of self-determination in contemporary international law
After the end of World War II, an intellectual movement to respect human rights and make 
them, and particularly their legal aspects, central to intellectual dialogue began among 
scholars and politicians.33 This development secured the importance of people’s human right 
to self-determine their national and political destiny in international law. Undoubtedly, the 
international practices and organizations have played a prominent role in the evolution of 
international law;34 thus, we can clearly say that international law is based on the deepest 
aspirations of the human mind, placing the human mind and its interests and orientations in 
control of practices.35 This claim is confirmed by the worldwide intellectual revolution that 
has led to the legal renunciation of violence and hatred as instruments of policy and the 
direction to legally regulate international activities through treaties and conventions.
Among the numerous international conventions and international and regional instruments 
dealing with the right to self-determination, the most important are the 1960 Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples36 and the Declaration of 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
                                               
32 Heike Krieger, The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.23.
33 A. A. Idowu, Revisiting the Right to Self-Determination in Modern International Law: Implications for African 
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States, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970.37 Other important milestones include 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,38 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,39 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights40 and 1990 Document 
of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,41 as well as numerous 
other international treaties and conventions.
Moreover, the ICJ has supported the global trend to enshrine self-determination as a legal 
right in international law.42 In many cases, the court has backed unequivocally and 
unconditionally those demanding the right to self-determination. The court did so, for 
instance, in its 1995 judgment in the case of East Timor,43 its decision in the Namibia case of 
197144 and 16 October 1975 statement on the issue of Western Sahara.45
As well, the Court of Justice has focused on many international issues affecting the desire of 
peoples for self-determination. For example, we can read in an advisory opinion issued 9 July 
2004 the court concluded that the Israeli government’s construction of a wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, ‘along with measures taken previously, severely impedes the exercise 
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by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of 
Israel’s obligation to respect that right’.46
Collectively, these instruments and international conventions build the physical and moral 
meaning of peoples’ right of self-determination, thereby establishing precedents in 
contemporary international law. The language of this law is acknowledges that this right 
derives its strength from peoples’ desire to achieve a national and political destiny. A 1991 
international meeting of experts reached this conclusion while clarifying the concepts of the 
rights of peoples in order to recognise them in international law.47
Michla Pomerance discussed the right of self-determination as a rule in international law and 
said that states’ practice of participating in international conventions dealing with the rights 
of peoples is sufficient to establish the correct formula for their practice in customary law. 
Moreover, he points out, the focus on this right in international discussions and negotiations 
and the emphasis placed on it in the instruments and international conventions has made it an 
important legal foundation and rule of law in international law.48
However, the right of self-determination clearly remains a thorny issue in international law,49
especially so for international lawyers. Fundamental questions about this right’s legal nature 
and how it can be put into practice legally are impossible to avoid. The limits of its 
application can be questioned, and a single formula to identify who comprises ‘the people’ 
who possess the right of self-determination is needed.
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1.4.1 Legal nature of the right of self-determination
The right of self-determination does not differ from other human rights enacted by modern 
international law,50 especially in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.51 In particular, 
the right of self-determination represents the popular will of a nation’s citizens and has all the 
features and advantages of the other human rights. The right of self-determination perfectly 
complements the increasing global interest in human rights and enshrines giving priority to 
the interests of humanity over those of governmental agencies.52
In general, contemporary international law consists of a system of rules that govern the 
relationships among countries and were formed mostly after the founding of the UN of 
1945.53 An important part of the work of contemporary international law has been the 
development of human rights, extending in the laws’’ obligations and protection to include 
individuals. The law thus protects the fundamental freedoms and human rights of individuals 
and supports peoples’ natural claim and legal right to self-determination. 
As well, Christian Tomuschat emphasises, the international human rights movement aims to 
create a general recognition that states no longer are the only subjects of international law and 
that the main purpose of the state is to provide services to its citizens.54 If any state fails to 
fulfil this basic responsibility, it likely will lose its legitimacy. These responsibilities extends 
to the failure to protect the lives and physical integrity of its citizens, even to the all-too-
frequent cases in which state organs become transformed into organs of terror that oppress 
certain groups of the population. In these cases, such groups are not held obliged to remain 
within the borders of that country.55
International humanitarian laws and treaties support the idea that self-determination is a 
natural right protected by law because modern human rights law provides the legal means to 
protect the fundamental freedom of the populace to pursue social, economic and political 
opportunities, both individually and collectively. It can be argued that the starting point for 
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human rights and the right of self-determination is the protection of rights, whether individual 
or collective. Kapitan Tomis argued that collective self-determination is the best way to 
protect the human rights and improve the quality of life of a country’s populace and that the 
right to self-determination means the freedom of all individuals to participate meaningfully in 
decisions concerning the sovereignty over the territory in which they lives.56
However, the right of self-determination goes a step beyond individual human rights and 
grants a number of rights necessary to maintain the identity of a particular group. These rights 
involve positive obligations upon the international community, such as the duty to respect the 
cultural heritage of various ethnic groups. In addition, it must be pointed out that the right of 
self-determination is not an absolute right without any restrictions; unlike absolute rights, 
which are gradated by the formulation of jurisprudence, the purpose of the right of self-
determination is not to protect the personal, physical safety of groups or individuals and can 
involve significant changes to the structural and institutional constitution of any state.57
Despite these differences, self-determination is treated as a human right and not as a political 
principle in this research. Even where this right is guaranteed to all peoples on the basis of 
equality, its outcomes have some limitations.58 Many references to the right of self-
determination occur in instruments of international or and human rights, such as Part VIII of 
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act,59 Article 20 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights60 and the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe.61
In addition, certain UN bodies are dedicated to human rights. For instance, the UN High 
Commission for Human Rights and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination have issued many reports and rules on the scope and content of the right to 
self-determination within their respective areas of responsibility. Take, for example, the UN 
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High Commission for Human Rights report No. S/2006/817, which supports the right of self-
determination in Western Sahara.62
The right of self-determination evolved conceptually through the 1966 International 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,63 Oslo 
Declaration of 1970,64 and Vienna Declaration of 1993. 65 This latter document gave the right 
of self-determination an important legal character by stipulating the international obligation 
to fulfil collective demands, to not raise barriers and pitfalls to these demands and to support 
and encourage the realisation of popular demands to the right of self-determination.66 These 
goals are to be achieved through the international community’s recognition of a particular 
group as a ‘people’ entitled to self-determination under international law. The ICJ 
documented this legal obligation in the case of East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ruling that 
the right of self-determination ‘is one of the fundamental principles of contemporary 
international law.’67
It is important to note the strong tone of UN General Assembly resolution 2625, passed in 
1970, which gave a country’s citizens the right to use all the state’s legal powers to exercise 
the right to self-determination and committed the organisation to make use of these legal 
mechanisms to support and assist such struggles. This decision indicates the ending of the 
control by the dominant authorities and colonial powers and the early establishment of an 
opportunity for a nation’s people to freely express their will. This resolution also established 
the principle that the presence of a colonial power and a dominant power in legal judgments 
is contrary to the principle of peoples’ right to self-determination and the provisions of the 
UN Charter.68
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Helen Quane has said that the claim that the application of the legal obligation to support 
self-determination to steps is a crucial step in the literature because, unless applied to 
countries, this right will be seen as a mere re-formulation of the principle of sovereign 
equality under international law.69 This latter approach is defective as it gives the impression 
that, when the legal obligation to the right of self-determination lies within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states, it has a narrow and limited range. Thus, any relevant decisions or 
recommendations by the UN and regional and international organisations would violate of a 
country’s sovereignty.
On the contrary, recognising support of the right of self-determination as an international 
responsibility of the state sets a lofty goal for this and all other human rights. Additionally, 
ensuring the maintenance and protection of humans and enabling the active participation of 
individuals in public life is a basic objective of all international regulations.
1.4.2 Limits of the application of self-determination
The stability of the legal doctrine for the right of self-determination rests upon two types of 
claims by the people. First, the right of external self-determination means the right of a 
nation’s entities (e.g., states, provinces, etc.) to exercise sovereign independence free from 
external colonialism or, through secession from an undesired union, to form a different union 
based on shared identities defined by the people. Second, the right of internal self-
determination means the freedom of the nation to organise its internal political and economic 
affairs and social and cultural rights; therefore, enjoyment of the right of determination is 
limited to those countries possessing full sovereignty.70
However, the objective of diversity in international conventions and instruments on the right 
of self-determination and the narrow interpretation of this right in  Articles 2 and 55 of the 
UN Charter have contributed to controversy over who enjoys the right to self-determination. 
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That is, is such a right due to all peoples, to the colony of a dominant power, or to the 
minorities in a country?
This question raises others such as: Does international law set a standard for the right and 
legitimacy of the claim of the right to self-determination? Until recently, this position was 
rejected, and international law was considered to be the province of the state which, as a 
representative unit, was active and influential in the international arena and thus denied any 
claims against the popular political unity and territory of any countries. However, the 
emergence of laws and conventions on human rights has changed dramatically this reality, 
with the individual and the group gradually taking on the role of the primary rational and 
influential actors in the international arena. This change has supported the formal definition 
of the right of self-determination.
In the same context, we find a lack of consensus on the legal value in the concept of self-
determination. In the various debates about the concept in the writings of David Rick, 
Cassese and Buchanan, the absolute value of self-determination has not been specified as an 
absolute value, except in discussions of colonial peoples. This deficiency becomes more 
evident when considering instances in which groups that secede from an existing national 
entity lose the absolute value of the right to self-determination. For example, in the case of 
Kosovo, the contending parties resorted to armed conflict, contrary to the main objective of 
the UN Charter to achieve international peace and security and the modern intellectual trend 
to reject violence and murder.
Moreover, the right to self-determination through secession has conflicted with many legal 
principles settled in international jurisprudence and conventions. These principles have 
received great support and been highly documented in the literature on international legal 
frameworks. Among these, the most important is the principle of territorial integrity.71 This 
principle seeks to preserve the state’s borders within a framework of realism and legal forms 
against any threat to break apart a country or changes the regional borders of a state. This 
principle has been enshrined in international law in order to maintain the sovereignty of the 
country and maintain the prohibition on the use of armed force in international relations.72
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Many international conventions and treaties reference this principle. For example, Article 1 
(1) of the UN Charter aims to maintain security and international peace by eliminating any 
reasons that could threaten the peace. As well, Article 2 (4) prohibits threats or the use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or any other action 
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN in international relations. Finally, Article 33 calls 
for peacefully resolving any threat to international peace and security.73
Although the doctrine and legality of the principle of territorial integrity and of the right of 
self-determination in the event of secession have been analysed widely, the principle of Uti 
possidetis more severely restricts the right to self-determination.74 This principle is often 
invoked by those who seek to resolve the historical legacy of colonialism by prohibiting any 
changes to the borders of states once independent of colonial power. This principle can serve 
in an attempt to find a smooth path in the jurisprudence of international law to prevent border 
disputes,75 especially in formerly colonial areas of Africa, Asia and South America. This 
principle became one of the important criteria in customary international law adopted by the 
peoples of Latin America who won their independence from Spanish colonialism in the early 
nineteenth century. This principle has worked to preserve the national borders inherited from 
colonisation by independent countries. This result is only logical, considering that all the 
lands of South America are claimed, and there is no free land that does not belong to a 
country.76
An important legal opinion from the ICJ mentions this principle when considering the case 
against Burkina Faso and Mali.77 Specifically, this finding states that ‘the essence of the 
principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the 
moment when independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries might be no more than 
delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same 
sovereign’. Therefore, the managerial boundaries from colonisation became the national 
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boundaries of the independent state.78 In this case, John W. Donaldson says, ‘the 
International Court of Justice admitted that Uti possidetis could be in tension with another 
general principle of international law, that of self-determination. It was adamant that Uti 
possidetis provided the most stable territorial platform for the peaceful succession of 
sovereignty’.79
In this context, the event of secession based on a people’s claim to self-determination has 
played a pivotal role in the controversy about the standard doctrinal application of the 
people’s claim to self-determination. Paul Clark has said that, in such cases of secession as 
those of Kosovo and East Timor, diplomats avoid using the term ‘self-determination’, even 
when the status quo has been imposed in order to avoid conflict and to change the focus of 
the case from the popular claim of self-determination to violations of human rights.80
Although diverse international instruments and conventions urge the international community 
to support the right of self-determination in general, they lack special international 
conventions to implement the content of this right.81 Additionally, many of these instruments 
formulate the legal formulas dealing with this right as guidelines, not mandatory obligations. 
This lack is clearly the result of legal political discussions at the UN and other organisations 
and of states’ practice of states regarding this right. For instance, Russia supports the right of 
self-determination in Abkhazia82 but not in Syria.83 This situation stems from the negative use 
of this right in most legal instruments and the lack of an international document that applies 
to all cases and clearly lays out rules for the implementation of this right. The international 
community also lacks mechanisms to support the right of peoples to self-determination.
Accordingly, the International law introduced this right but did not provide any broader 
interpretations clarifying the general meaning of the right’s content. As a result of this 
ambiguity, conflicts involving the right of self-determination have not been avoided or 
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reduced but, to the contrary, have been more intense. Moreover, international disputes 
regarding the right of self-determination have been subject to the varying interpretations of 
the jurisprudence of the international law and of the states involved according to their 
interests.
1.4.3 The definition of the people in the right of self-determination
As mentioned, the right of self-determination is linked to objective standards regarding the 
expression of the nominally popular will. However, in the contemporary legal literature, 
finding a single legal formula to define what constitutes ‘the people’ and how they can be 
linked to self-determination has proven elusive. Helen Quane states that ‘the realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination is ambiguous where there is no clear definition of the 
people; this has contributed to the establishment of numerous conflicting interpretations in 
dealing with this right’.84
It is easy to define the people’s demands for freedom from colonialism or for independence, 
and it is even easier to define the people’s demands for effective political participation in a 
regime. However, it is difficult to craft a single formula for defining how the people deal with 
the right to self-determination in general, as they may be claiming a right of self-
determination to gain independence from colonialism or a right of self-determination to 
secession and become a sovereign entity. Moreover, the particulars of the legal issues 
involving self-determination are varied and thorny. For example, popular demands for 
secession can stem from ethnic and linguistic issues, as in Chechnya,85 or from national and 
regional tensions, as in the Western Sahara.86 Furthermore, religious factors can also play a 
crucial role, as in Bosnia and Northern Ireland.87
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In this same context, Paul Clark argued that self-determination can be hidden in international 
law because it lacks substantive interpretations of the concept of the people who make 
demands for self-determination.88 This claim is evidenced by shortcomings in the UN Charter 
in dealing with this right; the charter does not fully explain this right or the international 
instruments supporting it. Some of those instruments are focused on one particular type of 
claim to popular self-determination. For instance, General Assembly resolution 1514 declares 
that self-determination includes the right to full independence for peoples whose country has 
been controlled by colonial powers,89 whereas General Assembly resolution 2625 describes 
the exercise of the right to self-determination differently: ‘The establishment of an 
independent state, sovereign, free association or integration with an independent State or the 
emergence of any other political status be determined freely by the people constitute modes 
of implementing the right to self-determination by that people’.90
Nevertheless, the right to self-determination has not been of low priority, and despite the 
passiveness and contrary nature of international practices by states and the UN in dealing 
with this right, it is an integral part of international law and has been formed through 
international law. As there are multiple types of claim to the right of self-determination, this 
dissertation deals with each claim separately or within a specific frameworks, such as the 
right of peoples under occupation, of colonised peoples and of ethnic groups that suffer from 
oppression and racial discrimination in any country and all popular claims that fall under the 
concept of self-determination.
In addition, this dissertation rejects the idea that ‘self-determination’ is not a legal item and 
can be included or omitted from the lexicon of diplomatic formulas at an individual’s 
discretion. To the contrary, the right of self-determination is designed to prevent conflict by 
establishing a negotiated formula to stop forms of popular violence. The right of self-
determination is a legal, non-conditional right; the evidence for this claim rests in all the 
instruments and legal documents that have dealt with the right, such as the UN Charter. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Right declares that ‘all people have rights to 
self-determination’91 without discrimination or exclusion of any kind and that it is the general 
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right of any people to have a political influence on the internal and external constitution of 
their state.
Thus, it is clear that the right of self-determination does not depend upon models of 
independence and secession, and it can be expanded to accommodate new forms that are 
based on the legal framework of the right to self-determination. The above analysis of the 
concept of self-determination in international law notes that, in general, the popular claim of 
this right is the basis for its emergence. The scope of this right includes two types of 
demands, the demand for external self-determination, such as separation or independence 
from colonialism, and the demand for internal self-determination, which refers to the freedom 
of a nation to organize its political, economic and social affairs. Therefore, the demands for 
political rights are consistent with this approach to self-determination and this will be 
addressed in the next part of this chapter when the emergence of the right to political self-
determination is discussed.
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1.5 The Emergence of the Right of Political Self-determination
According to the previous analysis, the right of self-determination is based effectively on the 
popular demand for this right. The components of popular demand can vary depending upon 
the general target of the claim of self-determination. This has been confirmed by international 
law scholars who are in agreement about the difficulty of finding a specific definition of the 
scope of the people’s right to self-determination, because the types of popular demands vary 
within the scope of this right, even when the target is fixed. In recent times, the world is 
witnessing a remarkable development in the promotion of political rights and an end of the 
period of the dictatorial regimes; thus, the people of a nation are becoming the source of 
authority within the State. This trend reflects the popular claims that have arisen and/or the 
revolutions that have emerged to demand the right to political self-determination within the 
State. This can be seen, for example, in the successive Arab revolutions that began in 2011.
The rising demand of citizens for political participation ushered in the initial phase of the 
right of self-determination came, but this new era did not see the wide enactment of this 
right.92 These changes in the accepted order of governance can be marked as beginning with 
the French Revolution, which took its spirit from the desire of the citizenry to end tyranny 
and to participate in choosing their form of government. Thus, in terms of content and 
context, such national movement stands as a purely political revolution.93 Subsequently, even 
the Bolshevik Revolution adopted the formal and objective criteria of the French 
Revolution.94 Since the French Revolution, there have been many historical models of 
peoples who demand to participate in the rule of their country or to change oppressive 
regimes that practice persecution and repression against their own citizens.
In modern history, we must not overlook the influence of contemporary civilisation and 
intellectual currents, whether during the first stage of the creation of the UN or the second 
stage from the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. These 
developments resulted in the creation of legal components that place priority upon human 
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rights by limiting violating individuals’ rights.95 Simultaneously, the perceived criminality of 
violations of these rights has intensified. As well, the concepts of human freedom of thought 
and belief and doctrine have been redefined so as to give every citizen the right to participate 
in the administration of society,96 and democracy has been recognised as the means to do so, 
making it a lofty goal of the human societies.97
In international jurisprudence, there exists a broad debate on the application of the right of 
self-determination outside the colonial domain where, as mentioned, it customarily holds 
legal value through the historical attachment of the updated terms of self-determination in the 
UN system and the emergence of the stage of colonisation. However, David Galbreath holds 
the opinion that, in the colonial context, the right to self-determination has withered and is 
inconsistent with important developments in human rights; consequently, the right of self-
determination must be linked with the trend to disseminate widely the principles of 
humanitarian law.98 Seen in this light, linking self-determination with the context of 
colonialism became untenable with the end of the colonial era.99
Projecting into the future, Michla Pomerance speculated that, after post-colonialism, self-
determination might well become a rule of law through rationing or custom.100 This could 
especially be the case against the governments of countries that completely ignore the 
fundamental interests of the citizens and only give them the minimal rights to be considered 
effective citizens of the state.101  In addition, Hurst Hannum argues that, in contemporary 
international law, the right of self-determination consists of the majority’s right to participate 
effectively in the exercise of power by the political unit of an internationally recognised 
nationstate.102
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International instruments contain many references supporting the right of political self-
determination.103 Idowu has said that the instruments and international conventions, including 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and other instruments that address the concepts of human rights, have paved a 
smooth path for the right of self-determination by developing the concept of popular 
participation and equality among  peoples.104
As mentioned, legal doctrine has defined internal self-determination as the freedom of the 
nation to regulate the internal affairs of politics and economics, as well as social and cultural 
rights.105 Thus, internal self-determination takes shape as the right of the majority of a people 
within the political unity to establish a form of government and national institutions in line 
with the interests of this majority and in accordance with the accepted principles of 
international law on the exercise of power. The people within these entities also have some 
say in the making of the laws that affect their future.106
The right to internal self-determination also includes several others aspects, including the 
right of the people to contribute to the general shape of the educational systems, such as 
freedom of religious education.107 The political dimension of this right is more 
comprehensive, because it deals with constitutional law and the general form of the regime of 
the state. The right of political self-determination consequently is important because it deals 
with the highest internal systems of countries.
The legal dimension of the right of self-determination represents the people’s freedom to 
choose any form of government and method of the administration for that country.108 Also 
essential are legal and political arrangements that ensure that freedom of the people does not 
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result in discrimination against or grant exceptions that contribute to the substantial exclusion 
of any specific class of people.109 Cassese has noted that the right to internal self-
determination assumes that people will have full participation in political decision-making by 
the state and all legislative and executive powers.110
It is important to note that such participation enables the people to develop a sense of self-
respect and promotes awareness of politics. It also informs governors of their duties towards 
citizens and encourages them to consider the demands of their people, focus on issues of 
justice and social peace and to promote the harmony of class and ethnicity. Moreover, such 
participation facilitates the equitable distribution of wealth as it is based on the natural human 
right to choose and express an opinion without interference, not on the power to adopt a 
policy contrary to the interests of the peoples. This is possible as long as participation is 
conducted in order to develop a political system in which the people are the stakeholders and 
which does not expression the will of a minority with special status.
Additionally, the right of political self-determination has contributed to increased political 
freedom of action by giving citizens the right to form and join trade unions and political 
parties without coercion, which is usually imposed by the ruling party of a country. The 
effective exercise of these freedoms comes from the active role of this right, which has 
enhanced the status of these freedoms and made them a legal and political priority on the 
international level. Hence derives the importance of the right of self-determination in the 
content and form of international law and international relations and in shaping all aspects of 
life of the country, when granted freely and in accordance with the traditions of that nation.
However, the tools of good governance and the effective guarantee of people’s participation 
in national decision-making require a special contract between people and government.111 I 
contend that international jurisprudence has commented on this contract indirectly through 
the concept of democracy as the practical expression of this contract.112 The people are the 
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first guiding point of this contract, and the second is the authority of the state’s legislative, 
executive and judicial branches. The most important pillar of this contract is the compromise 
between the people and authorities of the state; consequently, democracy can be considered a 
good tool to achieve compromise.113
1.5.1 Democracy in political self-determination
If the right of political self-determination reflects a popular will to end a nation’s dictatorship 
and serves as a means for the people to choose their country’s governing mode and style, then 
democracy is both an effective and an optimal legal way to achieve that right. Hence, it can 
be said that democracy is integral to the right to political self-determination. Historically, in 
international law and in the political realm, an objective link has existed between democracy 
and the right of self-determination, and democracy has seen as a natural form of balanced 
governance consistent with self-determination. If one views the right of political self-
determination as an important principle that supports popular participation, then democracy is 
the ideal legal method to achieve that goal.114
Jure Vidmar has said that in terms of theory, democracy is a form of self-determination but a 
silent form.115 And, in the same direction, Simone van den stated that politically, the best 
means to support the emergence and development of a democracy are to provide a fertile and 
stable environment in which for the people to realise the right of political self-determination 
and participate in how the country is governed.116 In addition, the recommendations of the 
International Conference of Experts, held in Barcelona from 21 to 27 November 1998, 
support the existence of an objective link between democracy and self-determination. 
Specifically, the conference found that the most impressive results in realising the desire of 
peoples for self-determination clearly were achieved where the people had access to political 
activities through the democratic process. The findings of the conference also showed that 
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democratic means provide an effective way to avoid internal conflicts when the people claim 
the right of political self-determination.117
Organisationally and historically, democracy and self-determination have been considered as 
separate albeit parallel concepts.118 However, both concepts are realised most fully when 
blended. This merger comes from the homogeneity and integration between the government 
and its people, which are the foundational principle of both democracy and the concept of 
self-determination. A representative government allows the people on-going participation in 
national decision-making, whether economic, political or cultural.119 This situation stands as 
the truest picture of those peoples who can decide their fate without duress or repression and 
is the epitome of the right of political self-determination.
This correlation extends beyond representative government; the democratic system of 
government also reflects the right of self-determination by recognising the people as the 
source of legislation and authority.120 This view is the silently growing trend in the 
contemporary international law. This concept mandates that no occupier of a country impose 
a constitution upon the occupied country or its will upon the authors of a constitution; nor 
may there be any apparent or hidden groups or individuals who manipulate power, let alone a 
monopoly of power or wealth that influences the public.121 In contrast, people must serve as 
the source of authority and legislation, and the exercise of this authority must be carried out 
by free individuals, who are given and retain the right to legitimise the power of the state. 
For a democracy, political pluralism is one of the basic conditions or, at the least, a 
foundational manifestation of its existence.122 Thus, if democracy presupposes the existence 
of a multi-party political system, this leads to the important conclusion that the people’s 
exercise of their right to practice self-determination, especially politically, requires a system 
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of political pluralism. In addition, the democratic political project in self-determination 
provides a fertile environment to guarantee human rights.123 Doing so is consistent with the 
recent trend in the international system, in which a government selected by the people can 
lose its national legitimacy given incontrovertible evidence that it has violated human rights. 
Therefore, the link between self-determination and democracy supports human rights.
In the global system, democracy faces a special challenge from legal pluralism. However, the 
international law of human rights has contributed indirectly to alleviating this challenge by 
giving preference to the individual’s civil and political rights.124 Specifically, the 
international law of human rights grants to the individual the freedoms of expression, 
association and religion. For example, Articles 19 and 22 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights stipulate these freedoms, including seeking the right of political 
self-determination.125 Moreover, there are many regional charters that provide for these 
freedoms. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights, through Article 11, 
gives the right both to form associations and unions and to join them.126 Similarly, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights specifies in Article 10 that everyone has the 
right to form and to join associations.127 The Article further stipulates that no one may be 
compelled to join an association or to leave it because of his or her beliefs.128
Democracy thus became the effective form and the standard model for formulating the right 
of political self-determination. However, democracy is not only a means for people to express 
their political will but is a major goal for peoples across the world129 and is increasingly 
expressed as the will of the public in various countries.130 Democracy certainly has deep roots 
in human history, and over time, various polities have had different visions of the form, 
manner and content of democracy. However, contemporary human thought has framed 
democracy as a means for providing stability to the individual citizen’s life and for freeing 
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citizens from the humiliation and subjugation inflicted by non-representative regimes, such as 
dictatorships.131  Accordingly, democracy is one of the most important features of the current 
era. To an increasing degree, the contemporary human society of advanced technology-based 
civilisations indisputably is founded on the principles of intellectual and political pluralism 
and freedom of association and the embrace of religious tolerance.132
Around the world, democracy has increasingly emerged in a number of countries as a need 
and realistic political and legal demand. As concern for human rights has influenced the issue 
of the need for a process to establish systems of governance, the democratic impulse become 
intensified in parallel.133 In turn, this impulse has contributed to the interest in human rights 
and the rights to free expression of political opinions and religious beliefs; to work; to have 
health insurance; to be free from physical torture, persecution and murder by the agents of the 
state; and to seek the punishment of such perpetrators. It can be argued that the democratic 
system is the best means to ensure human rights, to achieve the principles of justice and 
equality134 and to provide a comfortable environment for human life.
As a concept of governance, democracy has developed amid sharp class struggle and political 
turmoil and can be seen as the essential demand for which the peoples struggle.135
Democracy is based on the will of the conscious, active citizen who finds fulfilment in 
political participation, the achievement of economic and social rights and duties, and 
participation in the construction of the state.136 Democracy embraces two key principles: the 
importance of popular will in the process of decision-making137 and equal rights for all 
citizens in the exercise of that power.138 Together, these principles constitute the foundation 
of democratic governance, as far as can be achieved. Therefore, the main principles of 
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democracy do not only shape the private world of the state or government but are closely 
related to the collective rights of citizens.
The concept of democracy has been reinforced in all of contemporary literature, especially 
that dealing with legal and political issues, and has become an important part of 
contemporary intellectual discourse.139 Although the UN Charter does not contain the word 
‘democracy’, the UN has directly supported of democracy. For example, General Assembly 
Declaration No. A/RES/62/7 made 15 September the International Day of Democracy.140 As 
well, the very foundation of the UN and the decisions of hits committees have supported 
democracy. Evidence of this claim comes from the reports of the Secretary-General No. 
A/60/556141 and A/58/392, which give the UN system’s support to governments’ efforts to 
promote and consolidate new or restored democracies.142 The UN Human Rights 
Commission has demonstrated real attention to democracy, specifically in resolution No. 
2000/47 which recommends a set of legislative measures and important institutional 
processes to support the spread of democracy.143 In resolution 2002/46, the Commission 
identified the essential elements of democracy, in particular its governance frameworks and 
principles.144
In addition, many international conventions make democracy a goal or right of citizens. For 
example, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights laid the core 
foundational principles of democracy in the framework of international law. Article 19 
guarantees the freedom of expression, Article 21 the right to peaceful assembly and, most 
influentially, Article 25 the right to participate in the management of the public affairs of the 
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country.145Also, Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1966 provides for the freedom to form and join trade unions with no restrictions.146
Democracy has become important intellectually for the authors of constitutions; most of the 
constitutions that have been re-formulated or re-written have aimed to form the basis for a 
democracy, including the 1996 Constitution of South Africa147 and 2006 Constitution of 
Iraq.148 Richard Burchill stated that, during the establishment of a global system after the end 
of the Cold War, democracy has become the dominant ideology of international law and 
human thought, especially concerning the form of government.149
Other conventions and regional organisations have more explicitly embraced of the 
democratic approach. Article 9 of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
clearly calls for the expulsion of a member which topples a democratic government by 
force.150 This text represents the democratic system as the highest degree of good governance 
and sets it as a standard, required membership in the organisation. Article 30 of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) similarly forbids governments that come to 
power through unconstitutional means from participating in the organisation’s activities.151
This text focuses on the concept of democratic representation and its promotion in cases 
where the government is not democratic, which has become increasingly unpopular in the 
customs of modern international governance. The global change in national governance 
systems demonstrates the increase of countries that have embraced the key qualities of 
democracy. There were fewer than 60 such countries in 1985 but more than 140 countries in 
2007.152
Democracy, as expressed in international charters and conventions and in regional 
developments, is a wide and vast subject. Many covenants on human development, 
humanitarian protection and the achievement of world peace and security, such as the 1991 
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Harare Declaration153 and 1990 Copenhagen Declaration, have supported for the concept of 
democracy and worked to make it a legal right to humanity.154 As well as, some charters of 
regional and international organisations are concerned in the democracy, such as the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.155 According to the concept expressed in 
these conventions, democracy develops from a conscious, civilised process associated with 
human development. It is often sparked by overall mounting dissatisfaction among the 
majority, who are usually society’s poorest members. Related to this is the idea that 
democracy is a process to enact radical structural change based on the principles of freedom 
involved in humanitarian issues and the rights of each citizen.
1.5.2 The Claims for Political Self-determination and Repressive Regimes
Popular demand is the typical standard for evaluating the emergence of the right to self-
determination, there cannot be a tangible and moral force for this right, without the presence 
of popular demand.156 The claim of political self-determination is based on freedom from 
dictatorship and the assurance that all people will be able to participate in decision-making 
and uphold the rule of law, and that a nation’s people are the source of the State’s authority. 
These measures ensure access to good governance.157 Current trends in international law 
clearly support popular demand for the right of political self-determination, as evidenced by 
many, varied international conventions and international practices. For example, Article 20 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights states that: “Every people have the right to 
self-determination and they shall freely determine their political status”.158 In addition, 
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone has the right 
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to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives".159
Claims to political self-determination differ in essence from popular demands for 
independence from colonial rule and secession from the parent state. The latter aim to change 
the external structure but not necessarily the internal workings of how the state governs its 
people. In contrast, popular demand for the right of political self-determination specifically 
targets the internal form of governance used by the state, and external influence is limited to 
accepting procedural changes in internal form of the state by the international community.
Popular demands for self-determination differ not only in the need for external or internal 
change to the state but also in the factors behind the emergence of these demands in the first 
place.160 For example, popular demand for independence might be motivated by the aim to 
eliminate colonial rule and establish the state’s right to govern itself independently as a 
sovereign territory.161 In contrast, demands for political self-determination can be driven by 
the desire to end dictatorship, uphold the rule of law or achieve good governance through 
public participation in decision-making. In addition, the ruling entity of a state and its 
members belong to the same wider community of citizens and should work to establish 
ethnic, cultural and social unity. Whereas , in the case of secession, the demands made by 
individual communities within a state contradict the views of other communities within that 
state, whether those demands reflect an individual community’s sense of nationalism, ethnic 
origins, language or religious beliefs.162
Thus, the popular demand for the right of political self-determination differs in both 
substance and content from other claims for traditional forms of self-determination. These 
differences extend to the causes of and motivations for these claims: Consistently, rule by an 
authoritarian, dictatorial regime is the reason such claims are advanced.163 A dictatorial 
regime is based on the concept of a police state and, accordingly, does not accept the idea of 
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giving people opportunities to participate in the management of the state or to enjoy partisan 
and intellectual. There is no doubt that this type of government inconsistent with 
contemporary human thought and with the rules of international law. Therefore, popular 
demands for political self-determination seek to end dictatorial regimes and enable the people 
of a nation to determine the type and style of government that is used to run that nation.164
If popular demand for the right to political self-determination arises under a dictatorial 
regime, how does such a regime address those claims? Almost without fail, the regime will 
apply repression in an attempt to abort and extinguish those claims. This pattern can been 
seen, for example, in the events in Libya in 2011 and in the Syrian people’s efforts to 
exercise their right to political self-determination.165  As mentioned, popular demand for this 
right is based on many rules of international law.166 In addition, the repressive measures 
dictatorial governments adopt in response generally are contrary to international law, in 
particular, to the international law of human rights, as they lead to the commission of 
international crimes. For example, the Syrian regime’s military forces used chemical 
weapons in an attempt to silence citizens’ popular demands for an end to the regime.167
Under modern legal concepts, including the principle of responsibility to protect,168 which 
adopted in UN Security Council Resolution No. 1647,169 the international community can 
take measures to protect claims to political self-determination and to prevent rights violations 
and crimes against all those who demand this right. For example, in the 2011 Libyan 
revolution, Muammar Gaddafi’s regime violated international human rights law in order to 
deny the people’s claims and to silence demonstrations calling for an end to his 
dictatorship.170 These violations pushed the international community to engage in economic 
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and military interventions to protect the Libyan people and help them achieve the right of 
political self-determination.171
However, legal arguments against such measures can be made based on the principle of non-
interference. We can see such opposition in Russia’s and China’s veto of UN Security 
Council resolutions intended to protect the Syrian people from serious rights violations and to 
promote their right to political self-determination.172 These legal arguments based on the 
principle of non-interference are derived, in particular, from Article 2/7 of the UN Charter, 
which is the primary expression of this principle in international law.173
The above analysis led to the conclusion that the popular demand for the right to political 
self-determination is based on international law. However, such claims are established 
permanently by the people who live under a repressive regime or dictatorship. The objectives 
of these claims are to end authoritarian regimes and to ensure the participation of all peoples 
in national decision-making and selection of the economic and political systems that best 
conform to their aspirations. However, authoritarian regimes do not accept this point of view 
or value the desires of the people. Contemporary legal thought does not adequately consider 
or address the reality that making such claims exposes people to serious violations of their 
rights in international law. Consequently, the international community acts by itself to protect 
these claims and support the people’s right to self-determination, which has contributed to the 
creation of a substantive relationship between the claim to political self-determination and the 
international promotion and support of that claim.
It is true that there is a link between repression and popular demands for secession or 
independence from colonial rule as the colonial or parent state might refuse to address those 
claims or respond with violence, as happened in Kosovo.174 However, in Kosovo, the demand 
for independence or separation was not due to the existence of a dictatorial regime but, rather, 
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to the ethnic and nationalist divisions of that particular region.175 These motivations reflect 
the different types of claims that fall within the scope of self-determination, as explained 
earlier. In another case, the parent state might pursue a democratic approach and provide the 
people with the opportunity to vote. However, the people might remain deeply committed to 
their claim to the right of political self-determination because the government was originally 
a dictatorship and did not allow democracy.
The correlation between the popular demand for the right of political self-determination and 
international intervention conflicts with the principle of non-interference, posing a
fundamental question: Does the principle of non-interference have an effective impact upon 
the promotion of the right to political self-determination? Moreover, what are the results of 
the confrontation between the principle of non-interference and the right to political self-
determination?
1.6 Conclusion
The right of political self-determination is among the most important that has been developed 
in modern international law and legal discourse by both scholars of international law, such as 
Michla Pomerance and David Rick, and international instruments, such as Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Eighth Principle of the Helsinki 
Agreement.  Democracy has become an effective means to ensure the exercise of the right to 
political self-determination. It can be said that, if the right of political self-determination is an 
important means to achieve popular political participation, then democracy is the ideal legal 
method to achieve that goal. 
The right of self-determination did not cease to be relevant at a certain historical point, such 
as the end of colonisation; instead, it has evolved with contemporary human thought, serving 
as a legal justification that people can use in their efforts to end authoritarian governments. 
Such governments are those that do not seek to achieve social justice but rather use dictatorial 
behaviour to run the country and commit crimes against humanity to ensure the continuation 
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of their rule. Thus, the emergence of popular demands within those regimes subjects the 
people who are claiming this right to real risks, because those regimes will not accept this 
claim and they will use any and all means to suppress and extinguish the efforts of the people 
to claim their right to self-determination. This matter asserts that this right is permanently 
linked with international promotion and intervention, but that approach collides with the 
principle of non-interference. 
Hence, a conflict exists between the right of political self-determination and the principle of 
non-intervention, and that conflict requires a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of 
international law that support both self-determination and non-intervention. It is also 
important to examine the international practices related to this issue, in particular the 
international interventions that promote the right of political self-determination.
However, before that analysis can be undertaken it is necessary to ensure that the right to 
political self-determination does not violate the legal concept of statehood or the criteria of 
statehood in international law. Realising the right to political self-determination certainly 
leads to a change in the form of statehood. This change must be consistent with international 
law, particularly the international instruments and conventions that govern the emergence of 
the state and international recognition of the state after internal or external changes have 
occurred in regard to the government. The second chapter of this dissertation examines the 
impact that the right of self-determination has on the concept of the state in international law. 
It attempts to answer the following questions: Are changes to the form of statehood 
inconsistent with international law? If so, do they stand in the way of the current trend in 
contemporary international law and the international community to embrace and participate 
in the expansion of the right of self-determination?
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Chapter Two
The right of political self-determination, statehood and recognition in 
international contemporary law
2.1 Introduction
Contemporary legal literature holds that a close link exists between the general right to self-
determination and the legal principles and concepts that address state-building or 
rebuilding.176 Consequently, this right and these legal concepts reinforce one another; the 
right of self-determination cannot be achieved without fundamental changes to the state, 
whether to its external or internal form.177 However, a conflict arises with the principles of 
international law that deal with each issue separately.178 For example, the principles of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity have been associated with the concept of statehood,179
while the right of self-determination has been linked to contemporary intellectual thought’s 
concern with promoting human rights, human dignity and social justice.180 International 
organisations consistently pursue these aims in various ways. 181
The right of political self-determination becomes more prominent in the rebuilding of the 
state when people seek to achieve self-determination within an already established state.182
Rebuilding state institutions and changing the governance system can lead to a significant 
transformation in the internal form of the state. Therefore, there is a strong link between the 
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right of political self-determination and the legal principles that address the internal form of 
the state, such as absolute sovereignty. This does not mean that the external form of the state 
is irrelevant to this matter but, rather, that internal changes in the state affect its external 
form. From this relationship emerge the legal criteria that settled the jurisprudence on
international state-building and rebuilding and established that the state is accepted as a 
normal party among the parties involved in international law.183
Contemporary and traditional legal literature has been concerned with the sovereignty of the 
state for a variety of reasons, most importantly the maintenance of international peace and 
security.184 As well, international law aims to achieve and make substantial the aspirations 
and wishes of the people. Although the contemporary erosion of state sovereignty caused by 
globalisation and trade agreements should not be overlooked, the most important causes of 
changes in the concept of sovereignty are the development of human rights and the 
international responsibility to preserve these rights within a legal model.185
Thus, the formal criteria for the right of self-determination are inconsistent with concepts 
inherent in international law regarding statehood and state sovereignty. These criteria also 
demonstrate a lack of connection to the entity from they originated geographically and 
politically.186 Thus, a fundamental question arises: Do the legal concept of statehood and the 
maintenance of state sovereignty oppose the present trend in the international community and 
contemporary international law to embrace expand and embrace the right of self-
determination?
This chapter attempts to answer this fundamental question by studying the legal concepts and 
principles involved in the emergence in international law of statehood and state rebuilding 
and the impact on the rights of self-determination, especially the right to political self-
determination. This chapter begins by reviewing the concept of statehood in international 
law. Next, this chapter discusses state-building and the criteria for the emergence of the state 
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established in law, in particular the Montevideo Convention. Then, the focus shifts to the 
recognition of statehood and the most prominent classical and modern legal theories of 
international recognition. Finally, this chapter concentrates on popular demands for the right 
to self-determination and their impact on the political and legal concepts concerning 
rebuilding the state internally.
2.2 Statehood in international law
The legal concept of the state refers to the arrangement of an integrated and homogeneous 
organisation that consists of social, economic, political, legal and military institutions. All 
these units work to accomplish their goals within a common intellectual ideology and 
philosophy adopted to create a harmonious and stable state.187 Thus, the state is a system or 
structure that promotes social coexistence within a single legal framework and the limits of a 
specific intellectual tradition. The state marks an intellectual and theoretical construction of a 
shared lifestyle that achieves an advanced stage of quality of life.188
Thus, the state is a social and political phenomenon possessing complex elements that are 
interdependent and integrated with each other.189 These elements include the aims to establish 
the supremacy of state power, to determine the composition of the system and to distribute 
powers among the various elements of the state.190 In addition, the state involves a 
government system which may practice all the methods and means of exercising state power; 
this system is part and parcel of the political regime.191 A government system is a broad 
concept, encompassing the procedures and methods not only of executing the authority of the 
state but also of exercising political power by sharing it with political parties and civil society 
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organisations in the political system. In any state, political power is perceived as authentic
only if it is not derived from other authority; instead, other entities draw their authority from 
the political power. The state’s political power is defined as general competence in all aspects 
of life within the state, in contrast to other authorities which are concerned with the 
organisation of a single, particular aspect of the people’s lives. In addition, political power 
marks a distinction between the state and the nation. Political power is required to establish 
the state; however, political power is not necessary for the existence of the nation.192
The legal construction of the state shows that, in the existence of the separate, legal person of 
the sovereign, political power emerges as the highest internal authority and claims the 
capacity to represent the people of the nation abroad.193 As well, political power confers the 
right to issue political decisions both within and outside the state which reflect the philosophy 
espoused by the state. Thus, the state is an independent entity which possesses the 
characteristic of stability and promotes a sense of solidarity among certain members of the 
human race.194 The forms and models of the state have varied according to different 
intellectual philosophies and popular ideologies which, in turn, have been influenced and 
governed by the strength of the ruling elite. We find different legal forms for running 
countries such as socialist and capitalist states.195 As well, there are democratic countries that 
support the effective rule of law and social justice and police states that rely on the 
suppression of intellectual and religious freedoms and beliefs and permit only one ruling 
party.196
The intellectual philosophy of state administration emerges during certain stages of building 
or rebuilding the state. The standards of state-building have varied, and views on it are 
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multiple. I next examine these perspectives in order to understand the legal nature of state-
building and rebuilding driven by demands for the right to self-determination.
2.3 The legal criteria for stathood
The construction or reconstruction of the state unarguably requires achieving certain legal 
standards for the legitimacy of the state to be recognised by international law. At the time a 
new state emerges, it normally does not comply with all forms of international law.197
Therefore, the new state needs to build its legitimacy on the international level in substance 
and appearance. In international law, the construction of a legitimate state based on an
internal form of self-determination which grants citizens the right to participate in political 
decision-making does not fundamentally differ from legitimacy based on an external form of 
the right of self-determination.198 The first chapter of this thesis demonstrated the importance 
of the right to political self-determination and the adoption of a discourse in international law 
that values democracy, good governance and social justice. These changes have become 
significant factors in the development of current international law which directly influences
human rights in general and the details of relevant laws.
The legal criteria for the emergence of the state have differed and expanded according to the 
intellectual and ideological variables operating in international law.199 However, studying the 
traditional and historical emergence of countries shows that the population or community 
which forms a state commonly serves as a major reason for the existence of that state. 
Historically, nationalism has played an active role in the development of populations into 
states and, through common ethnic, linguistic and religious links, promoted the emergence of 
the state. As well, respect for the customary laws prevalent in that period must exist.200
Nationalism held prominence in state-building in both traditional law and ancient history. 
Examining many countries around the world reveals the pivotal role of nationalism in state-
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building.201 For example, nationalism made names, language and the national anthem 
important symbols of the nation of Japan.202 The right of self-determination traditionally has 
arisen in this context as populations develop nationalistic aspirations but do not have an 
internationally recognised right to establish a state.203 For example, the Kurds, who number 
nearly 35 million people, lack a national home or state and are distributed among various 
countries, including Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.204 However, when considering claims to 
self-determination, we must be mindful of the difference between nationalism that demands
independence from an external colonial power and nationalism among populations distributed
within a country or among several countries that demands the creation of an international 
entity to be their home.205
In nationalistic states, we find that homogeneity exists between individual groups and 
political power, whatever the kind and form of the government. The model of a state 
incorporating the people and the official legislative and executive authorities undoubtedly 
was an acceptable standard when nationalism was both an intellectual obsession and a 
harbinger of destiny.206 Take, for example, the models set by nationalistic European states 
formed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,207 in which the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia played a major role.208 These countries institutionalised the demarcation of 
borders through legal regulation based primarily on local legal customs. The nationalistic 
state did not emerge directly after the Treaty of Westphalia; rather, the demarcation of 
borders and attention to building international relations became more pronounced after the 
treaty was signed.209 In addition, the nationalistic state’s active role in the construction of 
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international law, organisations and relations deserves attention because the nationalistic state 
was the main actor in the international system.210
However, the evolution of international law did not halt with the emergence of the standard 
of the nationalistic state. Legal jurisprudence has adopted many modern standards that are 
consistent with contemporary legal thought and evolved gradually following changes in the 
rules of international law. Such developments started during the colonial period and have 
continued in modern thought, which prioritises the right to self-determination and all human 
rights in general in international law. 211
The 1933 Montevideo Convention became a fundamental building block in the development 
of state building in contemporary international law. Especially in the post-colonial era, the 
convention also played a prominent role in the jurisprudence controversy about the criteria of 
state-building. Montevideo Convention lays out four basic criteria for the construction of a 
state:
1. A permanent population
2. A defined territory
3. A government
4. The capacity to enter into relations with other states212
The presence of a population obviously is necessary for the establishment of the state, and 
also served as a standard in traditional international law.213 Notably, in traditional law, 
nationalism played a prominent role and formed an essential legal standard for state-
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building.214 However, the Montevideo Convention does not address nationalism but leaves 
the issue open and does not restrict the formation of multi-ethnic and multicultural states. 
This approach reflects the recent trend in state-building to encourage mutual respect among 
all races residing in a region. The state is a natural continuance of the hidden framework in 
which the survival of a particular community and its possession of a certain territory lead to 
the creation of standards for citizenship.215
The population of a given region has taken on a stronger role and become the most dominant 
element in state-building.216 If a population has diverse cultures, races and religions, the 
borders of the region become the foundation for combining that population within a single 
state; without defined borders in that region, the state could not be created.217 This condition 
played a prominent role in the emergence of territorial integrity as one of the most important 
principles in the field of international law.218 A direct correlation between this condition and 
principle appears when one considers that, without provincial borders that meet the prevailing 
legal standards, a population cannot engage fully in state-building and gain international 
recognition. Clear borders and entry requirements are necessary for a state to have good 
relations with its neighbours.
The third criterion of statehood is the existence of a government. Some scholars of 
international law have argued that this standard is the most important criteria established by 
the Montevideo Convention because it creates the authority upon which state-building relies. 
A state without government agencies such as official legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities cannot perform its role in serving the resident population.219 Therefore, the state 
organisation has to have a relationship with its population. As well, the state cannot acquire 
international rights without government authorities to protect and exercise those rights. Most
importantly, government authorities have obligations to the international community to 
respect international laws which govern relations among states.220
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In addition, the Montevideo Convention made the ability to enter into international relations 
as essential to the definition of a state as the possession of a specific population, defined 
borders and an effective government.221 The international jurisprudence which establishes 
this legal standard highlights international recognition as an essential condition for the 
maturation of the state. The state is considered part of the international community and, 
thereby, gains international legal standing.222
Clearly, all the criterion of the Montevideo Convention complement one another, and if one 
falls, the other will also. Thus arise many fundamental questions: Do the Montevideo 
Convention criteria serve as absolute standards in international law for the construction of the 
state? Is the state constructed through acceptance by the international community and the 
ability to acquire rights and obligations under international law?
Analysing the Montevideo Convention reveals that security and the rule of law are 
fundamental factors in state-building.223 The convention attempts to achieve precisely these 
conditions, although the core criteria are also consistent with the intellectual ideology of 
global security. A state’s ability to enter into relations with other countries clearly 
demonstrates that it seeks to respect the international laws regulating such relationships. 
However, without a government, the state cannot exercise its powers, resist the external 
imposition of security and establish the internal rule of law.224
Many other international practices and laws have emerged since the Montevideo Convention. 
Certainly, the First and Second World Wars, colonial era and Cold War have exercised 
different influences on those practices and laws. These developments do not necessarily mean 
that the Montevideo Convention has been ignored in international legal discourse on state-
building. It does, however, mean that additional criteria have emerged in international 
practices and contemporary legal thought and that new international organisations, both 
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regional and humanitarian, have been formed.225 Thus, one can say that the Montevideo 
Convention criteria are not based on the principle of realism and that these standards do not 
reflect the reality of international changes. Reviewing the many practices in the relations 
between states reveals an apparent absence of the Montevideo Convention standards and, 
consequently, their inability to respond to changing reality.226
Although Barrie Strain asserted that the criterion of an effective government plays a 
dominant role in the Montevideo Convention, many countries without a government exist.227
For example, Somalia possesses the characteristics of statehood, but its government does not 
exercise effective control within the borders of the state. In modern international practice,228
it is not necessary that the state have the power to impose hegemony through various official 
instruments, but the executive government must work to exercise effective supervision within 
the territory of the state and operate independently from the legislative and judicial 
authorities.229
In addition, the Cold War and the end of colonisation severely weakened the criterion for a 
state to be able to enter into relations with other countries. The division of the world into two 
camps put the new state in the difficult position of deciding which to join. Consequently, the 
new state could not engage in international relations and was not recognised by the other 
camp as a party in the international community.230
In the same context, Thomas Grant argued that the Montevideo Convention represents 
thinking particular to a certain era and does not explicitly lay out the preconditions for 
statehood.231 The ideas in the convention are not necessarily applicable to all times, and those 
historically dominant in the age of the Convention have changed and become outdated, 
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according to Grant.232 Thus, legal analysis leads to an important question: Are the legal 
criteria of the Montevideo Convention accepted in international law on state-building? The 
standards in the convention have increasingly come under the microscope, amid global 
attention to human rights and the modern view that the people are the source of authority and 
should decide their own destiny free of the influence of the state.
Therefore, there is a tension between the standards of the Montevideo Convention which 
have been adopted in international law and modern trends in international law. For example, 
the convention did not address the role of unity between a population and the government. 
The presence of a government and a population is not necessarily evidence of state-building. 
Rather, a lack of consistent standards means that the state cannot achieve the rule of law and 
the high degree of security necessary to ensure internal stability, which contributes to global 
stability.233 Consequently, it can be said that effectiveness and homogeneity with a population 
are required for the state to enter international relations. Certainly, a lack of legitimacy, one 
of the most important concepts in international law, means that the state cannot participate in 
the international organisations working to create unity within the international community.
In addition, the Montevideo Convention did very little to address the use of military force. It 
does clearly prohibit the use of force in nation-building. However, such a prohibition is 
consistent with the fundamental ideology of the contemporary global system which seeks to 
achieve security and world peace.234 The Montevideo Convention has been placed on a moral 
pedestal in international law which works intellectually and ideologically to ensure 
international stability and security.235 Although Article 11 stipulates that states must not 
recognise any territorial acquisition made through force236 such as a foreign occupation or 
mass arrests, 237 the convention does not stipulate compliance with this prohibition as a 
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criterion that the state must meet. The question then is: Do states adhere to this standard, and 
has international law recognised states that used military force to gain statehood? 
This matter, though, stops at the issue of recognition and does not influence the standards of 
state-building. This claim does not seek to minimise the role of recognition but to prove, 
contrary to international practice, the importance of recognition and, moreover, to propose 
recognition as a necessary criteria for the state to meet. International recognition means that 
the state has complied with the standards settled in international customary law.238 If the state 
has a population, a government and defined borders but cannot engage in international 
relations as a result of a lack of recognition, the state cannot meet the standards settled in 
customary law. This state might be able to enter into relations with other countries, but if 
these countries are very few and adopted these relations because of common interests, their
recognition does not necessarily mean that the process of state-building has been completed 
or that the state has met all the necessary criteria.239 Whether a state can be considered for 
admission to international organisations is a modern measurement of the fulfilment of defined 
legal standards for the state to be an actual entity and an active member of the international 
community.240
The use of armed force in the creation of the state leads to a highly important criterion: State-
building must occur in accordance with international law, especially because state-building
can occur contrary to the rules of international law. Take, for example, the construction of a 
state that is dependent upon the military occupation of part of the territory of another state 
which has been established and recognised in international relations.241 Even the fulfilment of 
the criterion for a population does not mean acceptance of that military occupation. The state 
certainly holds a prominent place in international law, and therefore, state-building, state 
rebuilding and any changes to the internal or external form of the state must be consistent 
with international law because incompatibility leads to illegality.242
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Most importantly, international public law is an acceptable model for organising international 
relations. It is also the foundation upon which the principles and concepts of international 
rights and obligations are based.243 However, the importance of the criteria of the Montevideo 
Convention in international law with respect to statehood has decreased. Greater importance 
has been assigned to the criterion of non-violation of international law in the construction of 
the state, that is, the state’s acceptance of international law.244 This standard means that the 
state respects international law and maintains its international relations within the framework 
of international law. Compliance with this standard ensures greater harmony between the 
intellectual ideology of political power and the traditional and modern goals of public 
international law. More importantly, adherence to this standard maintains security, 
international peace, respect for human rights and the prohibition on the use of force except in 
cases defined by international law.245
The Montevideo Convention clearly did not focus on international law as a standard model 
for a state to be considered to have fulfilled the required legal standards to gain legitimacy. 
The convention set standards that were more formal than realistic or practical.246 A state, 
however, gains effectiveness through several factors, including unity among individuals and 
between individuals and the government. In addition, the international community must 
accept this nascent entity as a state. There is no doubt that effectiveness is required for a state 
to gain legitimacy because international public law works to organise international relations 
between states, to maintain security and world peace and to monitor whether states and 
individuals fulfil their rights and obligations under this law.247 A state that violates the rules 
of international law, especially as it first emerges, makes itself illegal, even if its actions were 
consistent with the more formal standards.248
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Thus, we can say that the Montevideo Convention is incomplete and neither realistic nor 
practical. The concept and the construction of the state depend more upon realism and 
international relations than formal standards. It is extremely important that these criteria be 
flexible and in harmony with international changes.249 Moreover, criteria should ensure that 
the new state respects international law and that its creation does not violate the essence of 
public international law, which is the achievement of international peace and security.250
International customary law is clearly broader and more comprehensive than the Montevideo 
Convention because it derives from the practical reality of international practices. In addition, 
international customary is more in line with and even aided in the development of the 
principles and goals of international law. In my view, it has been proven with certainty that 
the legal criteria for state-building laid out in the Montevideo Convention are fraught with 
difficulties and must be transformed based on changes in legal principles and theory so that 
they are consistent with shifts in contemporary intellectual legal thought. 
2.4 The right to political self-determination and the criteria for statehood 
Traditionally, states have been seen as the core of international law and they are only party 
governed by international law. However, this view is changing gradually as international law 
permits individuals and groups to claim legal characteristics.251 Such parties have taken an 
active role in issues pertaining to international law, indeed becoming some of the most 
important actors in this arena.252 It is likely that this change will lead to a violent collision 
between the right to claim self-determination and the traditional ideas advocated in 
international law, which assign priority to states without considering the characteristics of the 
state and whether a sense of relative unity exists between the state and the people it governs. 
These traditional ideas are evident in the Montevideo Convention. For example, the 
Montevideo Convention does not acknowledge the government’s authority as being derived 
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from the people; rather, it views the government’s authority as being imposed upon the 
people.253
Legal studies on the right of self-determination and the state have concentrated on the 
external form of the state and secession from the state. This focus was a consequence of 
international practises that dominated the world. Especially during the ages of colonialism 
and post-colonialism, many ethnic groups existed within regions not recognised 
internationally or among split into different countries by international powers. This situation 
was the result of colonialism and some international agreements concluded by the major 
powers, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement.254
However, a new development on the international level bases such practices on the right of 
self-determination and is powered by popular demand to determine the political form and 
type of one’s governing regime.255 Thus, one can say that gradual, significant alterations have 
occurred in the general model of the state, starting in the age of the tribe and continuing 
through nationalism and its impact on the formation of organised society. The most recent 
changes gave rise to the modern state which is based on the spirit of equality and social 
justice, the involvement of the people in decision-making and respect for other religions and 
ethnicities.256
Thus, the system of the modern world no longer most highly values the external form of the 
state. The new world order takes as its foundation the individual and individual rights, which 
have applications for many aspects and subjects in international law. The discourse of human 
rights discourse recently has become an extremely important aspect in international law, 
which can no longer have effect in the world without taking into account this discourse.257
The state now demonstrates respect for international law primarily by ensuring that the legal 
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and political processes in all countries are based on granting human rights.258 Beate Rudolf 
contended that, at the present time, parties in the international community maintain 
international public law not only by imposing legal rules that demand full respect for human 
rights but, more so, by enforcing these rules and creating safeguards against the violation of 
human rights.259
Consequently, the criteria for state-building and rebuilding must reflect these changes. These 
standards must be consistent with the requirements of international law and compatible with 
the aspirations of the peoples of the world for international peace and security. Drawing 
guidance from the UN charter, scholars of public international law have created preliminary 
rules founded on three basic principles: peaceful coexistence, the maintenance of 
international peace and the avoidance of the use or threat of armed force.260 The fulfilment of 
those principles, in particular the principle of international peace and security, imposes no 
fundamental restrictions on the right of political self-determination. Realising these principles 
in the right way aids in achieving peace because it ensures that there are no internal conflicts, 
dictatorships or repressive governments. In this sense, the right of political self-determination 
has a practical impact on state-building and rebuilding through its adoption in the legal 
literature, customary international law and international treaties and conventions, as 
explained in the first chapter.261
However, the right to self-determination should prompt a reversal in the framework of 
international legal theory and must also effect formal changes in order to acquire tangible and 
moral force in customary international law. The right of political self-determination can gain 
this authority and become a necessity for state-building and rebuilding by playing an active 
role in international practises that support the creation of effective customary rules. Then, a 
state will not be considered legitimate without achieving this critical standard.262 The essence 
of this standard is realised through creating consensus and harmony between the people and 
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the government, ensuring that the government is not mandatory or imposed on the people and 
that it is the result of the people’s choice.263
When examining the actual practises of state-building as encoded in legal standards, we find 
that, under the model of nationalism, the state first claimed legitimacy through the standard of 
possessing a population. Since then, fundamental changes have occurred, especially in areas 
where colonialism gave rise to new frameworks not reliant on the formal terms of 
nationalism. More complex systems and political sharing prompted the emergence of new 
criteria for state-building and rebuilding.264 These standards derived their legal basis from the 
Montevideo Convention and from stricter, more formal standards in customary international 
law, such as such as acceptance and compliance with international law and formalisation of 
statehood through recognition from the international community.265 Next, the world entered a 
fresh, complex stage with the end of colonialism and the emergence of the Cold War. This 
age saw the birth of a real right to political self-determination through its enshrinement in 
international law. By the end of the Cold War, this right had been widely embraced and 
become one of the important human rights in international law because of the actual practices 
of international organisations and other parties in international law.266
This recent importance does not mean that the rights to self-determination and to participate 
in political decision-making have been absent in any stage of legal history. However, it can 
be argued that these rights were born as laws written in the colonial period and the World 
War II era and later matured and were confirmed through international adoption and practice 
during the Cold War.267 For example, to join the European Union (EU), nation-states have
demonstrating recognition of the right to political self-determination by conducting free and 
fair elections.268 As well, European nation-states have experienced advanced stages of 
various popular revolutions demanding the right to political participation, such as the French 
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Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution, which led to internal changes in the form of the 
state.269
Moreover, it must be pointed out that the state initially is the result of popular struggles based 
on the individual. State-building occurs as groups of individuals come together in order to 
found a political entity that represents them, regulates their relationships and preserves their 
rights and obligations as they organise on the local and international levels. This popular 
struggle began with and resulted in the formation of the nation-state and continued into the 
colonial era when peoples fought for independence and to create independent political 
entities.270 After the colonial period, this struggle became manifested as the fight against 
repressive governments to gain political rights and the ability to participate in decision-
making. The struggle to end the colonial age has faded but gave rise to a new struggle to 
eliminate all forms of dictatorial governments and to achieve social justice and respect for 
human rights. This historical transformation played a pivotal role in the formation of the state 
in contemporary international law.271
When looking at many former colonial states, we find an important factor that has affected 
the form of the state in the postcolonial era: that of the warlord, who led many of the wars for 
independence from colonial powers. Unfortunately, at the end of such struggles, the political 
system often fell into the hands of warlords who continued to hold onto power and refused to 
grant the people political rights or to allow them to participate in decision-making.272 Thus, 
the outcomes of these struggles contributed to the weakening of the social justice model and 
supported repressive governments. From this point began a new struggle to get rid of 
dictatorial governments by appealing to the right of political self-determination. This right 
thus became incorporated into the system of rebuilding the state through legal rules based on 
the global discourse that promotes human rights and human dignity. Thus, one can say that, 
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after the end of the Cold War, the state-building criteria underwent fundamental changes 
linked to the right of political self-determination.273
2.4.1 Legal criteria for statehood after the Cold War
The Cold War unarguably played an active role in halting the development of public 
international law by causing many of the rules of law to be broken. In addition, international 
interests and the conflicts of intellectual politics reined in the galloping development of 
public international law.274 In the waning of the colonial era, the major powers encouraged
the development of political parties loyal to the government, and the major superpowers
engaged in a close race to attract the new states emerging on the international map. The 
Soviet Union attempted to support the ideas of communism by building states through 
communist parties and warlords. At the same time, the United States adopted a hostile stance 
towards the Soviet Union’s efforts and undertook similar steps to support regimes opposed to 
the ideas of Communism.275
However, the end of the Cold War saw the disintegration of the republics of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, creating the opportunity to put sophisticated international practises to effect 
in the rebuilding of states. At the same time, the international community devoted itself to the 
concept of democracy and consequently gave the right of political self-determination a more 
active role. This trend became evident as from the disintegration and dissolution of these 
countries came a consensual framework driven by peoples who desired to participate in the 
formation of new political entities.276 For example, the Belarusian people did not oppose the 
Belarusian Parliament’s decision to declare the Republic of Belarus independent from the 
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Soviet Union.277 In some countries, the people voted on resolutions for independence, as in 
Latvia where 73% of the Latvian people supported independence.278 Moreover, the mother 
state of Russia did not oppose the wishes of the people, and the international community, too, 
supported those wishes. The new states had to meet conventional state-building criteria, but 
that does not undermine the pivotal role played by unanimity between the people and their 
new governments.279 If the people did not accept these governments, it would lead to the 
disintegration of the state.280
The maturation of the right of political self-determination entered an important historic stage 
as international practises increasingly complied with global trends that emphasised fulfilling 
the wishes of the people through political self-determination.281 As well, international law 
tended to prohibit the building of a repressive state and accepting such a state as an active 
player in the international arena.282 This development was evident in the state rebuilding of 
communist countries in Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Romania which gained 
international support to end repressive rule and rebuild through popular participation in 
decision-making and choosing a governance model.283 Those practises have evolved and been
enshrined in international conventions and customary international law, such as the 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. 2000/47 (2000)284 and No. 2002/47.285 In 
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addition, the UN has supported many states in rebuilding themselves according to the concept 
of the right of political self-determination, from Haiti in 1994,286 for example, down to the 
revolutions of the Arab Spring.287
Notably, since 1989, the conceptualisation of human conflict has transitioned from an era of 
national disputes to one of ethnic strife and religious struggles. An emerging concept holds 
that individuals should be prepared to die for freedom and to uphold human dignity.288
Accordingly, individuals should not be subjected to repressive governments or dictatorships, 
whatever the diverse ethnic groups, religions and ideas within the boundaries of a state. 
Belligerents might still advance legal arguments, such as that a state has the right to defend 
its territory against another state, and certain groups defend themselves in response to a 
racially motivated attack.289 However, in a conflict, contemporary legal arguments recognise 
the right to political self-determination and do not accept contrary claims made by 
governments or repressive dictatorships. Therefore, the right of political self-determination 
and its merits enjoy a high position in contemporary international law and practise, which 
endows it with strong influence on state-building and rebuilding.
One must not lose sight of the historical period in which emerged the right to political self-
determination and its impact on state-building, whether through legal rules, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights290 and the Declaration of Helsinki,291 or 
through international practices, such as the international community’s rejection of the racist 
government in South Africa, or South Rhodesia.292 This period also saw the violent collision 
of the Cold War, which affected the development of this right and made it an effective 
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standard for building or rebuilding the state. Thus, the period following the end of the Cold 
War was more stable, and the right of political self-determination became more visible.293
This development was reflected by the emergence of a new standard in the international 
arena, that of unanimity between the people and the government. International law no longer 
accepts dictatorial governments which are not consistent with the aspirations of their 
people.294 Governments also must also popular desire to participate in the management of the 
country in order to collectively achieve social justice and to realise the human rights agreed 
upon in international law.295 Along these lines, Robert Delahunty claimed that, at the present 
time, we accept states’ territorial boundaries only because of history. However, if a state no 
longer maintains an effective unity between its people and its government, this means that the 
state is not acceptable from the perspective of the international community.296
Almost all human rights settled in international law presuppose the existence of domestic 
laws, rules and institutions to ensure these rights. As well, the government cannot neglect 
respect for the rule of law for all the people within the boundaries of the state, whether they 
belong to the masses or to the ruling authorities. The government must also establish an 
independent judicial system and take other measures to preserve human rights, uphold human 
dignity and achieve social justice.
Undoubtedly, many fundamental factors beyond the end of the Cold War contributed to the 
emergence and growing importance of this new standard. Among these are the evolution of 
human thought to be more respectful of human rights and to reject racial and religious 
extremism,297 the material factors influenced by globalisation and the role of the non-
governmental actors in international law. The latter factors might have acquired the most 
prominence in state-building and rebuilding by taking on an active role in the formation of 
modern international law, extending to the domestic laws of countries themselves. 
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2.4.2 The role of non-state actors in the construction of criteria for the modern 
state
Since the end of World War II, the international community has witnessed the establishment 
of numerous international legal organisations.298 Some organisations are based on regional 
frameworks and others on an objective framework that adopts a particular issue as the central 
work of the organisation. Regional organisations have had a significant influence on the 
development of the rules of international law.299 As the world witnesses the actions of many 
regional organisations such as the EU, AU and Arab League, it is possible to see that these 
organisations have been concerned with human rights and made these rights a pillar of their 
legal rules.300 Take, for example, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights or the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
In addition, non-regional international organisations have played an important role in the 
adoption of many rights in international law. It has been argued that these organisations have
also had a large role in establishing the rules of international law regarding human rights.301
Consider, for example, the aims of the International Labour Organisation, the International 
Organisation for Migration or the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. In addition, 
groups around the world, such as Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for 
Human Rights, monitor human rights on the international level,302 while others such as the 
Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights and the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human 
Rights monitor human rights within the state itself.303
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Despite the existence of all these organisations, the most prominent non-state actor within the 
state which draws the attention of the international community is the organised opposition.304
The international community often negotiates with the opposition, which implies recognition 
and acceptance of these actors within the state.305 More importantly, this recognition means 
that the international community accepts the legal arguments that the opposition has 
advanced.306 There is no doubt that, within the model of the right of political self-
determination, the claim to end repressive rule and the call for political participation in 
decision-making and democratic elections are the most important arguments put forth by the 
opposition.
There is no doubt that the active roles of the non-state actors are not achieved if they are not 
accepted by the international community. This acceptance means that the measures that are 
carried out by these actors are positively received by the international community, such as a 
request from a regional organization to impose economic sanctions on a certain state. This 
situation leads to the conclusion that these actors become a subject in international law307
because their actions contribute to the development of international law through the issuance 
of legal rules and resolutions within the framework of the organization. Therefore, there is no 
doubt that these rules and resolutions are consistent with contemporary legal thought.308
Moreover, these non-state actors cannot work to support the legal rights of the people without 
a foundation of a popular will demanding those rights. This means that, if the government 
were a dictatorship and violated the rules of international law on human rights but the people 
did not express a desire to change this government, non-governmental actors, both within the 
country and abroad, could not play a direct role in this case and change the country’s 
leadership. It is important to point out that non-state actors have rights and obligations 
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because individuals who are represented by these actors or serve as their agents are parties to 
and are subject to rule by international law.309
This approach is reinforced by Article 9 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which stipulates that ‘the conduct of a person or group of 
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of 
persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default 
of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those 
elements of authority’.310 Thus, this approach gives non-governmental actors within the state, 
such as opposition movements, legal responsibility for their actions which carries with it the 
obligation to operate within the framework of international law.
However, this does not diminish the role of non-state actors in the promotion of human rights 
or negate the link between these rights and state-building. The building of the state should 
take into consideration the practical reality of the role of non-state actors in international 
law.311 Clearly, whether those actors are regional or domestic, legal organisations or 
opposition movements, non-state actors have a strong influence international practices.312 For 
example, the Syrian opposition coalition has received international acceptance and 
participated in negotiations concerning the Syrian revolution, meeting popular demands to 
rebuild the country within a democratic framework.313 Similarly, on 2 February 2011, 
Amnesty International accused the UN Security Council of failing to apply the law to protect 
protesters in Libya who demanded an end to repressive rule.314
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It is not yet clear whether non-state actors are as important as other factors in the international 
arena which affect the re-imagining of standards for the rebuilding of the state. However, 
non-state actors have influenced international legal discourse because contemporary thought 
takes a significant interest in these entities, especially international organisations.315 This 
interest stems from the organisations’ work to observe and monitor legal rules and to 
undertake research on the legal rules affecting humans, their relations and the surrounding 
environment. Thus, the role of non-state actors cannot be overestimated. Unanimity between 
the government and the people is required for the state to meet the criteria for good 
governance, and non-state actors work to monitor and promote precisely these activities.316
Non-state actors not only exercise influence in the supervision of those rights, but they also 
play a prominent role in determining the legitimacy of the state and the extent of its 
interactions with the international community.317 This influence can be observed in the 
reasons for dropping a state as a member of a particular organisation. For example, Article 
No. 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU states that ‘governments which shall come to power 
through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the 
Union’.318 When discussing recognition, it must be emphasised that international recognition 
is tangible evidence of the legitimacy of the state which enables it to become a party to 
international law.319
Thus, through the legal standards for state-building and rebuilding emerges the role of 
recognition in the acceptance of the state. I advance the argument that international 
recognition of the state is a real model for the fulfilment of the criteria for construction of the 
state. The study of recognition in international law and its impact on standards of state-
building, in particular the standard of homogeneity and integration, must be expanded 
because recognition is an effective means of realising political self-determination.320
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2.5 International recognition and the right of political self-determination in the 
criteria for statehood
In the legal literature, recognition is only an expression of the will of the state that a certain 
legal status has been achieved.321 Institutes of international law have defined recognition as 
the ‘free act by which one or more States acknowledge the existence on a definite territory of 
a human society politically organised, independent of any other existing State, and capable of 
observing the obligations of international law’.322 Thus, it is clear that there is a correlation 
between the state standards and legal recognition that serves as concrete evidence to support 
the acceptance of a state by the international community.
The power of legal recognition has grown, and the development of international organisations 
has driven its increasing legal role in the process of state-building and rebuilding. It can be 
argued that the creation of the UN in 1945 gave the impetus to create the international 
organisations or non-state actors which subsequently took on an active role in the acceptance 
of the state by the international community.323 These non-state organisations and actors 
became parties to international law because it governs their relationship with other entities. 
Across the continents of the world, one finds many regional organisations such as the EU, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and AU.324 In addition to these numerous regional 
organisations, others such as the World Trade Organisation and Non-Aligned Movement 
specialise in addressing subjects of particular concern in international public affairs.325
This argument does not seek to underestimate the role of recognition before the emergence of 
such organisations but, rather, to emphasise that their emergence made recognition 
instrumental as acceptable concrete evidence to meet the legal criteria for state-building and 
rebuilding.326 Before the existence of international organisations, such relations were based 
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on the importance of various international interests.327 The development of such organisations 
thus made the legal system of international relations more harmonious with contemporary 
legal thought because these organisations are built on the pattern of contemporary legal 
thought, and most of all, they must act collectively, not unilaterally.328 Unilateral recognition 
might be based on partisan, ideological or ethnic interests or such similarities with other 
countries. Collective recognition, however, guarantees that the state has fulfilled international 
law and committed itself to carrying out the provisions of this law.
It can be said that, in contemporary international law, international organisations have 
become a crucial component for granting the state the right to exercise legal capacities. 
Applicants to join any particular international organisation must comply with the legal and 
political values of the other countries in that organisation.329 For example, Article 4 of the 
UN Charter states that ‘membership in the United Nations (UN) is open to all other peace-
loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter’.330 Therefore, it is 
difficult to accept a state that fails to honour the obligations outlined in the present Charter 
joining the UN. Turmoil within the state does not excuse the state from fulfilling these 
obligations because the disorder might well be the result of a popular uprising against 
dictatorial rule. Here, note that the acceptance of the applicant depends on the construction of 
the new state. However, what standards apply during the rebuilding of a country? 
Specifically, what role does the right to political self-determination play?
The answer to this question comes from Article 1 of the UN Charter which lays out the 
purposes of the organisation. The second paragraph of Article 1 asserts the need to respect the 
principle that all peoples have equal rights and that each has the right to self-determination.331
Article IV explicitly states that UN membership also requires compliance with the rules 
contained in the charter.332 As member states have committed to abide by the rules in the 
charter, the country that does not meet the desires of its people violates the guarantee of the 
right to self-determination in Article 1. This right does not depend exclusively on the UN 
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Charter; many organisations do not accept the rebuilding of countries without attention to the 
right of political self-determination.333 For example, Article 9 of the OAS Charter stipulates 
that a state that ousts its democratic government will be suspended from membership in the 
organisation.334
Moreover, the country that does not fulfil the desires of its people can become subjected to 
internal disorder which threatens the peace of the state and, if left unresolved, can become a 
threat to world peace. Such a situation goes contrary to one of the main goals of international 
law, which is to achieve international peace and security.335 Therefore, for its part, the state 
must make a commitment to respect international law and be reconstructed according to the 
wishes of its people.336 As stated, international law has become more interested in issues that 
deal with individuals, their rights and the attendant legal obligations of the state.
At the same time, recognition has acquired power as a source of legal rights and obligation. 
Customary international law has demanded that, to gain recognition, states must fulfil such 
rights and obligations by respecting and not resisting the imposition of rules and internal legal 
safeguards to ensure those rights.337 Here, there is a clear, positive relationship between 
international recognition of the state and the state’s recognition of its legal rights and
obligations. Recognition of the state entails that the state acknowledges the legal obligations 
which it must carry out and the legal rights which it must not violate.338
When discussing recognition in international law, it should be pointed out that the 
Montevideo Convention made the state’s ability to enter into international relations with 
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other countries a standard of statehood.339 Although this standard acknowledges the theory of 
self-determination,340 the convention did not expand on this right or create clear explanations 
of it but, rather, left it to the jurisprudence and opinions of various legal authorities to explain 
and discuss this standard. Therefore, in the jurisprudence of international law, we find a 
tremendous variety of views and opinions on the recognition of the state. However, efforts 
have been made to establish concord among those views through their practical application. 
Such efforts have been most visible in the international practices and legal norms adopted by 
modern international organisations established after the Montevideo Convention. 
Recognition is not limited to the standard of the state’s ability to engage in international 
relations but is also based on other criteria. First, recognition is tangible evidence that the 
state has succeeded in fulfilling the established criteria and has dedicated itself to respecting 
public international law.341 For example, acceptance of the state under the UN Charter means 
that that state has respected international law. This dissertation next addresses the link 
between recognition and the standard of homogeneity and integration because it is associated 
with the right of political self-determination, which is the focus of this study.
Traditionally, several legal theories have dealt with the legal dimension of recognition and its 
role in the emergence of the state on the international level and in the acceptance of state as 
an integral part of the international community. The most important of these theories are 
constitutive theory and declaratory theory. These theories have gained remarkable attention 
from scholars of international law, who have devoted much legal literature to analysing, 
discussing and debating them.342 Therefore, it is important to consider these theories and 
analyse the extent of the attention that they pay to the right of political self-determination and 
their role in the adoption of the standard of homogeneity and integration between the 
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government and the people. This research thereby aims to understand whether the standard of 
homogeneity and integration is documented in customary international law.
2.5.1 Constitutive theory
This theory traces its roots to the mid-eighteenth century when it was developed by German 
philosopher G.W.F. Hegel amid the emergence of European nationalism.343 This theory 
suggests that recognition is necessary and cannot be waived. Therefore, recognition acquires 
a legal status because, through it, a state certifies its legal legitimacy.344 There is no doubt 
that, under this theory, the modern state must gain the recognition of the states that have 
preceded it in order to gain official statehood.345 Note that this theory does not lay out the 
legal criteria which must be met by the state but does require that the state be given explicit 
recognition by other countries.
This theory does not deny the existence of unrecognised states but asserts that their existence 
is incomplete and that they cannot achieve full legal standing without the acceptance of 
themselves and their conduct from other countries. Thus, the development of the nascent state 
lies at the discretion of other countries.346 This theory could lead to the abuse of the new state 
and its subordination to the dominance of other states which could force it to follow their own 
political ideas and ideology. Under this theory, the criteria of international law alone are not 
sufficient to secure the rights and the obligations of the state. Instead, those rights and 
obligations are granted by the will of other countries, particularly those that have established 
the rules of public international law and aided in determining the scope of those rules. In the 
absence of recognition, the new state is regarded as a transitory phenomenon or incident and
cannot hold official status in the area of public international law.347
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2.5.2 Declaratory theory
This theory makes the standards of state-building essential to international recognition but 
does not make explicit legal recognition from other countries itself a standard. Rather, the 
state becomes subject to public international law when it meets the legal criteria for state-
building or rebuilding.348 Thus, the criteria for state-building play a role in the state’s
acquisition of legal capacity and obligations imposed by international law.349 Note that, in 
this theory, recognition does not create a state but, rather, examines the state and 
acknowledges its existence. Accordingly, the will of other countries does not play any role in 
the granting of the state legal status in order to be a party to public international law. 
Recognition, therefore, is not a legal but a political action.350
This theory regards recognition as a secondary factor in state-building and suggests that de 
facto recognition is achieved when the legal standards for the construction of the state are 
insufficient to grant participation in international forums.351 This theory goes on to assert that 
recognition is a legal action which other countries commit when the nascent state fulfils the 
new legal criteria settled in international law. Recognition is granted retroactively from the 
date of establishment of the state, not from the date of the explicit recognition of other 
countries.352 This means that the state is subject to the provisions of public international law 
from its inception and, therefore, must adhere to and not break the letter of international law 
and legal norms from its founding.353
2.5.3 Differences between constitutive and declaratory theory
Constitutive theory awards existing states supreme legal authority over the new state and, 
therefore, cannot realise either the principle of equality between nations or the principle of 
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sovereignty.354 Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter (establishes maintaining the principle of 
sovereign equality among member states as a priority in the UN’s work.355 As well, Article 1
(2) states that the organisation seeks ‘to develop friendly relations among the nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’.356 Additionally, 
Article 5 of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of States, which was passed by the 
International Law Commission in 1949, stipulates that ‘every State has the right to equality in 
law with every other State’.357 Thus, discriminating among states is unacceptable under 
international law. A lack of equality among states’ obligations will result in legal 
complications that violate the principle of equal rights and obligations.358 International law 
does not make any one nation higher than another nation but, rather, grants all peoples equal 
right to determine their fates in the manner they deem appropriate.359
Declaratory theory does not invent such a complex hierarchy among nations and does not let 
any people claim superiority over any other people or state. However, one goal of 
international law is to make the individual the basis of governments. Individuals are given the 
right to direct the development of the political entity that will govern them, provided that that 
entity meets the legal criteria settled in international treaties and customary international 
law.360 Declaratory theory, on the other hand, makes the state more harmonious with the 
international community when the legal criteria are an expression of the desires of the 
community. In contrast, constitutive theory can extend legal status countries that are isolated 
and not widely accepted. For example, the inhabitants and effective governing authority of 
Northern Cyprus are largely isolated from the world and, consequently, recognised only by 
Turkey.361 Declaratory theory assigns more significance to whether a country enjoys 
extensive international relations, which is reflected in its citizens’ economic and health status 
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and in the security of state. More importantly, such a state has an international obligation to 
refrain from breaking the rules of international law and to respect those same rules.362
Some argue that declaratory theory supports the violation of international law in situations 
when the state emerges through the use of force or the occupation of the territory of another 
state because such a state can be recognised based on the consensus and acceptance of the 
international community.363 However, it is unreasonable that existing states would accept the 
emergence of a country established through military force because states always seek the 
achievement of peace and international security.364 The answer to this criticism, in brief, is 
that declaratory theory does not depart from this framework because it does not grant 
recognition to a state that has not met the criteria of international treaties and customary 
international law, such as respect for and acceptance of international law.365
This rebuttal is confirmed by the process by which all states gain recognition through the UN 
Charter, in which Article 4 (1) expressly provides that UN membership is open to all 
countries that ‘are able and willing to carry out these obligations’.366 Moreover, the obligation 
to submit to international law is not enshrined only in the UN Charter. Most states now also 
seek to join regional organisations whose members must abide by the legal rules issued by 
the organisation in order to remain members.367
Another critique can be advanced from the fact that all new countries emerge through 
separation from the mother state.368 The new state thus requires the approval of the parent 
state, which means that constitutive theory is compatible with this situation. Evidence cited in 
support of this argument is that Eritrea seceded from the mother state of Ethiopia with its 
consent,369 Singapore from Malaysia with its consent,370 and South Sudan from Sudan with 
its consent.371
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However, a fundamental question comes to mind: Were these new states able to achieve the 
legal standards for state-building? Certainly, when considering the measures which governed 
the separation of the states, we find that these acts of secession did meet those standards.372
These separations of states occurred under international supervision, and the new states were 
able to join the UN or regional organisations; Eritrea became a member of the AU, and South 
Sudan of the AU and the UN.373 Therefore, these emerging states demonstrated their 
commitment to international legal rules, in addition to the criteria of the Montevideo 
Convention. More importantly, these separations acknowledged the right of self-
determination and occurred after free and fair elections held under international 
supervision.374
If we assume that the consent of the mother state is a condition for statehood, thus assigning 
more credence to constitutive theory, we hold a position that is incompatible with the right of 
self-determination.375 This is because the right of self-determination arises from the 
aspirations of the people and it is the legal form of the special demands of a particular 
category within a particular region of the state, or the legal form of the demands of all the 
citizens in all regions within the state.376 Moreover, this condition leads to an armed conflict, 
because if the people insist that their right of self-determination will not bow to the condition 
applied under that concept, they will decide to pursue self-determination in their region, and 
they would become a source of authority in that region or that state, thereby potentially 
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becoming a threat to international peace and security.  The cases of South Sudan and Eritrea 
illustrate this very issue, where the mother state consented after bloody conflicts and popular 
uprisings. The people of South Sudan fought a long war that devastated the region and its 
inhabitants. Then Sudan allowed elections, enabling the public to vote on southern Sudan’s 
sovereignty.377 In Eritrea, the popular uprising started in 1961 but did not achieve self-
determination until the 1993 elections.378
Kosovo is a similar case because UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) bestowed the 
people of Kosovo autonomy379 after a fierce war was waged by the people of Kosovo to 
secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.380 This decision aimed to grant the 
aspirations of the people of Kosovo to establish an independent entity through the autonomy 
and ensure security, peace and respect for their human rights.381 However, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia did not support the separation of Kosovo as an independent state, and 
only granted Kosovo autonomy.382 Despite the lack of approval by its mother state, Kosovo 
declared full independence in 2008. Kosovo is not an official member of the UN.383
Nevertheless, more than 100 countries recognise the Republic of Kosovo as an independent 
state,384 and Kosovo is also a member of the International Monetary Fund.385
Here, we can say that declaratory theory regards recognition as a political action which is 
crystallised in state practices and the state’s dedication to the rules of international law. In 
contrast, constitutive theory does not accept this definition of recognition and considers it to 
be a solely legal concept that cannot be waived in accepting the state as a party to 
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international law.386 This difference does not mean that declaratory theory does not take into 
consideration the legal dimension of recognition but, rather, that declaratory theory blends 
recognition with the legal standards of statehood and regards recognition as the duty of other 
countries once the new state has achieved those standards. Therefore, other countries are 
obliged to recognise the new state if it has acquired the complete elements of a state or 
achieved the required standards.387
This measure ensures that the construction of the state and recognition of it are not subject to 
the views of individual countries.388 However, one might object that the legal criteria for the 
construction or rebuilding of the state are difficult to determine because of the lack of legal 
texts on the topic in international law since the era of the Montevideo Convention. Even if we 
accept these criteria, what is the legal guarantee that any given state has fulfilled these 
standards? At this question, declaratory theory faces a real dilemma in regards to constitutive 
theory. Although this issue presents great complexity, these criteria can be achieved through 
legal actions, that is, the state’s obligation to respect international law. If the state carries out 
this obligation, it will appear consistent with the rules of public international law.389 Such 
commitment is demonstrated when the state may join the UN or other regional 
organisations.390 The legal rules contained in the charters of the UN and other organisations 
express the spirit of international law, and therefore, these criteria are in line with 
international law and its goals, although they are not necessarily specifically the same. Thus, 
those standards are fused with international law, and there cannot be criteria contrary to the 
essence of international law.
A number of diverse standards in customary international law and international conventions 
have remained stable since the Montevideo Convention.391 For example, the state must accept 
the rules of international law, must not be built on occupied territory and must maintain unity 
between the government and the citizenry. These standards are fused with the written legal 
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rules of international organisations.392 For example, Article 4 of the UN Charter holds that 
member states must accept all the obligations contained in the Charter.393 As well, Article 49 
of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) states that all European countries have the right 
to join the EU, provided that they respect the principles of democracy, human rights, other 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.394 The Copenhagen criteria further add the 
important standard that the state must be able to fulfil the obligations set forth in EU law.395
In addition, Article 6 of the OAS Charter requires that a country wishing to join the 
organisation must declare its willingness to abide by all rules established by the 
organisation.396
One can observe the practical effect of these criteria in the case of Southern Rhodesia, which 
involved the important legal argument that the government could not meet the criteria settled 
in international law that the state prevent racism. The UN made this argument when it chose 
not to invite the state to join the UN and, instead, issued 14 resolutions refusing to recognise 
the government of Southern Rhodesia. For example, UN General Assembly resolutions Nos. 
1747 (1961)397 and 3115 (1973)398 and UN Security Council Resolutions Nos. 253 (1968) 399
and 288 (1970)400 declare that these bodies will not recognise the government of Southern 
Rhodesia due to its racism. The UN’s decision not to accept this state extended to imposing 
economic and military sanctions and inviting other nations to refuse to cooperate and have 
economic dealings with the apartheid government in Southern Rhodesia.
This denial of international recognition meant that the declaration establishing the country of 
Southern Rhodesia in 1961 did not meet one of the legal criteria, and therefore, recognition of 
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this state was incomplete.401 This situation was consistent with Article 41 of the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which stipulates 
that ‘no State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the 
meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation’.402 This legal 
text mandates that a state which exhibits systematic failure to fulfil international legal 
obligations should not be acknowledged as legal.
Thus, the declaratory theory can be integrated into the development of international law 
because as noted, declaratory theory does not specify certain criteria but leaves them open to 
international law to determine through written rules or international practices. Accordingly, 
this theory does not limit states or international law to certain specific criteria but, rather, 
allows human thought to deal the issues raised in state-building and rebuilding through the 
practices of states and international organisations. Declaratory theory’s compatibility with 
international law is confirmed by the fusion of these practises in legal rules, whether written 
or customary. This formalisation of declaratory theory reinforces the trend among scholars of 
international law to defend this theory and to consider it an acceptable form of legal 
recognition.403 Ultimately, declaratory theory gains a significant advantage from its 
compatibility with international legal discourse that promotes the rule of law and seeks to 
achieve international peace and security and to secure human rights.404
2.6 Recognition and the standard of homogeneity and integration
The previous analysis and discussion of the criteria for state-building found declaratory 
theory to be an acceptable form of international recognition. Is it possible to argue that the 
standard of homogeneity and integration is important and cannot be waived in state-building
and rebuilding? Is this criterion absolute, unable to be denied at any time? If so, the state 
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cannot receive international recognition as an active player and party to international law if it 
fails to achieve the standard of homogeneity and integration. Thus linked to recognition, the 
standard of homogeneity and integration standard is an important criteria in contemporary 
international law for state-building and rebuilding.
On the international level, practices achieve importance and become customary legal rules 
through repetition.405 Examining the standard of homogeneity and integration in international 
law reveals a number of issues in which the UN ( has dealt with it, frequently and repeatedly 
not accepting the imposition of government force on citizens. In the case of Southern 
Rhodesia, the UN issued resolutions, such as Resolution No. 288 (1970)406 which called for 
the non-recognition of the new government in Southern Rhodesia. As well, UN General 
Assembly Resolution No. 2946 (1972)407 urged all UN member states to refrain from any 
action which might confer a kind of legitimacy to the apartheid government in Rhodesia.
Questions then arise: Why did the UN issue these decisions, and what was its motivation? 
Certainly, the answer to these questions is the lack of consensus between the people and the 
government; the people of Southern Rhodesia did not accept the racist government which 
was administering the country.408 The same issue emerged in the case of South Africa when 
the UN and the international community did not accept that country’s government because it 
did not reflect the desires of the people, and no consensus or homogeneity existed between 
the people and the government.409 The UN went beyond the actions in taken in regards to 
Southern Rhodesia and directly intervened in the internal affairs of South Africa through 
Resolution No. 554 (1985),410 which declared the new constitution of South Africa null and 
void because it did not represent popular, national consensus.411 As well, UN General
Assembly Resolution (A/RES/S_16/1), passed on 14 December 1989,412 called for the South 
African government to set up an integrated democratic government which would consult the 
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wishes of all citizens and serve the will of the people.413 In 1994, the UN Security Council 
issued Resolution No. 919 which expressed the council’s satisfaction at the outcome of 
democratic elections in South Africa.414
These cases demonstrate that international law does not accept governments that do not 
comply with the will of their people, especially if these governments are repressive or 
racist.415 This stance in international law highlights the role of the standard of homogeneity 
and integration and its impact on the legal recognition of the state and its legitimacy. 
Recognition does not depend solely on the traditional criteria in public international law for 
state-building and rebuilding. Instead, the people must have a role in decision-making and the 
selection of the appropriate form for the management of their country. The people’s ability to 
play a role in state-building is crucial in the fulfilment of these standards.416 This standard’s 
importance is evident in the policies of the European Council and its remarkable interest in
the people’s exercise of their rights and safeguards to prevent a particular group or party 
imposing from a trusteeship on a political entity.417 On 16 December 1991, the (EU 
unanimously adopted the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and 
in the Soviet Union.418 These principles display a deep concern for the standard of 
homogeneity and integration for state-building and rebuilding.
The preface to this document clearly establishes as its first principle respect for the right of 
self-determination of peoples. The primacy of this principle is also enshrined in the Helsinki 
Final Act419 and the Charter of Paris,420 especially with regard to the rule of law and 
democracy and human rights. These principles were made legal requirements for states 
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emerging from the collapse of former entities to gain recognition. Respect for the right of 
self-determination encodes the standard of homogeneity and integration in two legal forms.
1. References to previous agreements which provided for securing human rights, 
particularly those concerning the right of self-determination. For example, the eighth 
principle of the Helsinki Convention holds that all peoples’ right to self-determination 
must be respected and that all peoples have the right to complete freedom to select the 
basic features of the government which will run their country and to participate in 
making domestic and foreign policy.
2. The development of democracy as a means to ensure consensus between the 
government and the people. Whether a country is democratic serves as concrete, 
substantial evidence that the government is compatible and in harmony with the 
people and not imposed on them.
Accordingly, the EU realises the concept of homogeneity and integration through two 
elements: democracy and the people’s right to administer their state internally and externally 
according to their own aspirations.421 The EU implemented this approach when Kosovo 
announced that it would secede from the Republic of Serbia. In this case, the European 
Parliament announced on 30 May 2008 that it would welcome the state of Kosovo as a 
legitimate party in the EU and then hoisted the Kosovo flag in the corridors of the European 
Parliament.422 There is no doubt that Kosovo fulfilled its obligations under the laws of the 
EU, particularly to ensure human rights, democracy and respect for diverse races and 
religions.423 Significantly, the nationhood of Kosovo was the result of the supervision by the 
UN, which helped make Kosovo a country friendly to human rights and thus aided it in 
achieving the standards of state-building required for recognition from the European 
Parliament.424 In addition, the advisory opinion of the ICJ No. A/RES/63/3 stated that the 
secession of Kosovo did not violate general international law.425
                                               
421 Gregory Fox, Brad Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 
p. 9.
422 Tanjug, ‘European Parliament Flies ‘Independent Kosovo’ Flag’ (b92 28 May 2008) 
<http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=05&dd=28&nav_id=50596> accessed 21 
October 2013.
423 Timothy George McLellan , Kosovo, Abkhazia and the Consequences of state recognition, Cambridge 
Student Law Review (2009) Vol. 5, No. 1.
424 Heike Krieger, The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.457.
425 Accordance With International Law Of The Unilateral Declaration Of Independence In Respect Of Kosovo 
(Advisory Opinion) 2010 <http://www.ICJ-cij.org/docket/files/141/14799.pdf> accessed 22 October 2013.
102
Similarly, Kyle Woods showed that the legal structure of Kosovo was built on the model of 
popular consensus and gave full legal freedoms to all the people in the country. The manner 
of running the country represented a compromise among different peoples, as evident in the 
Constitution of Kosovo which, Woods noted, explicitly accepts all international human rights 
standards. Thus, the Constitution of Kosovo was harmonious with public international law.426
As well, Robert Muharremi argued, the recognition of Kosovo depended upon the existence 
of a government that represented all people, was effective and was in line with contemporary 
international law.427 We note that neither Kyle Woods nor Robert Muharremi claim that 
Kosovo is a fully independent state. However, they do analyse the development of legal 
institutions in Kosovo, which are subject to supervision by the UN, to confirm the recognition 
of Kosovo’s independence in some countries, particularly certain EU countries, in line with 
the spirit of contemporary international law and in consideration of the presence of a
consensus government approved by all groups of people.
If the international community accepts dictatorships but does not accept popular revolutions 
that exercise the right of political self-determination, then the standard of homogeneity and 
integration will not have legal status. However, if the international community does not 
accept repressive governments but supports popular revolts against such governments and 
reinforces the value of the right of political self-determination, then the standard of 
integration and homogeneity will be an essential criterion that cannot be waived.428
Given the evidence, one can say that the standard of homogeneity and integration is 
compatible with both contemporary legal thinking and practices in international law that deny 
acceptance to repressive and dictatorial governments, especially during the construction of 
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the state.429 For that reason, the standard of homogeneity and integration has a role and a 
strong impact on the recognition of the new or rebuilt state.430 Moreover, contemporary 
international law does not accept the demise of a government which came to power through 
democratic means and reflects a consensus and homogeneity with the people. Article 30 of 
the Constitutive Act of the AU denies membership to states in which the government chosen 
by the country’s people is toppled.431 Article 9 of the OAS charter takes a similar 
approach.432
It is true that democracy is the most effective and tangible evidence of fulfilment of the 
standard of homogeneity and integration. However, as mentioned, the constitutions of many 
countries might state that the system of government is democratic, but the government is not, 
in reality, democratic. Thus, true homogeneity and integration can also be demonstrated 
through constants outside the legal rules of democracy. For example, the constitution could
contain legal rules which provide for public freedoms and freedom of belief. As the state is 
subjected to the control and supervision of international organisations in order to gain 
recognition, it must comply with demands to respect human rights and accept supervision to 
ensure safe, democratic elections.
This analysis highlights the strong influence of democracy on the effective model for 
statehood in international law, in the sense that the state must be consistent with the direction 
of current international law. In Chapter 1, the study of the right of self-determination led to 
the review of democracy literature and the conclusion that democracy realises the right of 
political self-determination.433 Thus, the existence of democracy stands as clear evidence that 
a state has met the standard of homogeneity and compatibility between the people and the 
government, which is one of the most important criteria in state-building and rebuilding.
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2.7 Democracy and Statehood
If democracy effectively is the materialisation of the right to political self-determination, it 
must exercise a strong influence on the standards of state-building and rebuilding, especially 
the criterion for homogeneity and integration of the people and the government.434 Whether 
such a consensus exists between the people and the government can be seen in whether the 
government was formed through democratic means and with the consent of the people.435
Consequently, democracy is a mirror that reflects the achievement of this standard in actual 
interactions, not mere formalities. Many countries have adopted a democratic approach in 
their constitution but are subjected to the rule of dictators who do not accept defeat in 
elections. For example, the Baath Party has governed Syria since 1963 and accepts neither 
defeat in any election nor grants the Syrian people’s right to participate in decision-
making.436 Since 1963, presidential elections in Syria have not seen Hafez Assad or his son 
Bashar al-Assad win by less than 97%.437
Therefore, democracy must be a reality and not a formality in order to claim that there is real 
interaction between the people and the government. For example, consider the popular 
uprising in Syria against a repressive regime to demand the right of political self-
determination.438 This argument does not depend on the example of Syria alone; many 
repressive countries such as North Korea, Sudan and Cuba boast formal democratic 
principles.439 Therefore, the criteria for state-building must be realised in all aspects of a state 
in order to guarantee the achievement of a just peace and international security because unity 
between the people and the government ensures regional peace and security, which 
                                               
434 Margaret Moore, National Self-determination and Secession, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 10
435 Peter Kraus, A Union of Diversity, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.30. See also Seth Jones, James 
Dobbins, The UN's Record in Nation Building, Chicago Journal of International Law (2006) Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 
703-723. See also Ondrej Hamulak, The Essence of European Union's 'Statehood' after Treaty of Lisbon and 
Lisbon Judgements, UACES Conference, University of Bath, 2010.
436 Stephan Rosiny, Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon's Taif Experience, Middle East Policy (2013) 
Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 41–55.
437 Mike Giglio, ‘Amid Syria’s Chaos, Assad Plans A Presidential Vote For Next Year’ (BuzzFeed News 23 October 
2013) <http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/amid-syrias-chaos-assad-plans-a-presidential-vote-for-next-y> 
accessed 29 October 2013. See also British Broadcasting Corporation News, ‘Syria’s Assad Wins Another Term’ 
(BBC 29 May 2007), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6700021.stm> accessed 29 October 
2013. 
438 Carlo Panara, Gary Wilson, The Arab Spring: New Patterns for Democracy and International Law, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, pp. 101-103 .Also see Rowena Maguire, Bridget Lewis, Charles Sampford, Shifting 
Global Powers and International Law: Challenges and Opportunities, Routledge, 2013, pp. 90-94.
439 Kirsten Bookmiller, The United Nations, Infobase Publishing, 2008, p. 101.
105
contributes to the international peace. When considering the many cases of territories 
separating from the mother state, we find that the real criterion for the legitimacy of secession 
after the mother state grants its approval is overwhelming public support, demonstrated 
through a referendum. This occurred in 2011 when South Sudan seceded from Sudan through 
democratic means.440
There is growing popular demand for democracy, and international codes have made it a 
human right and protected the pursuit of it,441 as explained in the first chapter. Most 
importantly, democracy has become a basic foundation for building a modern state under 
current international regulations. Democracy’s core status is illustrated by its inclusion as a 
guiding principle for the basic requirements for the acceptance of a state in the EU.442 This 
demonstrates that democracy has become a key support to a state gaining acceptance from its 
surrounding community.443 Thus, the question arises: Does democracy stand as a separate, 
independent standard, or is it merely a means to achieve the criterion of homogeneity and 
consensus between the government and the people?
To answer this question, we first observe that both propositions require access to good 
governance, which ensures agreement with modern legal discourse, peaceful coexistence 
among nations and respect for human rights and social justice.444 On the practical level, 
democracy is a means to realise these goals and to accomplish the integration and unity of the 
government and the people. On the moral level, the standard of homogeneity and consensus 
serves as a concrete measure of whether this discourse has been materialised through full 
respect for human beings and their civil and political rights. As well, this standard 
demonstrates good governance, that the people accept their government and that the 
government has not imposed its authority by force but, rather, acquired it from popular 
will.445
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Thus, homogeneity and consensus between the people and the government stand as an 
independent standard essential for nation-building and the reconstruction of the state and 
democracy as a supplementary standard or practical means to ensure that the primary 
standard has been achieved. We can say that there existence of homogeneity and integration 
guarantees that democracy has been achieved in actuality and not as a formality or in theory,
as in a repressive state or dictatorship such as Syria or North Korea which has the appearance 
of democracy. 
This argument is advanced not to underestimate the role of democracy but, to the contrary, to 
show that democracy ensures the full realisation of the standard of homogeneity and 
consensus. Therefore, democracy cannot be dispensed with during the stage of building a 
modern state, and many peoples rebuild their states according to the democratic model in 
order to fulfil the criterion of homogeneity and compatibility.446 Democracy achieves 
significance and importance through its role in the acceptance and recognition of the state by 
other countries and international organisations and serves as tangible evidence verifying the 
accomplishment of this criterion.447
2.8 Conclusion
In the effort of peoples to secure the legitimacy of their state and their rights, the principles 
and legal concepts in international law that deal with the statehood have not constrained or 
acted as a stumbling stone to the right of political self-determination. To the contrary, the 
right of political self-determination has had a clear impact on the standards in international 
law for state-building and recognition of the state, whether it is an emerging country or an 
existing country that has undergone internal changes. 
This influence is evidenced by the emergence of the standard of homogeneity between the 
people and the government, which in international practice has proven to have a strong effect 
on whether states gain international recognition. We can state with confidence that it is 
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among the newly established standards at the core of international law. Thus, there is 
substantial convergence between the right of self-determination and the international legal 
principles that deal with state-building and rebuilding. 
Certainly, democracy is an acceptable means to ensure the implementation of the right of 
political self-determination. However, the standard of homogeneity and integration is tangible 
evidence of the realisation of this right, because it ensures that the government was not 
imposed on the people by force and governs the country in accordance with the aspirations 
and desires of the people. Consequently, democracy and the standard of homogeneity and 
integration complement one another in the creation of a rational government that respects 
human rights and achieves the highest degree of social justice, as is consistent with the 
international legal discourse.
After a comprehensive study of the emergence of the right of political self-determination in 
modern international law, we conclude that this right did not emerge from the legal principles 
which produced the international laws concerning the concept of statehood but, rather, the 
right itself contributed to the development of new concepts and criteria for international 
recognition and statehood. In the next section of this dissertation, we examine international 
interventions to support and promote the right of political self-determination in order to study 
its impact on the legal development of the modern concepts of sovereignty and non-
interference.
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Chapter Three 
The legal aspects of international intervention and the principle of non-
interference in international law
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapters reviewed international law on the right of political self-determination
and showed that popular demand for this right can give rise to conflicts with dictatorial 
governments which seek to prevent its exercise. Such governments often commit crimes 
against humanity and violate human rights in order to deny peoples the right to political self-
determination. Such situations prompt international interventions to protect against such 
violations and aid in the assertion of this right. Intervention to support the right of political 
self-determination is considered one of the most important themes in contemporary 
international law and deserves comprehensive study to identify its components and consider 
its merits. Such an effort has been necessitated by repeated, recent international actions taken 
in support of this right and by attention to human rights. There have been many cases of 
international interventions to support the right of political self-determination and to promote 
democratic ideals, which stand as the contemporary, rational model for political 
governance.448 These cases include, for example, UN Security Council Resolution No. 940
(1994), private efforts made in support of democracy in Haiti,449 the 1989 United States
intervention in Panama450 and the 2011 international intervention in Libya.451
However, intervention to support the right of political self-determination gives rise to 
numerous thorny issues, and in many cases, interventions have diverged from the principles 
of this practice. Before examining international interventions to promote or support this 
particular right, we first need to examine the general concept of intervention in international 
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law in order to understand the substantive and formal aspects of this practice, which falls 
within the scope of international conventions and customary international law. In addition to 
the earlier discussion of international jurisprudence on topics related to international 
intervention, this analysis will aid in the objectively studying intervention to support the right 
to political self-determination and in determining its logical consequences.
3.2 Legal aspects of international intervention
Throughout history, differences in visions and international interests have driven the idea of
international intervention through several stages to reach its current state, with all its 
attendant contradictions.452 Despite a sometimes contentious history, the recurrence of wars 
has resulted, in most legal systems, in recognition of the necessity for what here is called 
international humanitarian intervention. The need for humanitarian intervention consistently 
emerges with the outbreak of international and domestic conflicts. Populations usually face 
occupation, colonialism or civil wars because of a power struggle or changes in the political 
system made through the use of armed force. Naturally, these violent events are accompanied 
by such negative effects as murder, persecution, deportation and the destruction of property.
In all these circumstances, humans need the legal protection established by the rules of 
international law, which aim to protect individuals’ dignity and restore their rights.453 Thus
arises the need to act within the international legal framework to protect those people whose 
rights have been violated. Such intervention has to be legitimate under international law in 
order to ensure that the effort by an international organisation will succeed and to avoid any 
deviations that would reflect negatively on the intervention.454
However, contemporary international law has characterised international humanitarian 
intervention with non-specific features. Even under existing international legal regulation, 
determining the specific legal rules on this subject can be challenging. Difficulties exist 
despite the adoption of customary rules for international humanitarian intervention in 
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traditional international law.455 This situation might be the result of circumstances in the 
period when contemporary international law was drafted. After World War II and during 
decolonisation, the framers of this law did not encourage the use of force by a state or group 
of states in the internal affairs of another country. The main objective of the writers of 
international law was to achieve global security and stability at a time when the world was 
suffering from wars, killing and destruction. Human rights were not a major priority;
however, the situation has reversed, and current methods of dealing with international turmoil 
include modern regional organisations taking an active interest in human rights.456
Accordingly, many international organisations have bylaws that allow members to engage in 
international intervention under prescribed conditions. For example, Article 4, Paragraph H 
of the Constitutive Act of the AU approves of African countries intervening in the internal 
affairs of any African country where a violation of human rights has occurred. The legal texts 
of some international conventions permit indirect intervention.457
However, identifying a general legal theory of international humanitarian intervention held 
by an international legal organisation is difficult. These organisations’ legal texts, such as 
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, do not define the circumstances and conditions for or impose 
on such intervention or impose restrictions.458 At the same time, the international conventions 
and regional agreements have focused on a broader range of human rights and specified the 
appropriate conditions for conduct intended to protect those rights.459 Accordingly, it is 
important to study the legal rules regulating international humanitarian intervention and to 
examine some cases of intervention in light of those international rules.
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3.3 The legal rules and international intervention
The rules of international law come from two primary sources. The first is international 
habits that are embodied in customary rules, and the second is the explicit consent of the 
countries as expressed in conventions.460 Customary rules were long been the most important 
as they have offered flexibility and dealt with serious legal matters.461 Their importance has
ebbed in contemporary international law, which instead focuses on the legal rules arising 
from international agreements. However, this retreat from in customary rules does not reduce 
the effective role in establishing rules through international conventions. The importance of 
these rules has increased significantly in public international law, as they represent an 
important way for the state to comply with certain specific customs and thereby to participate 
in the wording of treaties or conventions.
Thus, as a legal topic, these rules address international humanitarian intervention in general. 
This understanding has allowed states to accept such interference under international law, 
whether authorised by customary rules or the rules of a convention.
This part of the dissertation is divided into two sections. The first examines the practice of 
humanitarian intervention in international affairs under customary international rules, while 
the second deals with the legal rules made by international conventions and treaties.
3.3.1 International humanitarian intervention under customary international 
rules
The rules of international customary law contributed greatly to shaping the development of 
contemporary international law, and the international community has been enriched through 
legal rules that meet the changing needs of a globalised world. One positive result of
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incorporating customary rules is a sense of flexibility and abundance in the legal realm. Thus,
many emerging legal norms in contemporary international law embody international customs 
previously settled among countries.462
International custom cannot be established without two elements: the practices of states and 
the belief that these practices are required. The first element is achieved by the materialistic 
behaviour of countries; we must acknowledge that states often behave in this way. In 
addition, this behaviour must be repeated in new cases of similar legal action taken by states 
which accept this act or behaviour. The second element is achieved through agreement that it 
is compulsory to follow the rule of international law in the context of a particular event.463
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ indicates this belief by stating that the acceptability of 
customary law is evidenced by its repeated use. Accordingly, international practices must 
stem from individuals and states’ belief in certain legal rules.464
A careful historical reading of international humanitarian intervention finds that the 
international community has accepted this practice through the adoption of a number of ideas. 
The concept of the duty to intervene originated in the sixteenth century during Europe’s
expansion after the discovery of lands outside Europe.465 European countries adopted this 
notion in customary formula in order to legitimise the search for and control over new 
territories.
This customary formula was among the international community’s justifications for engaging 
in war and intervention and is not far from the just war theory that prevailed in the Middle 
Ages.466 Interestingly, the theory of just war emerged from the need to find mitigating 
reasons for conducting war, as Christianity prohibited war. This theory grants states the right 
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to engage in war only for a just cause.467 Traditionally, the only clear reason for going to war 
was to prevent injustice and protect individuals and groups from murder and persecution.468
Thus, the theory of just war might have contained the precursors to the idea of humanitarian 
intervention. Military intervention in the internal affairs of a state or group of states could be 
undertaken to protect the rights of citizens and to prevent damage and never without such
justification. 
This theory paved the way for the increasing international humanitarian interventions by 
various states in the following centuries. For example, the British and French intervened in 
Greece in 1829 to prevent the violation of human rights by the Ottoman Empire, and
European powers again intervened on the island of Crete in 1868 under the pretext of 
protecting the Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire entity against rights violations.469 In 
addition, many international conferences discussed international issues involving the internal 
affairs of a particular country or specific region. Such negotiations include the 1830 London 
Conference on the issue of Greece470 and the 1940 London Conference on the issue of 
Egypt.471 These international practices strongly indicate that traditional international law had
adopted the customary rules permitting intervention in the affairs of other countries for the 
purposes of protecting human rights and preserving individual human dignity and life. In the 
case of human exposure to brutal treatment and the abuse of individual rights by the state or 
the government of its citizens, such intervention became a duty. 
Accordingly, in the global human conscience, international humanitarian intervention has 
been associated with international responsibility to ensure stability and guarantee individuals
their rights and freedoms. Such responsibility provides justification for all states to intervene 
to protect human life. 
However, some parties of the international community and international jurists have 
questioned this customary rule and the motivations for such interventions. Some argue that 
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humanitarian intervention and related practices go beyond humanitarian efforts and become
the means to serve international interests.472 The practice of international humanitarian 
intervention has always been challenged, even under contemporary law as the major powers 
intervene under the pretext of protecting rights.473 Moreover, opponents to this customary 
rule say that international humanitarian intervention has occurred in many cases but not in 
others equally compelling, as was the case in South Africa; therefore, one of the most 
important elements of customary rule has been neglected. 
At the same time, the customary rule that allows humanitarian intervention sometimes 
conflicts with other customary rules that have developed under international law, such as the 
concept of sovereignty which treats intervention as a violation of the state’s independence.474
Therefore, other customary rules calling for non-interference in the internal affairs of states
under all circumstances were formed. US President James Monroe supported this position in 
1823 with a proclamation preventing European countries from interfering in the internal 
affairs of South American countries.475
However, practices intended to ban international humanitarian intervention have largely been 
absent on the international level. Thus, the customary rule prohibiting international 
humanitarian intervention has lacked a component essential in similar cases. Article 38 of the 
Statute of the ICJ establishes that customary rules apply when international practices have 
been repeatedly implemented in similar situations, as international intervention to protect 
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human rights has been.476 Moreover, states and international organisations have tended to act 
to protect human rights and, therefore, have resisted giving up those rights.477
In recent times, the issue of humanitarian intervention has become controversial and sparked
many differences in international legal circles, especially given the legal intellectual 
development of and the marked interest in human rights and support of freedoms. These 
practices raise a number of questions and discussions, the most important being the practice 
of the UN to permit intervention for (human rights if this practice has been repeated in similar 
cases in the past. It is important to point out that customary rules are not limited to the 
practices of countries but extend to those of international organisations.478 In essence, the 
content of a customary rule is determined first by a decision that establishes the rule’s
elements and then by repetition in similar cases.479
International organisations usually make decisions that establish a customary rule when a 
similar written rule is missing from the code of the organisation and from the legal statutes.480
Most importantly, the decision on which a customary rule is based must be specific, handle 
matters of a general nature and touch the basic needs of human beings.481 Therefore, the 
decision reflects public will and can be inferred as having been approved by a majority vote 
of the members. It is believed that the protection of human rights and freedoms reflects the 
will of the people, as shown by support for international resolutions on international 
humanitarian intervention. Take, for example, Resolution 770 (1992) calling on states to 
coordinate humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina ,482 Resolution 872 (1993) which 
determined the establishment of a peacekeeping operation aimed at ending the conflict in 
Rwanda and helping the Rwanda people hold democratic elections,483 and Resolution 1973 
(2011) which authorised the Member States to take all necessary measures to protect the 
Libyan people, as well as the imposition of a no-fly zone to prevent Gaddafi’s forces from 
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launching air strikes against the Libyan people, who were demanding an end to the dictatorial 
rule in Libya.484
Through resolutions and many international conventions, international organisations, 
especially the UN, have contributed to establishing a set of customary international rules 
dedicated to protecting human rights.485 These documents include the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In addition, 
the UN General Assembly has often condemned human rights violations in many countries, 
as when it issued A/RES/66/176 (2011) to condemn human rights violations in Syria.486 In 
most cases, UN General Assembly resolutions are accepted as valid international customary 
rules under the general principles and moral and political standards used to guide the conduct 
of states. Therefore, those rules are used similarly to the customary rules meant to prevent
violations of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by international law.
Many countries have repeatedly imposed economic sanctions on a particular country because 
of human rights violations in the state’s territory and a lack of respect for individual 
freedoms. Such international intervention attacks the economic sovereignty of the state and 
targets its resources. Such actions include sanctions on Myanmar and Serbia.487 The 
international community has also used military means in many cases of international 
humanitarian intervention, as in Kosovo and UN Security Council action in Somalia and 
Rwanda.
3.3.2 Legal rules derived from international conventions
In the historical development of the concept of international intervention, many interventions 
in the nineteenth century were based on international conventions. For example, the Paris 
Convention of 1814 held by Austria, England, Russia and France after the fall and abdication
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of Napoleon488 gave these states the right to intervene in any revolutionary movement. After 
Napoleon’s return and subsequent defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, the second Paris 
Convention confirmed the legitimacy of intervention in the internal affairs of states. Article 
VI of the convention permits diplomatic and military intervention whenever the 
circumstances so required. 489
The Treaty of London (1827), considered one of the most important legal rules on
international intervention to protect populations, was intended to maintain the stability and 
calm of Europe. Accordingly, the treaty allowed Britain, France and Russia to intervene to 
protect Christians in Greece from persecution by the Ottoman Empire.490 In 1878, the Treaty 
of Berlin was signed, reinforcing the right of humanitarian intervention. The treaty gave the 
right to intervene to protect the population in the European parts of the Ottoman Empire and 
bound the Ottoman Empire to several standards, including religious freedom, in order to 
ensure the protection of its citizens.491
In addition, in many conventions and treaties sponsored by the League of Nations permitted 
international humanitarian intervention to protect minorities. For example, the Treaty of 
Saint-German and the Treaty of Lausanne 492 imposed a number of obligations on states that 
had fought alongside Germany during World War I to favour minorities in their territory. 493
Those conventions created two types of guarantees designed to protect minorities: internal 
and international. Article 62 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and Article 37 of the Treaty of 
Lausanne give internal safeguards for the protection of minorities and stipulated that the 
signatories cannot issue legislation, laws or regulations contradicting these agreements. In 
this way, the international safeguards crystallised, giving the League of Nations a crucial role 
in the protection of minorities. The Council of the League of Nations had the right to pursue 
                                               
488 Luis Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and Humanitarian Intervention, Valparaiso University Law Review (1985) 
Vol 19, pp. 593-631 .
489 J.H. Leurdijk, Intervention in international politics, Leeuwarden: Eisma, 1986, p 179. Also see Carl Cavanagh 
Hodge, Encyclopedia of the age of imperialism: 1800-1914, Greenwood Press, 2008, p. 162. 
490 Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, Princeton 
University Press, 2012, pp. 162-169.
491 Ibid, pp. 58-62.
492 Bjorn Arp, International Norms and Standards for the Protection of National Minorities: Bilateral and 
Multilateral Texts with Commentary, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, p. 69.
493 Li-Ann Thio, Managing Babel: The International Legal Protection Of Minorities In The Twentieth Century, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, p. 50.
118
those conventions and was the only body authorised to amend the provisions in these
conventions. In addition, the council had the authority to take appropriate measures in the 
case of any violations of those agreements or of minority rights.494
Those rules placed international obligations on the states concerned to respect these rules, to 
prevent their violation and to protect minority rights. Those conventions confirmed the right 
of the League council to take any action it deemed appropriate to stop such violations. The 
council’s authority to intervene to protect humanity from such violations was based not on 
the Covenant of the League of Nations but on the conventions for the protection of 
minorities. Thus, the Council of the League of Nations accepted the legal rules enshrined in 
the conventions and the obligation to take protective measures, indicating the international 
community’s willingness to permit humanitarian intervention in this era.
Under contemporary international law, international humanitarian intervention finds its 
justification in many international conventions and treaties in force. One such instrument is 
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
Specifically, Article 8 of this convention gives any signatory party the right to request that the 
organs of the UN, in accordance with its charter, take appropriate measures to prevent or stop 
any instance of genocide.495 The article explicitly grants the UN the right to intervene,
following the measures in its charter, in cases of genocide and other criminal acts described 
in Article 3 of the convention, which include conspiracy and incitement to direct participation 
in the crime of genocide.496
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However, this article does not specify which organs of the UN possess the right to intervene 
with appropriate means. . However, if we consider that genocide is extensive killing with the 
clear intent to exterminate a particular ethnic group, it is appropriate that the UN’s organs are 
responsible for protecting this particular ethnic group and have the right to intervene.497
According to Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, if the crime of genocide poses a threat 
to international peace and security, the Security Council shall play a pivotal role in the 
intervene to prevent this crime.
Additionally, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid addresses the subject of international humanitarian intervention.498 Article 6
allows states that are party to the convention to carry out the decisions taken by the Security 
Council to prevent the crime of apartheid and suppress and punish the perpetrators.499 Thus,
the Security Council may legitimately act to prevent and stop the crime of apartheid and 
punishment its perpetrators. In contrast, the Convention does not specify which organ of the 
UN may respond to violations of the terms of the convention. 
The legality of intervention is found in sources beyond the Genocide Convention and the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 
International conventions on human rights, particularly those which include specific 
mechanisms for monitoring respect for human rights, permit international intervention. 
Policies adopted by those conventions can be used to justify some kinds of intervention. This 
legitimacy is confirmed by the refusal of some countries to join treaties and conventions 
aimed at respecting and protecting human rights. For example, of the 193 countries that 
belong to the UN, only 168 have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.500 However, submission to international conventions does not represent a violation of 
countries’ sovereignty; rather, these conventions serve to protect the sovereign rights of the 
signatories.
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In a similar vein, many international committees are entrusted with protecting human rights. 
One such body is the Human Rights Committee formed under Article 28 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.501 Another is the Committee against Torture, 
established under Article 17 of the 1984 Convention against Torture.502 In addition, the 
Economic and Social Council No. 17 established the Committee on Economic and Social 
Rights to monitor states’ commitment to the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.503
The work of conventions or committees monitoring these covenants has two principal goals.
First is to protect the human rights guaranteed by those conventions and the committee’s
work, regardless of the mechanism used to achieve such protection. Second is to protect 
cross-border work when humanitarian intervention occurs across borders.504
Moreover, many regional conventions have embraced aspects of appropriate international 
intervention in the form of codified agreements. The European Convention on Human Rights,
established by the Council of Europe in 1950, can be considered a clear example of such an
intervention agreement.505 Article 19 creates a sophisticated mechanism for the promotion 
and protection of human rights: the European Commission of Human Rights, charged with
monitoring human rights.506 In accordance with the rights established in the convention, the 
European Court of Human Rights also considers violations of human rights.507
As well, Article 30 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights directs the 
establishment of a committee to accomplish the purposes of the charter. Article 45 assigns
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this committee a large role in the investigation and monitoring of violations in order to 
protect human rights in African countries.508
As is clear from the many cases examined, no international convention has dealt with 
international humanitarian intervention in a clear and detailed manner. However, it is also 
evident that some international conventions contain provisions that can allow international
humanitarian intervention.
Although some agreements also have provisions at cross-purposes with intervention, 
interested parties commonly refer to those texts that do not make clear or explicit statements 
on military intervention. Other provisions grant powers to the committees overseeing the 
protection of human rights and establish courts to consider issues that fall within the domestic 
jurisdiction of signatories.
A more important issue is the collision of international intervention with legal principles 
developed under international legal norms. The most prominent of these principles is the 
principle of non-interference, which evolved from the concept of absolute sovereignty. The 
principle of non-interference clearly poses a legal challenge to international humanitarian 
intervention, as confirmed by all the evidence from the deliberations in numerous 
international meetings dealing with international jurisprudence. In addition, the legal texts 
upon which those principles are based have been used to condone humanitarian intervention
in many cases.509
Accordingly, it is appropriate to examine the concept of international sovereignty, 
particularly the principle of non-interference, in order to understand the legal consequences
of the legitimacy of international intervention to protect human rights. 
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3.4 The principle of non-interference and state sovereignty in international law
Since the seventeenth century, the international system of sovereign countries has developed
around a number of customary or written rules.510 The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia forms the 
basic foundation of international law from which the core features of sovereignty have been 
drawn.511 However, the components of sovereignty today are not restricted by the settlements 
of Westphalia. The objective criteria of international law that inform the concepts of 
jurisprudence and sovereignty were developed largely in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. During that time, the concepts of territorial sovereignty, formal equality between 
countries and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries gradually formed the 
basis for notions of international legal obligations which have become fundamental principles 
of the international community.512
Numerous decisions and legal instruments have been devoted to the concept of sovereignty, 
such as UN General Assembly Resolution No. 32/155 on the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. The fifth paragraph of the 
declaration prohibits states from threatening or using force and requires states to abide by the 
principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity in their relations with other 
countries.513
The sovereignty of any state results from the enjoyment of international relations and legal 
status, which grants states the freedom to exercise its sovereignty and conduct its affairs.514
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The principle of state sovereignty gained legal status in modern politics through the practices
and thought that became dominant after World War II. Over time, this outlook has come to 
perceive nationalism as the embodiment of the freedom and independence of a country and 
its supreme authority over its territory and population.515 Therefore, the exercise of 
sovereignty has two dimensions. The first is internal, which means that the state possesses the 
absolute legitimate authority over all individuals and groups that live within its territory, and 
any violations of its decisions subjects the officers of the state to punishment.516 The second 
consists of independence from external control and intervention by any other country or 
international organisation.517
During the emergence of the nation-state, the concept of sovereignty crystallised as the need 
to protect a state or humanitarian groups, which led to militancy and the expansion of the 
concept of sovereignty to free countries from subjection to higher political authority. 
Accordingly, each state may make decisions without external interference and has complete 
freedom to choose its own political, legislative, economic and social systems and the 
measures it deems appropriate to achieve its foreign interests.
In the development of the idea of sovereignty, practitioners of international jurisprudence 
adopted the principle of non-interference as a basis for the international reactions. This 
principle stems from adherence to the principle of sovereignty, which prevents countries from 
committing actions that constitute an attack on the sovereignty of another country.518
And thus, sovereignty occupies a central position in one of the most important principles in 
international law, that of non-interference. This principle is inherent in all documents and 
legislation in international law. All international conventions and treaties are based on mutual 
respect among nations and express the spirit of equality and peaceful relations, as well as 
mutual recognition. This approach is derived from the texts and principles of the UN Charter.
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3.4.1 The principle of non-interference
The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is a basic foundation on 
which the post-World War II world was established. This principle is based on the UN 
Charter, which establishes international law banning intervention in the internal affairs of 
other different countries. The most important statute is Article 2 (7)’s prohibition on
interference in the internal affairs of states based on the sovereign equality of each country.519
Does this mean that a party to international law may not interfere in the internal affairs of a 
country, whatever the reasons and justifications? Or do certain conditions, if met, grant 
legitimacy to intervention? If the answer to the latter question is yes, the next question is: Do 
these conditions include those situations in which the public authorities of the state violate
human rights in general or the right to political self-determination in particular? Or does the 
possibility of intervention still fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the state? If the latter is 
the case, then, under international law, states may not intervene in the internal affairs of other 
states.
Knowledge of the framework for the application of the non-interference principle has a 
material effect on the answers to these questions, enabling analysing those restrictions and 
identifying cases in which international intervention is permitted. In fact, as a result of 
international differences, the framework for the application of the principle of non-
interference in international issues is neither easily defined nor identified. 
The principle of non-interference acquired legal force only after the UN Charter documented
it in 1945. Article 2 (7) stipulates that ‘nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state’. 520 This article corresponds with Article 10 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations,521 which mandates that member states adhere to the concept of internal 
sovereignty and refuse to acknowledge other international authorities as superior to their 
national authority. This text certainly restricts the UN from interfering in many cases which 
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fall within the domestic jurisdiction of member states. The importance of the principle of 
non-interference is manifested in the international legal regime which governs the behaviour 
of political units and ensures their ability to coexist by granting all equal sovereignty and 
freedom to choose the political, social, cultural and economic systems that fit the needs and 
wishes of their citizens.522
Taking into consideration the exception of the UN Security Council, compliance with these 
articles extends to all organs and activities of the UN and could play an important role in 
supporting freedoms and human rights. Take, for example, the ICJ’s response when requested 
in UN General Assembly resolution No. 294 to interpret the peace agreements among 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. This resolution pushed these countries to call the General 
Assembly’s request for an interpretation of those conventions by the ICJ interference in their
internal sovereignty. In the light of these considerations, the court denied the request because,
as a UN organ, it should not interpret international conventions, mainly due to the domestic 
jurisdiction of the states concerned. UN organs are committed to respecting the UN Charter, 
in particular Article 2(7).523
The UN also faces many difficulties when applying Article 2 (7), especially when exercising 
some of its jurisdictional powers. According to Chapters IX and X, in particular Articles 55 
and 62, the UN enjoys wide powers in economic and social areas.524 However, the UN can
fulfil its duties without interfering in the internal affairs of member states only with difficulty. 
Moreover, in accordance with Article 56, member states have committed, individually and
collectively, to co-operating with the organisation to achieve the purposes set forth in Article 
55.525 Thus, the previous texts can be interpreted as obliging member states to accept UN 
intervention in the areas provided for in Article 55, even if these areas involve the domestic 
jurisdiction of those countries.
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Taking Article 2 (7) as the basis for this principle, it can be argued that this provision 
prevents only the UN from intervening in the internal affairs of countries. However, drawing 
upon Article 3 of the Rights and Duties of States, the International Law Commission has 
interpreted the principle of non-interference as broadly and comprehensively as possible, 
prohibiting states from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Specifically, 
Article 3 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States states that ‘every State has 
the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other State’.526
This declaration emphasises that the principle of non-interference prohibits intervention in 
the internal affairs of countries not only by the UN but also by nation states. However, some 
might object that this interpretation of the principle of non-interference is too broad and 
extends to international relations beyond the scope of the UN Charter. In this view, Article 
2(7) supports a much narrower interpretation, as it clearly and explicitly prohibits the world 
organisation from such intervention. However, we should note that the UN agencies have 
applied this principle flexibly, without being restricted by prohibitions on interference by the 
organisation itself or its member countries.
This interpretation confirms the position taken by the Ukrainian delegate during the 1946
Security Council debate on the issue of Greece that the presence of British troops in Greece 
was interference in its internal affairs. The Ukrainian representative asserted that Article 2(7)
does not give countries the right to intervene in the affairs of another country.527 Another 
example emerges from the Security Council discussion the situation in the Dominican 
Republic in 1965. The Uruguayan delegate said that the UN and its members must follow the 
principles proclaimed in Article 2 of the Charter, in particular the principle of non-
interference in paragraph (7).528 During the heated debates in the Security Council on the 
situation in Georgia in the summer of 2008, the United Kingdom delegate said that Russia’s 
                                               
526 Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, UN International Law Commission (1949).
527 UN, Consideration of Questions under the Council’s Responsibility or the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security 301–309 <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/46-51_08.pdf) accessed 28/06 2012. 
See also Thanasis D. Sfikas, The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War 1945-1949: The 
Imperialism of ‘Non-Interference’, Ryburn, 1994, p. 133.
528 Max Hilaire, Nijhoff Law Specials, International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the 
Western Hemisphere, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p.57.
127
actions in Georgia must be considered a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.529
It must also be pointed out that, through customary law, the prohibition on intervention in 
countries’ internal affairs applies to those states that have joined the many international and 
regional conventions and agreements made over the past several decades. For example, in the 
first conference of the Group of Non-Aligned States held in Bandung in 1955, the principle of 
non-interference was one of ten principles included in an international charter to govern 
relations among different countries.530 The Conference of Security and Cooperation ( held in 
Helsinki in 1975 confirmed that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
countries is one of the basic principles underlying relations between participating 
countries.531
Additionally, in many decisions such as Resolution No. 2131 in 1965, the General Assembly 
has endorsed the principle of non-interference and called member states to respect it.532 We 
must also include the declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in 
the Internal Affairs of States No. 36/103 in 1980.533 As for international justice, in 1947, the 
ICJ stressed the principle of non-interference in the judgment of the Corfu Channel Incident 
between Britain and Albania534 and in the issue of military activities and paramilitary actions 
between the US and Nicaragua in 1984.535 In addition, the legal provisions of many 
international conventions have recognised this principle, including Articles 2 and 3 of the 
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Charter of the OAS536 and Article 3 of the Organisation of African Unity Charter.537
Moreover, the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States issued by the General Assembly under recommendation No. 
2625 on 24 October 1970 expresses this principle as follows: ‘the duty of States to refrain in 
their international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion 
aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State...’.538
Thus, we can say that non-interference in the internal affairs of states has become a legal 
principles governing the contemporary world, whether within or external to the UN. Respect 
for this principle prevents any country from imposing its control on another by obliging them 
not to interfere in others’ internal affairs.
However, the implementation of this principle, particularly in the field of human rights and 
freedoms, has not yet reached the stage of consensus in international law among international 
jurists or nations and international organisations. Essentially, we have arrived at an advanced 
stage of attention to freedoms and human rights. Through the adoption of standards that
promote democracy and gives political support to human rights, the international community
generally has, agreed on the need not to go beyond protecting humans against murder, torture 
and persecution.539 Thus, the issue of humanitarian intervention poses a direct challenge to 
the ideas of sovereignty and non-interference, especially as it concerns direct intervention in 
the internal affairs of any country.
In modern times, the international community has witnessed many cases of international 
intervention intended, for the most part, to protect human rights and support the freedoms and 
rights of individuals. These methods of these interventions have varied from direct military 
action to economic or political acts. These developments have given rise to an important,
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fundamental question: Are interpretations of the concepts of absolute sovereignty and the 
principle of non-interference becoming broad rather than narrow, permitting international 
humanitarian intervention when the circumstances warrant it? Or, put another way, has the 
principle of non-interference emerged from a stalemate as a flexible ideal allowing 
intervention in cases in which a majority of state actors agree that it is necessary for the 
protection and advocacy of human rights? The answer to these questions will be found 
through an analysis of the evolution of the principle of non-interference in modern 
international practices, conventions and doctrinal debates.
3.4.2 The concept of Non-interference in a transformative phase
The evolution of traditional legal principles must keep pace with changes in the 
contemporary international reality caused by new challenges and intellectual 
developments.540 This development is being imposed on international relations and thus 
strikes at the core of public international law. The doctrinal controversy on the impact of the 
concept of human rights has spread among scholars, in the corridors of the UN (and to the 
content of public international law.541 These changes thus confront public international law 
with new challenges and developments, such as the gradual shift from the concept of absolute 
sovereignty to that of relative sovereignty542 and of sovereignty as a responsibility. This shift 
can be considered a bridge linking the modern and traditional notions of state sovereignty.543
Since the mid-twentieth century, the idea of the international responsibility to protect the 
citizens of each state has emerged through the establishment of international organisations 
and committees concerned with human rights, courts of war crimes and the concept of crimes 
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against humanity.544 During the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late
twentieth century, these concepts developed rapidly and led to the wide spread of intellectual 
and doctrinal freedoms.545 These concepts thereby contributed to the emergence of the 
principle of sovereignty as a responsibility, which has been imposed as a mandate on the 
international community. This principle particularly applies to cases where a country fails or 
is unable or unwilling to carry out its responsibility to stop violence and persecution, 
displacement and torture and to achieve social justice and equality.546
In practical terms, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union had the greatest 
impact on focusing international attention on and granting flexibility in international 
decision-making on the human rights field. During the period of the Cold War, the UN 
Security Council served as the field for a fierce ideological battle between the Soviet Union 
and Western countries, specifically the United States (, to protect the interests of and prevent 
intervention in each camp’s allies.547
In my view, the principle of non-interference has achieved effectiveness in international law 
as a result of the following circumstances.
1. The chaotic and teeming world situation that unfolded in the period preceding the 
creation of contemporary international law, which saw many wars and permanent 
conflicts that led to human catastrophes, particularly the First and Second World 
Wars. This historical era contributed to the development of the concept of global 
peace and security. This concept seeks to restrict international disputes and has played 
a direct role in the development of the concept of sovereignty and the principle of 
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non-interference through the establishment of the rules of law on which this principle 
is based.
2. During the Cold War, the division of the world into an Eastern and a Western camp 
contributed to the development of the principle of non-interference in international 
law and relations, whereby each camp opposed intervention by the other camp in 
different countries. In this way, each side intensified the principle of non-interference,
and the scholars from each side narrowly interpreted the principle of non-interference 
to prohibit the parties from interfering with one another, whatever the reason. Given
that both the Soviet Union and the United States both sat on the UN Security Council 
and possessed veto power, the seventh paragraph of Article II was adopted to resolve
any questions raised in the Security Council or the General Assembly about 
interference in the internal affairs of any country. This paragraph addressed the
political considerations of both the United States and the Soviet Union. 
These political circumstances became evident when the Security Council initiated direct 
intervention in Somalia and Rwanda under the pretext of protecting human rights after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.548 In fact, 1992 marks a milestone 
in international humanitarian interventions. Previously, the UN carried out international 
interventions for the sole purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Since then, 
the Security Council frequently has sought to link humanitarian aid and Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. For example, the Security Council issued several successive decisions relating to 
Somali affairs intended to providing humanitarian aid. Among these, resolutions Nos. 733
(1992),549 751 (1992),550 767 (1992)551 and 794 (1992)552 permit the international community 
to intervene directly using all available means.
These transformations thus have created a fit between the principles of sovereignty and 
human rights, making sovereignty not absolute but relative status. In confirmation, let us refer 
to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s his annual address to the General Assembly of 1999, 
in which he said:
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State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of 
globalisation and international co-operation. The State is now widely understood to be 
the servant of its people, and not vice versa. At the same time, individual 
sovereignty—and by this I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each 
and every individual as enshrined in our Charter—has been enhanced by a renewed 
consciousness of the right of every individual to control his or her own destiny.553
Note that Annan focused on the shift in the focus of the concept of sovereignty from 
countries to the individual. By expanding to include individual rights and the right of every 
person to self-determination, the concept of sovereignty has been renewed and gained the 
support of an increasingly wide range of actors. The traditional concept of sovereignty no 
longer satisfies the aspirations of the peoples for freedom and stability without domination,
oppression or persecution. In addition, Annan acknowledged that the state is responsible for 
protecting its people and cannot limit itself to maintaining its sovereignty and control. 
In fact, Annan’s speech contributed to creating international practices that have lessened 
support of efforts against non-interference and helped establish responsibility for the 
protection of a country’s citizens as an international principle. Therefore, these practices can 
be implemented when urgently needed to break the principle of non-interference and promote 
the active international protection of human rights.554
3.4.2.1 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty
In response to these changes, the Canadian government established the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In 2000, the ICISS issued a 
report titled ‘The Responsibility to protect’, which introduced many new concepts and called 
for a shift from the concept of sovereignty as authority to sovereignty as a responsibility.555
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This shift makes the state responsible for the protection of its citizens under international 
monitoring.556 The acceptance of this shift in sovereignty means that if the state cannot or 
does not intend to protect its citizens, the responsibility to do so shifts to the international 
community.557 More specifically, this responsibility is assumed by organs of the UN, 
particularly the Security Council.
The ICISS attempted to develop a broad concept of international intervention and to
formulate a global consensus on how to respond to large, systematic violations of human 
rights.558 Amid the transformations in the concept of sovereignty since the end of the Cold 
War, it has become accepted that sovereignty imposes a dual responsibility, both internal and 
external. The external responsibility requires the state to respect the sovereignty of other 
countries, whereas the internal responsibility requires the state to protect the human rights
and respect the dignity of its citizens.
However, reactions to the ICISS report of the Commission have varied, with most support 
coming from Canada, Europe and some South American countries. Many countries, including
India, Russia and some Asian nation, were critical of the report. Before voting on it, these 
countries stipulated that the report should require the prior approval of the states and 
demanded a wide representation of the states on the Security Council, which has the power to 
intervene. At the same time, a range of countries in the Middle East and Asia, along with
China, announced their opposition to any restrictions on the concept of sovereignty in favour 
of human rights.559
Despite the criticism and objections from so many countries, Annan announced his approval
of the report and urged the adoption of most of the commission’s recommendations.560 He 
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expressed his approval of this concept even more clearly during his speech in receipt of the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2001, from which the ICISS drew a number of quotations.561
3.4.2.2 The report of the committee of High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, 
and Change
In 2003, Annan established the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to study 
the dangers to international peace and security.562 The committee issued a report entitled ‘A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, which the UN approved in 2004.563 The 
report expresses the following sentiment:
In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the 
privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions 
may have prevailed when the Westphalia system first gave rise to the notion of State 
sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the 
welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international 
community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every 
State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own 
people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles 
of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken 
up by the international community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to help build the 
necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be.564
It is notable that the report used some concepts and ideas from the ICISS report and adapted 
them to shift sovereignty and the international responsibility to intervene. More importantly, 
the panel’s report supports the emerging principle that a collective international responsibility 
to protect human rights exists and, furthermore, is to be exercised by organs of the UN, 
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particularly the Security Council, under the powers granted by Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Such intervention is especially urgent in response to gross violations of human 
rights, ethnic cleansing or genocide, and history has proved that, all too often, sovereign 
governments can be helpless, unable or unwilling to prevent such violations or to resolve 
them.
3.4.2.3 The principle of responsibility to protect (R2P)
The 2005 World Summit at the UN Headquarters took the same approach, although some 
objections were presented in the preparatory meetings for the summit. The participating 
countries divided over support of the fundamental shifts in the principle of sovereignty, 
particularly regarding the principle of non-interference, and the adoption of the principle of 
responsibility.565 Representatives of some countries proposed that the UN Security Council 
assume responsibility for the protection of endangered communities, as stipulated in the 
Secretary-General’s report. However, Russia objected to the motion, which had a strong 
influence as the country is a permanent member of the Security Council and has veto power. 
In addition, some Latin American countries intervened during the discussions to vote on 
some paragraphs.566
However, in response to the suggestions of the World Summit, the General Assembly 
adopted the principle of responsibility through an amendment to the resolutions of the 
summit. This amendment admits the resolution was not as expected and does not abide by the 
conditions laid down by the ICISS Commission, such as the requirement for Security Council
members to not use their veto on issues that require international responsibility. In addition, 
the amendment weakens the protection of human rights violations.567
The most positive aspect of the summit came in its final report. Interestingly, the report 
clearly emphasised respect for human rights as a fundamental principle in international 
relations and the responsibility of member states to protect their citizens from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In addition, the report stipulates that 
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the UN should bear the final responsibility to protect communities through collective action 
by the organisation’s members.568
However, the report retreated from mandating the use of force by stating that the Security 
Council should examine each case individually to determine (the possibility of genocide or 
ethnic cleansing. In the cases considered by the Security Council, the role of the principle of 
collective responsibility for protection was restricted, and the right to object or change the 
text of resolutions was given to any country, particularly the permanent members of the 
Security Council.569
Despite this weakening of the principle of collective responsibility, the summit participants 
did sign a pledge referencing it. Item 138 states that ‘we accept that responsibility and will 
act in accordance with it’. In addition, item 139 includes a clear and explicit pledge by the 
international community, through the UN, to accept the responsibility to use all possible 
diplomatic and humanitarian means to protect each country’s peoples from the four agreed-
upon crimes.570
After the Word Summit recognised this conceptual shift, the principle of the responsibility to 
protect appeared in a draft resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts 
submitted by Britain to the Security Council. After a delay of more than a month because of a 
split within the UN Security Council, it issued resolution No. 1674 (2006).571 Paragraph 4 of 
this resolution includes a statement on the principle of the responsibility to protect 
populations from crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide and crimes against humanity.572
However, Russia declared that it was premature to adopt the principle of the responsibility to 
protect in the documents of the Security Council. Furthermore, the Russian delegate asked to 
add a clause confirming the Security Council’s commitment to respect the political 
independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all states. However, this objection 
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did not actually pose a barrier to recognising the principle of responsibility for the protection 
as stipulated in the resolution.573
Subsequently, the Security Council adopted the principle of the responsibility to protect in 
order to address the situation in Darfur and then, given the situation in Sudan, confirmed this 
principle in legal form in resolution No. 1706 (2006). That resolution authorised the Security 
Council to establish a UN-affiliated peacekeeping force to carry out its duties to maintain 
security and peace. The resolution pointed to the responsibility of every member of the UN to 
protect its citizens, in addition to the responsibility of the international community to provide 
protection if the state failed to do so on its own.574
In any case, the acceptance of the principle of responsibility for protection does not depend 
upon these international practises, as it originates from fundamental changes focused on the 
necessity to protect human rights. The establishment of criminal responsibility for and 
international courts to prosecute crimes against humanity have played an active role as well. 
Those courts have deliberated how to apply basic individual criminal responsibility and how 
best to secure international peace and security through the deterrence of violence and human 
rights violations within the borders of a country. Thus has arisen the necessity for those 
courts to be able to intervene in matters fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states. All of 
these capabilities are in addition to the practises of international intervention that are possible 
with or without the consent of the Security Council.
3.4.2.4 The impact of international criminal tribunals on the principle of non-
interference
Undoubtedly, it is through the support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
directly challenges the principle of non-interference in particular and traditional principles of 
sovereignty in general, that the individual now enjoys private and public legal rights. On the 
international level, the international community’s embrace of the International Criminal 
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Court (ICC) actively pursues the protection of human rights through individual criminal 
liability.575
Individual human rights have become of interest to international law since the emergence of 
the principle of international responsibility for international crimes, so the perpetrators of or 
decision-makers in such crimes can no longer act with impunity protected by principle of 
non-interference. The freedom of the state to abuse its citizens within its territory under the 
cover of absolute sovereignty and non-interference in countries’ internal affairs has been 
nullified. So has the argument that an abuser is justified by either representing the state or 
merely obeys its orders. Human rights have become a key issue in international law and are 
no longer restricted to domestic law.576
The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals marked the starting of the application of the concept of 
international criminal responsibility, with the purpose to punish individuals who have 
committed international crimes against humanity or war crimes through an international 
court. These courts have played an active role in the development of international criminal 
responsibility, as shaped through numerous resolutions and international instruments.577 For 
example, the International Law Commission considered the verdicts handed down by these 
courts to lay out key principles, including the recognition of individual criminal responsibility 
at the international level.578
The courts rejected the objection that international law governs the acts of only sovereign 
states and has no power to punish individuals who committed crimes as representatives of the 
state. In response to these allegations, the courts also asserted that international law imposes 
duties and responsibilities on both the states and individuals.579
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Additionally, the UN Security Council has created numerous international courts to prosecute
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Specifically, the Council has 
established, for a limited time and a specific dispute, the International Court for the former 
Yugoslavia (resolution No. 827),580 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (resolution 
No. 955),581 Special Court for Sierra Leone (resolution No. 1315)582 and Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (resolution No. 1757).583
By applying specific adaptations of the principle of international responsibility to the 
prosecution of the crimes in these cases, these courts have virtually broken the principle of 
non-interference. The inability of those countries to carry out their obligations to their own 
people created the necessity for the international community to shoulder the responsibility to 
protect individuals and punish both the perpetrators of offenses against other citizens and
state decision-makers. These courts were formed independently of the countries’ internal 
judicial systems, traditionally the domestic jurisdiction of the state. Thus, these international 
courts rank higher than the national courts, which represent the judicial power of the state.
In addition, the global judicial authorities have aided in enshrining these definitions of 
responsibility by giving permission to some national courts to try those suspected of acts 
considered international crimes, regardless of where they were committed or of the 
perpetrators’ nationality.584 For example, the Belgian judiciary indicted Israeli Defence 
Minister Ariel Sharon for the Sabra and Shatila massacres.585
As Karinne Coombes said, universal jurisdiction aims to end the era of impunity for 
perpetrators of serious crimes.586 However, universal jurisdiction faces challenges in the 
domain of international law, particularly with regard to international practice,587 because it 
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gains its strength from international customary law.588 This is supported by decision No. 121  
(2000) of the International Court of Justice regarding the arrest warrant issued by a Belgian 
judiciary against the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Abdoulaye 
Yerodia Ndombasi,589 who was accused of inciting racial hatred against the Tutsi ethnic 
group and crimes against humanity.590 The Court, in its decision regarding this warrant, 
violated the principle of diplomatic immunity.591
In the same context, we find that the reaction of the African Union towards the French arrest 
warrant for nine Rwandan officials, including Rwandan President Paul Kagame, was violent 
and unwelcoming.592 The African Union stated that the warrant violated territorial 
sovereignty and that the action was political in nature and abused universal jurisdiction. The 
practice of universal jurisdiction does not depend on such restrictions; instead, it extends to 
the difficulty in determining the international jurisdiction of national courts.593 Anthony 
Colangelo considers that the national jurisdiction for international crimes is unclear, because 
jurisdiction has an international dimension that collides with the principles inherent in 
international law, including those of territorial sovereignty and political and diplomatic 
immunity.594
However, universal jurisdiction constitutes an important development in international law595
and contributes, along with other international courts, to eliminating safe corridors for the 
perpetrators of international crimes whenever there is international consensus or agreement 
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regarding jurisdiction.596 If some of the perpetrators of these crimes have diplomatic 
immunity, such immunity may be rescinded with the passage of time, or may otherwise be 
cancelled—either by the state to which the offender belongs or by international decision.597
This development does not end with Special Criminal Courts or persistent attempts within the 
scope of universal jurisdiction, but rather it represents a fundamental shift in the development 
of international criminal tribunals, catalysed by the establishment of a permanent ICC, which 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the principle of criminal responsibility. This court is the 
most prominent achievement in the application of individual criminal responsibility at the 
international level.598 Founded in 2002, the ICC is a permanent international court capable of 
trying individuals accused of war crimes, crimes of aggression, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.599
It is important to point out that one of the most important principles underlying the court is 
expressed in the Rome Statute, which seeks to preserve sovereignty through the principle of 
complementarity. According to Article 17 of the ICC’s statute, the court completes the work 
of local judicial organs. The court also may not initiate judicial proceedings unless the local 
judicial organs have expressed a desire to refer the issue to the ICC or could not investigate 
or prosecute those issues. This principle aims to strengthen local courts by giving the court
narrow authority in cases where the state could not or did not desire to fulfil its responsibility. 
If the goal is to maintain the sovereignty, this statute allows local courts to refer cases to the 
ICC and play an active role in prosecuting criminals within the state’s borders.600
Moreover, Article 13of the Rome Statute, and paragraph (B) in particular, grants the Security 
Council broad authority to refer any issue to the ICC. Therefore, the court’s jurisdiction falls 
according to assignment by the Security Council, as paragraph (B) states: ‘The Court may 
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exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the 
provisions of this Statute if.….. a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to 
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations....’.601 For example, UN Security Council 
resolution No. 1593 (2005) appointed a judge to refer human rights violations in Darfur to the 
ICC.602
3.4.2.5 Security Council resolutions authorising international intervention
In the system of collective security established by the UN Charter, the Security Council is the 
main driver of and, in this context, fulfils the international responsibility to achieve global
peace and security.603 In addition, according to Article 39, the Council has the jurisdiction to 
assess cases and international issues to determine if they pose a threat to international peace 
and security. According to Article 24, there is a fundamental limitation on the practices of the 
Security Council: Its work must be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN. 
However, one of the UN’s main purposes is to maintain global peace and security, and 
therefore, it may take actions to ensure the protection of human rights. This obligation is 
more explicit in Article 1 of the Charter, which identifies the organisation’s purposes and 
principles of the Organisation and, in the third paragraph, specifies the need to promote 
respect for human rights.604
Through deliberation and decisions, the Security Council has dealt with many cases of human 
rights violations and discussed numerous issues involving international intervention.605 For 
example, resolution No. 2014 (2005) condemns violations of human rights in Yemen,606 and
resolution No. 1906 violations in the Republic of the Congo.607 In all these cases, the Security
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Council considered the means available to preserve human rights, especially international 
intervention measures in the event that the crisis worsened.
In other cases, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council has authorised military 
intervention to protect human rights and stop the deterioration of humanitarian situations, as 
in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In the case of Somalia, the council convened
an emergency meeting to study the seriously worsening humanitarian situation and issued 
resolution No. 733 (1992), banning the sale or delivery of any military weapon for the 
warring parties.608 Next, the Council issued resolution No. 751 (1992) requesting the 
Secretary-General to send a UN military unit to monitor the cease-fire.609
Despite these efforts to prevent further violence, the Council was compelled to take the 
important step of military intervention. It did so through resolution No. 794 (1992), which 
authorised the US-led allied forces to use all necessary means to provide humanitarian 
assistance and protect the lives of thousands of Somalis. Based on this decision, US troops 
entered Somalia to implement the resolution.610 Clearly, this was a legal action, as resolution
No. 794 authorised UN troops to intervene in Somalia and permitted the use of all necessary 
means,  justified by the deteriorating humanitarian situation and grave breaches of the rules 
of international humanitarian law.611
The Security Council followed the same pattern of intervention in Rwanda, unanimously 
adopting resolution No. 872 (1993) establishing the UN mission to provide humanitarian 
assistance to that country.612 However, genocide and human rights violations continued, 
which forced the UN Security Council to take further measures. Following a French proposal,
the council passed resolution No. 929 (1994), which authorised the establishment of a 
multinational force to provide security and protection for displaced people, refugees and all 
those at risk in Rwanda.613
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In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the council issued resolution No. 770 (1992) allowing
any members of the international community to take all measures to provide humanitarian aid 
and protection.614 In addition, Security Council resolution No. 824 (1993) designated six 
cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Sarajevo, as safe areas protected by UN troops 
against military attacks and other hostilities.615 Resolution No. 836 (1993) also gave UN 
troops the right to respond militarily against attacks on those safe areas.616 In many other 
cases, the Security Council has cited Chapter VII of its charter to authorise interventions for 
humanitarian purposes, such as resolution No. 797 (1992) regarding Mozambique617 and
resolution No. 688 (1991) concerning Iraqi Kurdistan.618
Moreover, to put pressure on conflicting parties or those violating their citizens’ human 
rights, the Security Council has in several cases imposed economic sanctions on offending 
countries. For example, Resolution No. 757 (1992) imposed multiple sanctions on the 
Yugoslav government619 and prohibited the importation of many goods. In addition, 
resolution No. 1970 (2011) put economic sanctions on Libya,620 and resolution No. 2048
(2012) sanctions on the Guinea-Bissau government after a coup.621
3.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear that the principle of non-interference faces stiff winds because of the 
need to protect human rights and the international community’s responsibility to provide such 
protection. The international community has taken many steps that have weakened the 
traditional manifestations of sovereignty, especially the principle of non-interference. In 
addition, many organisations have adopted a number of international resolutions and policies 
that have furthered the on-going transformation of the principle of non-interference. 
However, these practices and decisions have not led to the collapse of the concept of non-
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interference but, rather, to the identification of exceptional circumstances, such as violation 
of human rights, in which this principle may be broken. Thus, we can say that staunch 
support of the principle of non-interference has given way to some flexibility and that the 
basic conditions for this change have been met, in particular establishing the principle of 
international responsibility for protecting human rights.
However, this conflict over the principle of non-interference also extends to support for the 
rights recognised by the international community, especially the right to self-determination. 
Thus, these changes have helped establish the duty to intervene when humans are exposed to 
the real danger of being killed, displaced or tortured. Unarguably, the belief that the right of 
political self-determination is one of the most important human rights has been produced by 
modern legal and political thought formed through many of the practices and international
resolutions relevant to this right. The next chapter will examine the legal dimension of 
international interventions to promote the right of political self-determination. Specifically, 
the political and legal norms of international jurisprudence concerning this right and the legal 
basis for such interventions will be analysed. The most prominent legal obstacles to 
legitimising this kind of international intervention will also be discussed.
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Chapter Four 
The legal concept of international intervention to promote the right of political 
self-determination
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a critical analysis of the concept of international interventions to 
promote the right of political self-determination and the legal basis for such interventions,
whether in rules or jurisprudence. As well, this chapter explores the legal obstacles to their 
legitimisation. In the previous chapter, we described the bending of indicators of states’
sovereignty, particularly the principle of non-interference, and explained how this legal 
principle has become more flexible in conformance to modern legal trends that prioritise the 
protection and support of human rights. It is important to undertake a deep analysis of the 
extent to which legal interventions to promote the right of political self-determination are in 
line with these trends. In particular, we consider the contemporary interest in the right of 
political self-determination as expressed in the rules of international law and jurisprudence.
4.2 Meaning of international intervention to support the right of political self-
determination
Providing a specific legal definition of international intervention to promote the right to 
political self-determination is challenging because of the need to consider both legal and 
political issues. Any confusion between law and politics inevitably complicates the 
development of a clear legal formula. Discrepancies can also arise between the legal rules in 
force, such as Article 2(7) of the UN Charter,622 and the objectives of the international 
community, such as support for democracy.623 The concerned parties, whether states or 
international organisations, might also have different views on the appropriate mechanisms 
for such interventions. However, it should be possible to formulate a definition of 
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international intervention that supports the right of political self-determination. The creation 
of such a formula contributes to the development of greater attention to human rights, 
including the right of political self-determination and its defence.
It is essential to differentiate between international intervention to protect human rights and 
international intervention to support or promote the right of political self-determination. 
However, both interventions seek to uphold the dignity of human rights and share an 
interdependence and interrelatedness in the goals, actions and style of intervention.624
International jurisprudence has tended to focus on the study of unilateral intervention for the 
protection of basic human rights, such as in cases of murder, persecution, torture, and 
displacement, rather than upon interventions to foster political self-determination. This
tendency has emerged despite the argument that an environment of democratic politics and
popular political options could contribute to the elimination of human rights violations. 
However, it should be noted that steps have been taken to enable international intervention in 
support of the political right to self-determination. For example, Security Council resolution
No. 940 sought to support democracy in Haiti by restoring a constitutional government after 
the military coup led by Raoul Cedras.625 Other examples include the US prosecution for the 
invasion of Panama in 1989626 and the economic sanctions imposed on South Africa during 
the apartheid era.627
International interventions for the protection of human rights can be broadly classified into 
two types: apparent intervention, which focuses directly on protecting human rights, and 
hidden intervention, which works towards the same aim by promoting political self-
determination. Example of both kinds of intervention occurred in Kosovo in 1999, when the 
international community interceded to protect ethnic Albanians from genocide and atrocities 
committed by the Serbs. It can be argued that the right to self-determination played a pivotal 
role in the outbreak of the crisis. This is evidenced by the events that occurred in Kosovo 
after the 1989 declaration by Slobodan Milosevic abolishing the autonomy of Kosovo 
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Albanians.628 In 1991, the people of Kosovo held a referendum which expressed a majority 
desire to secede from Serbia and establish an independent republic.629 The Serbian 
government refused to recognise the wishes of the people of Kosovo, resulting in armed 
clashes that led to violations of international human rights. The international community 
launched a programme of military intervention to protect human rights, particularly with 
regards to murder, persecution, and torture.630 While this is an apparent intervention, a hidden 
intervention was also achieved through the promote the self-determination of the people of 
Kosovo.631
Another example of these interventions can be seen in the  security Council resolution 
No.1973 (2011) regarding Libya. The resolution took on an apparent form—to protect 
civilians from attacks by the forces of Muammar al-Gaddafi632—contributed to a hidden 
international intervention to change the regime in Libya. This eventually culminated in the 
current situation in Libya: a trend towards democracy and international recognition of the 
Libyan Transitional Council.633 Similarly, the results of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, on 
the pretext that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that could threaten international 
security, contributed to ending the 24-year regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. This 
resulted in the creation of a democratic environment for the Iraqi people,634 culminating in 
the drafting of a new democratic constitution in 2005.635
These examples have illustrated the two types of international intervention to support the 
right of political self-determination: apparent interventions, as that in Haiti, and hidden 
interventions, so called because they overlap with international interventions to protect 
human rights, as in Kosovo and Libya.
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Other scholars of international law want to divide international interventions for the 
protection of human rights into a narrow and a broad category.636 This division is premised
upon the close relationship between the formal and substantive objectives and procedures of 
international interventions to promote political self-determination and to protect human 
rights. Therefore, examining both categories is required to ensure the protection of these 
rights.637
The broad category of international intervention includes all measures taken by the 
international community to prevent or stop the violation of human rights. These measures are 
organised within the legal framework provided in the UN Charter and regional conventions. 
Intervention can take the form of diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions, up to and 
including the use of armed force.638 The narrow category of international intervention is 
focused upon the use of armed force, including restrictions on its use and the threat of its use. 
Acceptance of this division requires consideration of whether non-violent actions in support 
of self-determination should be considered interference in the political and legal sense. This 
would permit viewing non-violent intervention as falling outside the scope of intervention, 
along with measures agreed upon by the UN Security Council.639 In this sense, it can be 
argued that military actions are a faster and more effective means of protecting human rights. 
Jamnejad and Wood have noted the close relationship between the principle of non-
interference and the rules of international law on the use of force. Thus, intervention remains 
associated with the use of force in jurisprudence and the legal literature. This association
might be why many forms of interference involve the military, as in Kosovo or Haiti.640
However, international intervention to support the right of political self-determination 
generally draws upon the broader sense of international intervention, representing a modern 
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trend to renounce violence. The right of political self-determination is an intrinsic part of the 
legal principles that govern the post-World War II world,641 which prohibit the use of force in 
international relations.642 Democracy arguably is a manifestation of the right to political self-
determination, creating security and stability for the people. Thus, the right of political self-
determination contradicts the narrow definition that limits intervention to the use of armed 
force, unless the claim for self-determination has been met by human rights abuses such as 
displacement, murder and torture or by the use of legal proceedings and other economic 
sanctions.
The broad definition of international intervention supporting the right of political self-
determination can be implemented in several ways.
1. Narrowly interpreting international intervention supports the traditional stages of 
international relations that permit the use of force. However, this interpretation does 
not accord with international law’s increasing emphasis on the avoidance of force in 
international relations. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force except in the case of 
legitimate defence, as provided for in Article 51,643 or in the case of collective 
enforcement measures authorised by the Security Council, following Chapter VII.644
Support for the right to political self-determination reaches this point only in 
exceptional cases in which the government brutally represses a people’s popular, 
peaceful claim. There is evidence to suggest that the international community should 
support these demands peacefully, as the international resolutions and 
recommendations supporting the right to peaceful self-determination often lead the 
state and the international community to meet the wishes of the people to achieve this 
right.
2. The trend towards a broad interpretation of intervention is consistent with 
contemporary international relations as economic, energy, transportation and media 
developments have increased the interdependence of countries. Thus, no state can live 
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in isolation from the international community,645 which could increase the political 
turmoil within states. These circumstances suggest that intervention through political 
or economic pressure could be an effective means to compel a country to end its 
objection to the popular desire for political self-determination. 
3. The broad interpretation of the concept of interference includes the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of states. This is in line with international laws and 
resolutions issued by international organisations, especially the UN. The gradient in 
the use of international procedures therefore contributes to the tension between the 
principle of non-interference and support for the right of political self-determination. 
This helps to create an environment that supports the right to self-determination by 
not resorting to direct intervention in the internal affairs of states. Instead, states are 
given adequate opportunities to correct their positions until they comply with the 
modern international position, which supports the right of political self-determination.
Therefore, we can link the broad category of international intervention to support of the right 
of political self-determination, in contrast to the narrow category, which does not comply 
with modern global thought which no longer favours resorting to force.646
It is therefore possible to define international intervention as being in support of the right of 
political self-determination. Such interventions range from granting asylum to imposing
political and economic pressure on a state that refuses to grant self-determination to its 
people. On the other hand, limiting this definition to military intervention means that 
intervention may include the use of armed force when another state suppresses its people’s
desires in violation of international law on human rights. However, this definition was not 
intended to include interventions to change regimes or dictatorships, nor to be the permanent
formula in traditional international law. 
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There is no doubt that the legal personality of a state is an important factor in the actions of 
other states aimed at weakening that personality. International figures might join together to 
form international organisations and regional federations.647 These entities play a pivotal role 
in contemporary international relations, contributing to either strengthening or weakening the 
personality of states. For example, Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU forbids 
memberships to countries that violate their political constitution and replace ruling regimes 
by force.648
This definition also reveals an overlap between international interventions to support the right 
of political self-determination and to protect human rights.649 An intervention to promote this 
right might take place before a government has applied excessive force against its citizens 
making such demands. However, as soon as the state begins using excessive force, it violates
international human rights, and the intervention therefore shifts into the protection of these 
rights.650 As mentioned, however, the hidden motive of this intervention might still be to 
support the right of political self-determination.
Although the right to political self-determination clearly is less important than universal 
human rights, this right and the need to encourage the growth of democracy are increasingly 
regarded as essential to fostering stability and peace,651 as stated in Article 21 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.652 It is important to differentiate between the 
severity of damage inflicted by the types of intervention and by political and economic 
sanctions. As well, it must also be understood that intervention, in whatever form, has only 
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one goal—the betterment of individual human lives—which includes the right to self-
determination as an important, basic human right. 
In light of these considerations, the rights and freedoms outlined in international conventions 
deserve to be protected effectively by the international community. However, determining the 
appropriate intervention mechanism requires a distinction to be drawn between human rights 
and the magnitude of potential damage. As the right of political self-determination is linked 
to the pursuit of international peace and security, it therefore is important to reject violence 
and achieve the empowerment of peoples through peaceful measures that put pressure on the 
state.
4.3 Legal basis for international interventions to promote the right of political 
self-determination
As discussed in the first chapter, with the global trend towards democracy, the international 
community increasingly recognises the importance of individual human rights and freedoms 
and accepts them as basic principles of contemporary international law. It can even be said
that these rights have become a common heritage of mankind.653 Consequently, countries 
commit to respecting these rights, irrespective of political borders. This commitment has 
found its basis in a wide range of international conventions that oblige member states to 
respect human rights and general freedoms, most notably the UN Charter. As stated in the 
preamble to the Charter, We, the Peoples of the United Nations determined ... to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small’.654
The UN has also contributed to and adopted numerous resolutions that encourage the spread 
of freedom and democracy. In addition, the UN has established many programmes aimed at 
supporting democracy, such as the UN Development Programme.655 These interests are not 
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constrained within certain borders or specific geographical areas but extend to all the people 
of the earth.
The first chapter of this dissertation discussed the universality of the right of self-
determination, access to this right and the on-going campaign to establish democracy as a 
right in international law. Related to these developments, it should be noted that 
contemporary international law support the individual rights and peoples rights.656 This 
support of political rights and freedoms by international organisations and governments, 
however, has led to conflicts with the principle of non-interference. This research has also 
discussed the evidence that international attention to human rights and freedoms has 
contributed to a more flexible interpretation of the traditional concept of non-interference. 
Under the still-evolving consensus, the international community may now undertake 
measures to intervene for the protection and promotion of human rights. This new, more 
flexible interpretation has found expression in many cases, such the Security Council
interventions in Somalia and Libya and the legal rules adopted by the General Assembly of 
the UN, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
However, political differences and the interests of international players have occasionally 
limited this international trend. This can be seen in the case of the continuing violence in 
Syria, where the governments of Russia and China oppose any form of international 
intervention, asserting the right of national sovereignty against the rights of the Syrian people 
to political self-determination. This opposition has had the practical effect of leaving the 
Syrian regime intact, despite more than 40 years of persecution of its citizens.657 Many Third 
World countries are likely to be non-democratic regimes that, under the pretext of state 
sovereignty, do not allow the interference in matters relating to democracy and human rights. 
Interventions in these situations would give major powers the opportunity to control the other 
countries’ economic resources in the wake of political independence.658
This possibility drives the position and statements by some countries in the Middle East, a 
region torn by revolts over political self-determination. Former Libyan leader Muammar 
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Gaddafi asserted that the Western colonial powers want to regain control of the region.659 The 
Syrian media has also consistently maintained that these interventions are an extension of the 
colonial era.660 Similarly, during the past quarter of the twentieth century, officials of the 
former Eastern European socialist states repeatedly argued that the UN debates on issues of 
democracy and human rights were solely an attempt by the major powers to intervene in their 
internal affairs, thereby damaging their national independence.661
In contrast, countries interested in supporting human rights and freedoms have recognised the 
need for the international community to monitor the freedoms and rights of individuals in 
different countries.662 This need has been recognised by many governments regarding the 
violations of human rights in Syria. Accordingly, these countries have applied a range of 
economic, diplomatic and political sanctions against the Syrian regime in response to its 
refusal to grant self-determination to its people. The blatant violations of human rights in 
response to calls for democracy have raised great concern among the international 
community.663
It is clear that respect for human rights and freedoms, including the right to political self-
determination, cannot be achieved if every state may observe or deny these rights within its 
borders. It, therefore, is advisable that each state extends its respect for these rights and other 
peoples beyond its borders, under the governance of a responsible international 
community.664 Accordingly, Article 56 of the UN Charter obliges members to act 
individually or collectively to achieve the purposes set forth in Article 55.665
                                               
659 IBM Research, ‘Data Set: Muammar Gaddafi’s State TV Speech, 22 February 2011’ (IBM Many Eyes 29 
March 2011) <http://www-958.ibm.com/software/data/cognos/manyeyes/datasets/muammar-gaddafis-
state-tv-speech-2/versions/1> accessed 04 July 2012.
660 China Daily, ‘Syrian Envoy praises role of China, Russia’ (China.org 16 August 2012) 
<http://www.china.org.cn/world/2012-08/16/content_26251674.htm> accessed 22 August 2012; see also 
International Movement for a Just World, ‘Syrian News’ (Just-international.org 9 May 2012) <http://just-
international.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5435:syrian-news-on-may-9th-
2012&catid=45:recent-articles&Itemid=123> accessed 19 July 2012. 
661 Spyros Economides, United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p234.
662 Jennifer Moore, Collective Security with a Human Face: An International Legal Framework for Coordinated 
Action to Alleviate Violence and Poverty, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (2004) Vol. 33, No.1.
663 Several regional organizations, including the League of Arab States or European Union countries, have 
imposed economic and military sanctions on Syria, such as banning the export of military equipment and food 
products and dealing with the Syrian banks.
664 Belden Fields, Rethinking Human Rights For the New Millennium, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p4
665 UN Charter (1945) Article 56.
156
A number of international instruments and conventions have adopted the concept of political 
rights and freedoms. Among the foremost examples is the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, of which Article 1 states,
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.666
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights established the basis for a universal legal 
system of human rights and freedoms. Article 28 states that ‘everyone is entitled to a 
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized’.667 Issued in 1970, UN General Assembly resolution 
No. 2625, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations, clearly provides for oppressed peoples’ right to struggle for fairness and to 
receive the necessary moral and material assistance.668 In addition, paragraph VIII of the
1975 Helsinki Convention states that ‘all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, 
to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status’.669
Many regional conventions, such as the Charter of the EU, have also embraced these political 
rights. For example, Articles 4 and 5 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU focus 
on the principles of human dignity, while Articles 9 to 16 specify the basic freedoms that 
should be enjoyed by European citizens, and Articles 49 and 50 summarise the concepts of 
social justice and equality of rights.670 Similarly, Article 13 of the (AU Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights states:
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Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his 
country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance 
with the provisions of the law.671
Therefore, the international behaviour of nation states, in particular after the establishment of 
the UN in 1945 has demonstrated a clear interest in the right to self-determination and the 
support of hose political rights enshrined in contemporary international law. This support has 
been manifested through the following actions:
1. The establishment of organisations, associations and committees to monitor and 
preserve those rights and freedoms, including the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights,672 UN Fund for support of democracy,673 European 
Parliament’s Committee for Human Rights,674 African Commission on Human 
Rights675 and Peoples’ Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights676
2. The organisation of international treaties and conventions and regional agreements 
which promote the right of political self-determination, such as the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (,677 1981 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 678 1990 Copenhagen meeting of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation on humanitarian issues679 and the 1975 Helsinki Convention680
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3. The measures consistently undertaken by a number of countries and international 
organisations against those who violate those rights and freedoms, such as the 1960–
85 international sanctions on South Africa,681 1980 economic sanctions on 
Uruguay,682 recent economic sanctions on Syria based on a 2011 decision by the 
Turkish government,2011,683 EU sanctions on Syria imposed in 2011684 and 1994–95 
US military measures to support democracy in Haiti.685
4. Public statements by the leaders of countries in support of those rights and freedoms. 
For example, US President George H.W. Bush stated on 20 December 1989 that the 
entry of US troops into Panama was intended to defend democracy and human rights 
in that country.686 On the decision to intervene in the uprising of the Libyan people 
against Gaddafi’s government, Cameron said,
I think it is the moment for Europe to understand we should show real ambition 
about recognising that what’s happening in North Africa is a democratic 
awakening, and we should be encouraging these countries down a democratic 
path.687
The decisions and declarations supporting human rights, along with the customary rule 
established by the behaviour of the international community, have laid a clear foundation for 
the legal obligation to support and preserve the right to political self-determination. The 
international community has a proven record of attempting to ensure respect for the rights 
                                               
681 Christof H. Heyns, Frans Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic 
Level, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp 539-540.
682 Marcel Germain, ‘Blunt Instrument Sanctions Don’t Promote Democratic Change’ Boston Review (Boston 6 
February 6 2012) <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.1/trita_parsi_natasha_bahrami_iran_sanctions.php> 
accessed 16 October 2012.
683 Buckley, Caitlin A. 2012. Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria. Journal of Strategic Security (2012) Vol.5, pp. 
81-104.
684 Ibid.
685 David Wippman, Defending Democracy through Foreign Intervention,Houston Journal of International Law , 
(1997) Vol. 19, No. 3.
686 George H. W. Bush: Address to the Nation on Panama—December 20 1989’ (Historical Speeches 16 January 
2009) <http://greatspeeches.wordpress.com/category/twentieth-century-speeches/george-h-w-bush/> 
accessed 26 September 2012.
687 Joe Murphy. ‘EU Leaders Fail to Agree Action Plan for Libya’ London Evening Standard (London, 11 March 
2011) <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23931030-give-up-power-immediately-eu-prepares-
gaddafi-ultimatum.do> accessed11 March 2011.
159
and freedoms guaranteed by those documents, in particular the right to political self-
determination, regardless of the territorial boundaries that separate countries.
However, the legal texts that serve as the basis for international intervention in support of the 
right to self-determination do not necessarily legitimise international intervention on 
humanitarian grounds. Certain restrictions must be followed to justify an intervention, and 
exceeding them removes the legitimacy of the action. This aspect of intervention will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter.
4.4 Legal limitations to the legitimacy of intervention to promote the right of 
political self-determination
A discussion of international intervention in its general form typically is limited to a military 
perspective. Historically, intervention has been associated with interference to ensure the 
protection of individual rights to be free from murder, persecution and torture. However, this 
chapter has discussed the idea that the intellectual justification for the right to self-
determination stems from global progress towards the acceptance of inalienable individual 
human rights and dignity. These rights and freedoms are not consistent with the use of armed 
force, because their basic tenets pertain to security and stability for humankind. A 
fundamental criterion for achieving these rights is to remove any dictatorial regime and 
thereby free the populace from injustice, oppression and tyranny.688
Therefore, support for the right of political self-determination does not necessarily rely upon 
armed force, although it can be an important tool in addressing human rights violations. This
practice is consistent with the rules of modern international law, which prohibit the use of 
armed force in international relations, except (for legitimate defence and to resist 
repression.689 Regardless of the human and intellectual motives for international intervention 
to support political self-determination, the jurisprudence of humanitarian intervention 
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remains debatable. Its core elements are inconsistent with the principle of non-interference, 
which is one of the important legal principles guiding international relations.
As mentioned, the principle of non-interference has become flexible, but the codification 
of this principle has not been understood widely. In addition, the modern intellectual 
trend to support and promote the protection of those rights has gained strength through 
the customary rules. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the core elements of the 
implementation of intervention. However, UN General Assembly resolutions Nos. 2131
(1965) and 2625 (1970) state that ‘no State may use or encourage the use of economic, 
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it 
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign’..690
These resolutions reveal that coercion must be present for an action to be considered 
intervention, whether military or non-military, to support the right of self-determination in the 
internal affairs of a targeted state. Effectively, there must be no doubt that an attack on the 
sovereign rights of the target country would compel the government of that country to meet 
popular demands for the right of political self-determination.691 Therefore, to be legal, any 
intervention must therefore be examined for elements of coercion. Should coercion be found, 
the intervention measures taken against that State can be legitimated.692 Consequently, it is 
important to identify the different aspects of this element in both international jurisprudence 
and practices in order to determine whether supporting the right to political self-
determination involves unlawful inference. This issue is examined in the next section of this 
chapter.
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4.5 The element of coercion in international intervention
Despite agreement about the need to consider whether coercion has rendered intervention in 
the internal affairs of other countries unlawful, no formal agreements in international law 
have dealt with the issue of coercion.693 The specific requirements for the existence of 
coercion vary according to the perspective of the international parties involved, whether these 
are countries, international organisations or the UN itself.694 When nation states intervene, 
coercion is more likely to be proven than when the UN does because of the international legal 
status it enjoys and international parties’ different interpretations of Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter,695 which forms the legal framework for UN intervention in states’ internal affairs. 
In the study of the element of coercion, it therefore is necessary to determine the legal content 
of the idea of coercion and the scope of the idea of coercion in the interventions undertaken 
by countries or the UN.
4.5.1 The first requirement: The legal content of the idea of coercion
Coercion is widely thought to be an essential component in determining the illegality of 
interference in the internal affairs of a country. For example, Article 32 of the Charter of the 
Economic rights and Duties of States, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 
1974, prohibits any measures that might compel a State in the exercise of its sovereign 
rights.696 Also pertinent is Article 4 on the Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, which explicitly forbids states from undertaking interventions
for political coercion or military and economic control.697 In addition, General Assembly 
issued and reaffirmed resolutions Nos. 2131 (1965) and 2625 (1970) on the grounds that 
coercion is a core constituent element of illegal intervention in the internal affairs of 
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countries.698 Such interventions are not restricted to support of the right to political self-
determination. 
Many other international declarations and resolutions, such as Resolution 3171 (1973) on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, stipulate that countries should refrain from 
any form of coercion against any other country.699 This same restriction is contained in
General Assembly Declaration No. 31/91 (1976) on non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states. The fourth item in the declaration specifically condemns any coercion intended to 
prejudice the political or economic system of another country.700
The ICJ also addressed this issue in its 27 June 1986 judgment whether the activities of 
military and paramilitary forces in Nicaragua constituted non-interference or coercion.701
According to this decision, intervention is illegitimate whenever it imposes coercion on
matters integral to the internal sovereignty of the state, such as the right to choose a nation’s
political, economic, social and cultural systems.
Accordingly, an intervention can be confirmed as legitimate even when based on the grounds 
of coercion if the intervention cannot occur without coercion or interference in the affairs of 
that country, rather than changing the political orientation of its ruling regime.702 Despite this 
assertion, the mentioned documents discussed neither specified what could be intended under 
duress nor provided detailed descriptions of the forms of coercion.703 Therefore, the concept 
of coercion must necessarily be subjected to broad interpretations in accordance with 
international interests. This increases the complexity of interpretation because no precise 
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definition of coercion exists in international law.704 In addition, international jurisprudence 
often uses other expressions, such as deterrence or cram, to express coercion.
When discussing the element of coercion with regards to interference in countries’ internal 
affairs, it is important to emphasise that coercion take place not only through military 
means705 but also through economic and diplomatic measures.706 If there were jurisprudential 
agreement or a legal text limiting intervention to military means, it would mean there is no 
problem because the military action makes the coercion more pronounced. Therefore, such 
interventions do not require a comprehensive study and extensive justification for coercion, 
as the right of political self-determination is consistent or compatible with non-military 
means, as mentioned. 
The legal texts mentioned above have included military and non-military means, such as 
economic and political sanctions, within the scope of coercion. This definition overrides the
ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case that stated explicitly that that intervention is illegitimate 
whenever coercion is applied to matters at the core of the state’s internal sovereignty. 
However, in this and other cases, the ICJ decided that the economic intervention employed by 
the US lay outside the scope of the principle of non-interference. 
This line of thinking was evident at the beginning of the case in May 1985, when the US
government undertook a series of economic measures, such reducing its share of sugar 
imports and completely banning the export and import of goods from Nicaragua.707 These 
measures have affected on Nicaragua and caused huge economic losses. However, when 
the case was presented to the ICJ, the resolution issued on 27 June 1986 stated that the 
Court is unable to regard such action in the present case as a breach of the customary law 
principle of non-interference.708
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The ICJ position’s ICJ could be interpreted as arguing that the economic measures lack the 
character of coercion and compulsion, because the US did not force Nicaragua to commit any
particular act.709 In theory, Nicaragua could reject these measures and take counter-measures, 
such as establishing new commercial exchanges with other countries. This possibility 
provided the logical explanation for the ICJ’s denial that these measures constituted coercion.
In summary, coercion plays an essential role in determining whether intervention in a 
country’s internal affairs is legitimate. Coercion can be political, economic or military 
measures, but the important consideration is the effect that the use of these measures has 
upon the country and its right to freedom of decision. If the country can accept or refuse the 
measures and its freedom of decision is unaffected, the intervention does not constitute illegal 
interference in its internal affairs. These analyses and arguments in support of the right to 
political self-determination are reasonable and balanced. This right may be supported through 
economic measures and finds political and jurisprudential expression in the ICJ’s judgment in
the case of Nicaragua. Within the wider consideration of human rights, the right to political 
self-determination can be encouraged through coercion on the grounds that these rights 
belong to the people, not the government which only possesses sovereignty as a grant from 
the people. Therefore, whether coercion constitutes revenge from the government or 
intervention on behalf of the people depends upon its implementation by the UN or a 
particular country. 
4.5.2 The second requirement: The extent of the idea of coercion in an 
intervention implemented by the United Nations or a country
The analysis of the former requirement seems to clearly stipulate when an element of 
coercion makes an intervention in a country’s internal affairs unlawful. This element is 
permitted when incorporated into the existing framework of international laws and 
agreements but is deemed illegal when the intervening party, whether a country or 
organisation, disregards all aspects of the targeted country’s sovereignty. An examination of 
the various standards governing the legality of previous interventions reveals that the 
legitimacy of the action seems to be determined based on what entity conducts the 
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intervention. This standard might stem from the different legal bases used to govern 
interventions by the UN and by individual countries.710
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter states that
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state ... but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.711
This article set out the legal framework governing UN interventions in affairs falling within
nations’ domestic jurisdiction. A literal interpretation of this text suggests that intervention by 
the UN is permitted in only one scenario: to arrest the internal jurisdiction of the state 
targeted for intervention. In such a case, interference is not required to include or exclude an 
element of coercion, but when the state divests the target country of all internal competences
and authority, the intervention becomes illegitimate. Consequently, with the exception of the 
Security Council, no UN organs can issue a decision pertinent to the internal, sovereign rights 
of countries, as this would constitute an illegal intervention in the affairs of that country. This 
interpretation seems confirmed by the preparatory work for the conclusion of the UN Charter.
Specifically, the Secretary-General’s request for the Australian delegate to include the 
exception for measures of repression in Article 2(7)712 seems to indicated a desire to prevent 
the Security Council from taking any repressive measures in the sovereign affairs of states.
However, it would be illogical to state that the principle of non-interference applies to all 
legal acts issued by UN organs, with the exception of repressive measures permitted to the 
Security Council by Chapter VII of the Charter. This restriction would limit the Security 
Council’s ability to deal with matters relating to the internal jurisdiction of member 
countries.713 To the contrary, the Security Council has attempted to ensure international peace 
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and security in accordance with the provisions of Article 24 of the UN Charter.714 The 
council also has freedom in issues involving repressive regimes, because these fall within the 
exceptions provided in Article 2(7), although this discretion in the steps taken to combat 
repression is subject to different interpretations.715 In addition, the Council does not have the 
authority to initiate discussion of issues falling within member states’ jurisdiction because 
this conduct is not subject to the provisions of Article 2(7). Undertaking military action thus 
is more difficult as it must be discussed and voted upon before commencing.
This opinion gives all dictatorial rulers freedom to abuse and persecute their people without 
regard for the rights accorded to them under international law.716 Thus, curbing the powers of 
the UN runs contrary to the modern trend in international law to protect human rights. To 
interpret the principle of non-interference so broadly as to include all acts of the Security
Council and thereby narrow its work would increase the power of tyrants and create an 
environment in which international regulations do not encourage the protection of human 
rights.717
Article 42 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council a crucial means to grade the actions 
of the Board according to the severity of the damage likely to occur from the non-military 
approaches permitted in Article 41 and the military means allowed by Article 42.718 These 
permissions, therefore, could expand the scope of legitimate actions by the council on the 
basis of the main objective, set out in Article 24, to achieve international peace and 
security.719 The council’s work is dominated by this broad objective, regardless of the misuse 
of veto power by the permanent members. In addition, international practices to protect
human rights have weakened this principle, which has become more flexible. This has been 
accomplished by various interventions by the UN and international community to protect and 
support human rights. 
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These developments have allowed the element of coercion to be influenced by the shift in 
international perceptions and the ideology concerning the principle of non-interference.720
Therefore, it has become acceptable for an element of coercion to be introduced when the 
humanitarian situation in any country calls for international intervention.721 This change has 
occurred in accordance with contemporary international law, as formulated in conventions,
instruments and customary rules, calling for the support and promotion of basic human rights, 
including the right to political self-determination. Arguably, it therefore is appropriate to 
place less emphasis on the traditional view in which coercion serves as an essential element 
in determining the legality of an action. Increasingly, the importance of human rights 
supersedes all other considerations.722 Consequently, the international community more 
frequently accepts interventions, especially in cases in which gross violations of human rights 
are either occurring or impending. In those cases where international human-rights laws are 
invoked to stop the violations of these laws, contemporary international customary laws do 
not prevent international intervention. Under certain conditions then, interventions to stop 
any actions that degrade human dignity and restrict freedoms may be justified.723
Thus, countries’ internal competences regarding human rights and freedoms seem restricted. 
These developments give rise to the fundamental question of whether freedoms and political 
rights have transcended the domestic jurisdiction of states. This question is discussed in the 
next section in order to determine the importance of those rights and freedoms, including the 
right to political self-determination.
4.6 Domestic jurisdiction and political rights and freedoms
The legal framework for international intervention in the internal affairs of countries requires 
that such an intervention be exercised in the domestic jurisdiction of the affected country. 
With the development of the principle of non-interference and the dramatic shift caused by 
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the growing attention to human rights and the principle of international responsibility,724 it 
becomes essential to identify which issues fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
countries.
This raises the question of whether, if the right to political self-determination lies within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state, the international community may intervene to force a 
government to meet the wishes of its people to gain exercise this right. Certainly, the issues 
of human rights violations are not limited to the domestic jurisdiction of countries,725 as 
confirmed by numerous international practices explored earlier. This suggests that political 
rights and freedoms, especially the right to self-determination, should also exceed the
jurisdiction of the state.
Intervention to protect human rights enjoys broad acceptance under customary rules, for 
which there is a consensus among nations and organisations which belong to the international 
community.726 However, the wide variation in views on the issue of human rights violations 
complicates the legal position of intervention to support political self-determination. This is 
especially true if international jurisprudence views political self-determination as an 
indivisible human right.
UN General Assembly resolution No. 2131 on the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence 
and Sovereignty stipulates that ‘every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, 
economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State’. 
727
In addition, General Assembly resolution 2625 on the Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States addresses
the principle of non-interference in the internal and external affairs of the countries. This 
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resolution enumerates a number of rights and duties, perhaps the most relevant of which is 
the sovereign right of a state to enjoy political, economic and social freedom. In the same 
resolution, paragraph (A) of the second item provides that states have a duty to refrain from 
the threat or use of force or violation of borders in order to destabilise the political or 
economic system of another country or to work for the overthrow of the political system of 
another country.728
These resolutions demonstrate that international intervention to support the right to self-
determination can be deemed unlawful interference in the internal affairs of countries. This 
possibility makes it difficult to remove political rights and freedoms from domestic 
jurisdiction. These decisions assume the existence of an international community based on 
the co-existence of nations with equal sovereignty. Therefore, international support cannot be 
given to political self-determination because it inherently falls within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any country. These resolutions effectively state that absolute delivery puts the 
protection of human rights in general in the position of seizure and non-implementation. 
Consequently, the international community cannot take measures against a dictatorial ruler 
who commits crimes against his own citizens and their human rights.729 However, this 
position contradicts contemporary thought and practice, as shown in this chapter. There is no 
doubt that dictatorial rule directly relates to the protection of human rights and that these 
rights are also closely linked with the right to self-determination. When citizens want to rid 
their country of a dictatorship, they also want to end human rights violations.730
Many international conventions and resolutions support the right of political self-
determination, particularly those issued by the UN General Assembly. For example, Article 1 
of the General Assembly resolution No. 2200 (1966) on the Declaration of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that
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All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.731
Article 25 provides a similar right for peoples to participate effectively in their countries’
political process.732
Similarly, Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the (AU forbids participation by governments 
that make decisions in an unconstitutional manner.733 Article 9 of the Charter of (OAS states 
that
A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has 
been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to 
participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, 
the Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the 
commissions, working groups and any other bodies established.734
The political rights of peoples must exceed the scope of domestic jurisdiction when 
international organisations suspend the participation of governments that govern 
undemocratically from international activities. 
Similarly, the Institute of International Law’s September 1989 decision on the protection of 
human rights and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries 
emphasised that respect for human rights constitutes a commitment of each country towards 
the international community. This decision provides that a country that violates this 
commitment cannot evade its international responsibility.735
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The adoption of these human rights resolutions by the International Law Institute indicate 
that human rights are no longer primarily under the domestic jurisdiction of countries. These 
rights are protected regardless of whether they are individual or collective, and they include 
the right of peoples to political self-determination. This is true whether the rights are civil or 
political, cultural or religious or whether they derive from peremptory rules or 
complementary rules. 
This development means that no state can violate human rights without incurring a sanction 
of some sort, and these deterrent measures cannot be considered as interference in their 
internal affairs. This position is illustrated in the Institute for Human Rights’ adoption of the 
principle of international responsibility and countries’ demonstrable commitment to 
international treaties and conventions in this area, in particular the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.736
Based on these considerations and considering the contrast between the international 
resolutions and jurisprudence, backing either position is extremely difficult because both are 
based on legal rules and logical arguments in the spirit of international law. However, it is 
unacceptable to ignore violations of human rights and political freedoms when they are 
neglected by domestic laws.737 This is especially true when the demand for those rights leads 
to efforts to the overthrow of dictatorial regimes, in conformity with contemporary 
international law.738 This raises important questions about the appropriate course of action to 
deal with the mistreatment of populations by dictatorial rulers when they people call for 
participation in the governance and social justice of their own country.739
In the same context, the question arises whether democratic governments should be obliged 
to be informed by local or international opinion in their interactions with dictatorships. In the 
context of this research, the issue is whether countries should be obligated to assist 
populations living under the rule of a repressive state, such as in Syria at the present time. 
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There are strong arguments that this duty exists based upon the evolution of human rights in 
the wake of World War II and their maturation after the end of the Cold War. The 
international community has come to believe in the need to respect and protect these rights as 
a common heritage of humankind. Therefore, contemporary international law increasingly
has been directed to support those seeking the protection of their guaranteed rights.740 This 
has resulted in greater oversight of human rights within the domestic jurisdiction of countries, 
obligating the international community to act to prevent infringements of these rights, such as
freedom from torture or ill-treatment.741
The international community has demonstrated this duty in many international interventions 
intended to support the right to self-determination or to provide political support for 
democracy directly and self-determination implicitly. The most important examples of these 
interventions are examined in the next chapter.
4.8 Conclusion 
International law has given the international community legitimate means to intervene to 
promote the right of self-determination, such as economic sanctions and political measures 
against states which refuse to grant this right to people who claim it. Interventions may 
involve military force when governments suppress these claims and violate the international 
law on human rights. A broad interpretation of contemporary international law permits such 
military interventions because the right to political self-determination is viewed as essential 
to the achievement of international peace and security and eventual renunciation of the use of 
armed force. International law also encourages a gradual escalation of the use of all available 
means before reaching the stage of military intervention.
International interventions to promote the right of political self-determination have gained a 
legal basis through rules that position this right as in keeping with the spirit of international 
law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter 
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on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights. Other legal justifications are derived from the 
practices frequently performed by a number of countries and international organisations 
against those who violate this right. Examples include economic sanctions imposed by the 
EU on Syria and by the UN Security Council on Libya in 2011 and US President George 
H.W. Bush’s 20 December 1989 statement that the purpose of sending US troops to Panama 
was to defend democracy and human rights in that country. In addition, international
organisations, associations and committees have been established to monitor and maintain 
those rights and freedoms. These include the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UN Democracy Fund, European Parliament’s Human Rights Subcommittee and 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
However, these developments do not mean that absolute legitimacy is granted to any 
intervention undertaken to promote this right. The analysis of legality of any intervention to 
promote the right to political self-determination must consider restrictions, such as coercion 
and state sovereignty which imposes special legal obligations limiting the practice of 
international intervention. However, these restrictions derive their legal strength from the 
principle of non-interference which, the previous chapter showed, has been made more 
flexible by modern international practices and legal norms when violations of human rights 
are concerned. Thus, interventions can be more palatable if they aim to protect and promote 
individual rights as proscribed in the framework of international law. Such interventions may 
not run against the general will of the people, and it must be verified that state agencies 
cannot protect the people involved from crimes that violate their rights. 
The next chapter examines international interventions that contributed to the promotion of the 
right of political self-determination in order to identify the causes of such interventions and 
their degree of compliance with international law. It is important to evaluate the results of 
these interventions and the extent to which they have provided access to good governance, 
which is a standard for the achievement of the right to political self-determination.
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Chapter Five
International practices to promote the right of political self-determination and 
the principle of non-interference.
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the legal concept of international intervention to promote the 
right to political self-determination by analysing this type of intervention within the scope of 
jurisprudence and the rules of international law. This chapter looks at the real confrontation 
between this promote and the principle of non-interference by studying some of the actual 
cases dealing with the promotion of this right to determine the effect of the principle of non-
interference on this promotion. In the fourth chapter, this thesis deduced that there is a 
curvature in the absolute concept of the principle of non-intervention, but this is more on the 
theoretical side. Therefore, it is better to study the real practices in the promotion of this right 
to know the extent of the impact of the principle of non-interference on this promotion. This 
chapter will thus not focus solely on the cases in the international promotion of the right to 
self-determination. Rather, it will also examine some of the cases in which this right has been 
restored, such as Haiti and Sierra Leone.
There is no doubt; international practices have played a prominent role in the development 
and revision of the rules of international law.742 Many individual subjects of this law have 
derived standards and obligations from the rules of customary international law.743 Article 38 
of the Statute the  (ICJ clearly states that the habits of states frequently serve as a source of 
international law, while commitment to the principles of international law approved by 
civilized nations has become normative.744 These principles have been strengthened by 
customary international law. Individual states’ repetition of certain actions evidences their 
conviction that results can be achieved through that action, irrespective of the potential 
consequences or losses. More importantly, such practices must be acceptable to the 
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international community. For example, international aggression or invasion, as occurred 
against Kuwait, is considered unacceptable, whereas the international community welcomes 
humanitarian interventions, such as those in Somalia and Rwanda.
This study will be divided into the following two main sections: the first section examines 
international practices to promote the right of political self-determination during the Cold 
War, whereas the second section examines some international practices after the end of the 
Cold War. The reason for this division is to determine the extent of the influence of the 
principle of non-interference in the two periods in the evolution of international law. This is 
because many international law scholars consider the next phase of the Cold War to be a 
crucial stage in the interest of human rights and the rights of peoples. Therefore, it is very 
appropriate to follow some actual cases from the Cold War period before then moving on to 
examine some cases from after the end of the Cold War. 
Therefore, this chapter is divided into two major sections:
1. International practices during the Cold War (Southern Rhodesia, the Dominican 
Republic and Panama).
2. International practices after the Cold War (Haiti, Sierra Leone, Libya and Syria).
5.2 International practices to promote the right of political self-determination 
and the principle of non-interference in the Cold War
The Cold War resulted in an international division that has a profound impact upon 
international decision-making.745 Although this period was characterised by the ending of 
numerous human rights violations, especially in the judicial field,746 it nevertheless did not 
witness significant development of the rules of customary international law747 This lack does 
not necessarily imply that these rights were not accorded full protection. To the contrary, 
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concrete steps were taken through the creation of codified and customary rules, such as the 
Final Act of the Helsinki Convention 1975,748 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights749 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.750 All of these covenants 
came into being during the Cold War period, although implementation of international 
practices was relatively sluggish in this era, as reflected in international attention to human 
rights and civil liberties.751
Confirming this situation are the post-Cold War interventions by the UN in Somalia, Sierra 
Leone and Haiti. This era also saw the Security Council issue various decisions supporting 
civil liberties, political rights and especially democracy. Resolution 688 (1991) supported 
political self-determination for the Cambodian people by organising a democratic election 
under UN supervision.752 Resolution 973 (1995) called for a peaceful solution in Angola by 
conducting free and fair elections753 to realise the rights of the people. However, the Cold 
War practices of the UN, especially those of the Security Council, generally are viewed as 
more limited and less ambitious.754
In contrast, other mechanisms of the UN have seemed more interested in human rights and 
democracy. This is especially true for those less impacted by the Cold War or those that did 
not intervene with the parties involved in conflicts during this time. For example, both the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund followed models to ensure that lending targets 
encouraged the privatisation of public assets and reduced the activities of the state. These 
measures were compatible with the foundations of democracy.755
Despite the negativity of the Cold War period, the UN and its executive apparatus, such as 
the Security Council and the General Assembly, still promoted the right of political self-
                                               
748 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Helsinki Final Act 1975’ (Helsinki) 
<http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true> access 12 February/2013.
749 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 
(1982) 21 ILM 58.
750 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
751 Stephen MacFarlane, Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the United Nations, Indiana University Press;
Chesham, 2011, p 75.
752 UN, Security Council, Resolution No. 688 (April 1991).
753 UN, Security Council, Resolution No. 973 (January 1995).
754 Jennifer M. Welsh, Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, Oxford -University Press, , pp 
181-182.
755 Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, Cambridge 
University Press , 2000 ,p 112.
177
determination. This claim is evidenced through its military and non-military interventions in 
support of democracy and the freedom of the people in political decision-making. This is 
exemplified by the events in Southern Rhodesia exemplify such interventions. In addition, a 
number of international interventions have occurred outside the framework of the UN, such 
as the intervention of the OAS in the Dominican Republic and the unilateral intervention by 
the United States in Panama. These cases are discussed in order to illustrate the development 
of law and human rights in the international context.
5.2.1 Southern Rhodesia
Rhodesia has experienced profound changes since the late nineteenth century, when it was 
colonised by the British South Africa Company, an organisation founded by British 
entrepreneur and politician Cecil Rhodes.756 After the departure of the colonialists, the white 
minority proceeded to seize power without free and fair elections, which prompted the 
Rhodesian population to express its dissatisfaction.757 In response, the UN General Assembly 
issued resolution 1747 (1962),758 which called for Britain to invite to general conference to 
draw up a new constitution. This policy was intended to facilitate a democratic solution in 
response to the usurpation of power by a minority group.759 The situation in southern 
Rhodesia was the first issue dealt with by the organs of the UN in order to promote a 
democratic and peaceful solution to the political struggle between the minority whites and the 
Rhodesian people.
However, the government of Ian Smith did not respond to the calls of the UN General 
Assembly but instead announced the independence of Southern Rhodesia from the British 
throne and approved a new constitution which gave special privileges to the white 
minority.760 This matter embarrassed the British government after it had fought action being 
taken against the decision of the General Assembly, claiming that it constituted interference 
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in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. This position forced the General Assembly, to declare that 
the usurpation of power from the Rhodesian people should be considered racially 
discriminatory.761
Simultaneously, a protest movement began which forced the Rhodesian people to take the 
initiative to oppose the Smith government and the constitutional provisions that gave 
excessive political privileges to the white minority.762 The theme of the African liberation 
movements in Rhodesia was the one-man, one-vote principle that gained wide support in 
order to achieve majority rule and abolish the Constitution of 1961.763 The Rhodesian people 
found great support for their right to self-determination from the newly independent African 
nations and the countries of the socialist bloc in the UN.764
The British government agreed to enter into long and complex negotiations with the white 
minority government in Rhodesia in the hopes of achieving democracy.765 On more than one 
occasion, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson threatened to impose strict sanctions on the 
Smith regime in the case of a unilateral declaration of independence. However, the Smith 
government ignored these threats and continued to suppress the liberation movement in 
Rhodesia.766
Since its inception in 1963, the Organisation of African Unity has paid special attention to the 
process of the decolonisation on the continent. The case of Southern Rhodesia topped the 
issues addressed by the organisation at the level of the African Summit and Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting.767 The second African Summit held in Cairo in July 1964 issued 
                                               
761 Myres McDougal, Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International 
Concern, The American Journal of International Law ( 1986) Vol. 62, No. 1, pp 1-19.
762 Jrt Wood, So Far and No Further!: Rhodesia's Bid for Independence During the Retreat from Empire 1959-
1965, Victoria & Trafford, 2005, pp 226-238.
763 Adrian A. Roscoe, The Columbia Guide to Central African Literature in English Since 1945, Columbia 
University Press, 2008, p35.
764 Jrt Wood, So Far and No Further!: Rhodesia's Bid for Independence During the Retreat from Empire 1959-
1965, Victoria & Trafford, 2005, p174.
765 Ibid, p407
766 Philip Murphy, An intricate and distasteful subject’: British Planning for the Use of Force Against the 
European Settlers of Central Africa, 1952–65 , English Historical Review (2006) Volume CXXI, Issue 492, pp. 
746-777.
767 Adrian A. Roscoe, The Columbia Guide to Central African Literature in English Since 1945, Columbia 
University Press, 2008, p17.
179
Resolution No.33,768 calling for African countries to resist any move towards a unilateral 
declaration of independence by Rhodesia’s white minority. The summit also called for 
bringing the matter to the UN Security Council, given that any step in this direction 
represented a serious threat to world peace. Popularity quickly came to the decision to make 
the British government accept blame for the deterioration of the situation in Rhodesia, 
demand the abolition of the Constitution of 1961, use force to impose its authority on the 
colony and work for the release of activists and African detainees imprisoned by the 
apartheid regime, such as Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo.769
The resolution also requested that the British government hold a constitutional conference 
representing all sectors and ethnicities of the Rhodesian population to draft a constitution to 
achieve democratic governance in the country. The third African summit held in Accra in 
October 1965 issued resolution No. 25770 which clearly condemned the weak position of the 
British government’s weak position on the threat by white minority in Rhodesia to declare 
unilateral independence. The resolution also called on African countries to resort to force to 
resist the independence of Rhodesia under white minority rule and demanded that neighbours 
provide all possible support to the liberation movement in order to achieve political self-
determination. As well, the resolution called on African countries to reconsider their political, 
economic, diplomatic and financial relationship with Britain in the case of a unilateral 
declaration of independence.771
The Organisation of African Unity not only demanded that the African states and Britain be 
recognised as the parties directly concerned with the subject. It also explained to the rest of 
its member states the need for the UN to not recognise the white minority government that 
might arise after the declaration of independence. Under the prevailing conditions of the Cold 
War, the African countries found support from the Communist bloc countries led by the 
Soviet Union. This support was firmly predicated upon the right of those peoples under 
                                               
768 The Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Organisation of African Unity Res 33 
(1964) 
<http://www.africaunion.org/official_documents/council%20of%20minsters%20meetings/com/dCoM_1964b.
pdf> accessed 19 February 2013. 
769 Ibid.
770 OAU, The Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in its Second Ordinary (Accra, Ghana 1965) 
<http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_21_26_OCTOBER_196_ASSEMBLY_HEADS_STATE_G
OVERNMENT_SECOND_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf> accessed 19 February 2013.
771 Ibid.
180
Western colonialism to enjoy self-determination.772 African countries also showed clear 
support for the Non-Aligned Movement, especially when the issue was put to the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly later.773
On 11 November 1965, the Smith Government announced unilateral independence.774 The 
British reaction to the failure of negotiations with the apartheid regime and the unilateral 
declaration of independence came in a statement made by Wilson in the House of Commons 
in which he described the Rhodesian act as an illegal act and outright revolt against the 
British Crown. Moreover, the prime minister announced the withdrawal of the British High 
Commissioner in Salisbury (Harare) and the expulsion of the Rhodesian High Commissioner 
to London and stopped all commercial and financial transactions between the two 
countries.775
Although the British procedures against the apartheid regime appeared to be strong, they 
were neither decisive nor influential. Arguably, they were taken only as a procedural 
formality and did seem to prevent the Smith government from continuing its work. While the 
British government did intervene in order to end violations by the minority government in 
Rhodesia, African nations did initiate international procedures as a deterrent against the 
minority government.776
These steps are most evident in Resolution No. 13 (1965)777 issued during the African 
summit held in Addis Ababa in December 1965. This resolution called for the imposition of a 
comprehensive ban on the minority government in Rhodesia, as well as for all African 
countries and allies to participate in this prohibition and non-recognition of the independence 
of Rhodesia. Moreover, the decision indicated the summit’s desire to refer the case to the UN 
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Security Council seeking a resolution to create a mass boycott of the minority white 
government. The resolution also stipulated that, if white minority control were not ended and 
democracy achieved by the end of 1965, the African countries would all cut ties with the 
British government as it was responsible for what had and was happening in Rhodesia.778
On 12 November 1965, one day after the announcement of unilateral independence by the 
white minority government, the Security Council passed Resolution 216 (1965)779 which 
condemned the minority white government’s decision. The second paragraph of the 
resolution and the implicit recognition of the Security Council declared the actions of the 
Smith Government illegal, as they robbed people of their right to political self-
determination.780 There was also recognition of democracy as a natural and legal governing 
system. So Resolution No. 217 passed by the Security Council on 20 November 1965 called 
for a halt to economic dealings with the government of Southern Rhodesia and urged the 
international community to impose an economic embargo. The resolution also encouraged 
cutting off all diplomatic relations with the minority white government. The Security Council 
considered that the unilateral declaration of the minority white government to be extremely 
serious and called on the British government to put an end to it as a threat to international 
peace and security.781
The Security Council did not stop at those decisions and in December 1966 issued Resolution 
No. 232782 banning all exports from Southern Rhodesia, including iron, chromium, copper 
and tobacco. The resolution also prohibited the export of all kinds of weapons and the 
equipment and tools needed to manufacture and maintain weapons to Southern Rhodesia. In 
the last paragraph of this resolution, the council stressed the non-inalienable right of the 
people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence and recognised the legitimacy of 
their struggle.783
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On May 29, 1968 the Security Council adopted Resolution 253,784 which condemned the 
military actions undertaken by the minority government. More importantly, the second 
paragraph of this resolution recognised that the measures taken so far in the issue of Southern 
Rhodesia had not achieved concrete results. Therefore, the resolution called for the council to 
impose comprehensive economic sanctions banning the imports and exports of all kinds of 
goods and minerals and to stop dealing with all ships and aircraft registered in Southern 
Rhodesia.785
The council continued to issue resolutions: Nos. 277 (1970),786 403 (1977),787 411 (1977),788
423 (1978),789 424 (1978),790 437 (1978)791 and 445 (1979).792 They all condemned the 
undemocratic measures in Southern Rhodesia and confirmed the international community’s 
resolve to imposed economic sanctions against the non-democratic regime. The next 
resolution, No. 448 (1979),793 stated that the results of the elections conducted by the Smith 
government were invalid and illegal due to a lack of formal procedures. In addition, the 
resolution states that the Rhodesian people did not view these elections as a democratic 
exercise to decide their political fate.794
Note that, in all of these resolutions, the right of veto, which was such a potent weapon in the 
Cold War era, was not exercised by any parties. As well, all of the resolutions were approved 
by either all of the permanent and non-permanent council members or the consent of the 
majority, with the remaining members choosing to abstain from voting. This moral and 
physical evidence shows that the international community did not accept the non-democratic 
practices undertaken by the minority white government in South Rhodesia.
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The UN General Assembly also supported the rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to 
exercise political self-determination and enjoy majority government. UN General Assembly 
resolution No. 3115 (1973) invited the British government to undertake the necessary steps to 
deliver power to a government representing the majority of Southern Rhodesia.795 Resolution 
No. 1747 (1962) condemned the violations of political rights and public freedoms in Southern 
Rhodesia. The resolution called for the establishment of a consensual constitution with the 
participation of the full population in Southern Rhodesia, along with the immediate release of 
all detained politicians.796 Subsequently, UN General Assembly resolutions Nos. 2138 
(1966),797 2151 (1966)798 and 2383 (1986)799 supported the people of Rhodesia in obtaining 
their democratic rights.
However, this matter does not mean that the international community consistently refused to 
accept dictatorial governance, and we must examine the circumstances during the Cold War 
which contributed to the silence of the international community on the actions of dictatorial 
governments loyal to certain factions. This practice hindered the international resolutions and 
contributed to their inability to curb and stop such practices and give the people the right to 
practice healthy democracy.800 Although the Security Council and General Assembly were 
concerned with the Rhodesian people’s rights to political self-determination and democracy, 
they turned a blind eye to emerging dictatorial governments in developing countries and 
those emerging from colonialism. For example, little or no attention was given to the 
undemocratic coup in Sudan led by Jaafar Nimeiri or the subsequent coup against a 
government accused of crimes against the Sudanese people.801
It is clear that the international community accepted and supported the Security Council and 
General Assembly resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, which contributed to their individual 
and collective implementation African governments. Most prominently, the Frontline 
countries (Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana) offered support to the 
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Rhodesian rebels’ struggle to liberate their country. The heads of the five Frontline countries 
first met in Mozambique in February 1976 and agreed on a new strategy for the liberation of 
Rhodesia, in addition to supporting the rebels. With the cooperation of other nations, the 
Frontline countries continued to assist the people of Rhodesia, confirming their absolute 
support of the rebels.802
Here, we note the significance of the fact that the heads of the five Frontline African 
countries believed in the need to escalate the armed struggle against the racist white minority 
rule in order to achieve the liberation of Zimbabwe. Therefore, they did not pin great hopes 
on the possibility of achieving democracy and African majority rule through economic 
sanctions, international diplomatic practice and the political efforts of UN envoys to reach a 
diplomatic solution. UN Security Council resolution No. 232 (1966) explicitly recognised the 
right to struggle against the military forces of the minority white government. None of the 
Security Council resolutions prohibited the people of Rhodesia from struggling or using 
various means to save their right to protect themselves.803
The African countries continued to impose economic sanctions to damage the economy of the 
minority white government. On 3 March 1976, Mozambique Prime Minister Samora Machel 
closed the border between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia, striking a serious blow to the 
economy of Rhodesia. As 80% of Rhodesia’s exports and imports passed through 
Mozambique, this decision was seen as the final nail in the coffin of the racist white minority 
rule in Rhodesia.804
This effort did not depend solely upon the Frontline African countries. Many nations imposed 
economic sanctions, assisted the people’s struggle to end minority white rule and banned the 
import of industrial products from any country which used Rhodesian chrome in its products. 
For example, US House of Representatives voted 250–146 to approve House Resolution 
1746, authorising an embargo on chrome from Rhodesia.805
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After numerous attempts to resolve the issue of Rhodesia, power was transferred to the 
majority in 1979, while ensuring adequate representation for the white minority. In the 
following year, the first democratic elections were held in Rhodesia, with Robert Mugabe 
winning the majority. He later changed the country’s name to Zimbabwe and has since ruled 
the country with an iron fist.806 In 1987, Mugabe cancelled the constitutional provision giving 
the white population political privileges, making it clear that the international community 
played a prominent role in supporting democracy and the desire of the majority in Southern 
Rhodesia to gain political rights.807
Hence, it is clear that the trend of supporting the right to political self-determination in 
Southern Rhodesia was not influenced by the strength of the principle of non-interference in 
the Cold War era. The United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity were 
determined to give the people in Southern Rhodesia the right of political self-determination. 
Interestingly, on this issue, the Security Council was effective even without the right to veto, 
which is an important tool in international law. This effectiveness of the Security Council 
was clear despite the strong influence of the Cold War on the Security Council resolutions 
during this period.
5.2.2 Dominican Republic
Dictator Rafael Trujillo led the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1960. The UN began 
threatening international intervention in the Dominican Republic when a group of American 
states imposed economic sanctions against this dictator. These actions resulted in a popular 
revolution which revealed the intransigence and the use of military force by Trujillo and his 
regime. Next, the  (OAS imposed sanctions, which led to Trujillo’s resignation. The country 
then held its first free and fair elections in late 1962.808 In February 1963, the government 
issued a new constitution which regulated public freedoms and granted wide civil and 
political rights. Despite the rapid development of the democratic process in the Dominican 
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Republic, the country experienced a fast military coup led by General Elias Rivera, 
characterised by bloody street warfare only seven months later.809
In response, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 203 (1965),810 which called for a halt 
to the growing hostilities in the Dominican Republic. The council promised intervention in 
the case of a failure to implement a cease-fire.811 A few days later, the council issued 
Resolution 205 (1965),812 demanding that the cessation of hostilities be a permanent cease-
fire and instructing the secretary-general to provide a full, detailed report on the situation in 
the Dominican Republic.813 The OAS met to consider the Security Council resolutions and 
decided to send military forces to maintain security in the Dominican Republic until a 
compromise could be reached and a national coalition government formed.814
Some argue that these interventions were designed to serve the aims of the OAS in 1954 and 
1962, which viewed communist control of South American countries as a threat to regional 
peace and security.815 However these interventions, whether against the Trujillo regime or 
successive military coups, were aimed at establishing constitutional legitimacy.816 These 
interventions first sought to stop oppression by the Trujillo dictatorship in 1962. The OAS 
suspended sanctions against the Dominican Republic in exchange for the end to Trujillo’s 
rule and the establishment of a constitutional council to lead to a democratic president.817 As 
a result, the country’s first democratic elections took place in December 1962 and were won 
by Juan Bosch, but the 1963 military coup led by Rivera drove Bosch into exile.818
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However, continued international intervention sought to restore democracy to the Dominican 
Republic, culminating in the United States sending an estimated 42,000 soldiers.819 As a 
result of the pressure from the OAS, an interim government was formed and held democratic 
elections in July 1966. Thus, the OAS played a prominent role in the progress and restoration 
of the democratic process in the Dominican Republic.820
Then, after all of this, the Organization of American States and the United Nations 
contributed to ending the succession of authoritarian regimes in the Dominican Republic. In 
this case, the principle of non-interference could not stand against the winds of political self-
determination in the Dominican Republic. The UN Security Council resolutions aimed to end 
the conflict, which was a result of the Dominican people no longer accepting a dictatorial 
government. The United States and the Organization of American States broke the concepts 
of the principle of non-interference in order provide the Dominican people with the right to 
political self-determination.
5.2.3 Panama
The problems in Panama can be traced to the decision by Manuel Noriega, the commander of 
the Panamanian Defence Forces, to waive a govern in the favour of Colonel Florencio 
Aguilar. Noriega surged in influence and power, becoming dominant after promising to 
ensure civil liberties and stop political parties from participating in the management of the 
country.821 In May 1989, Noriega held democratic elections for a second time as a result of 
pressure from the public, human rights organisations and the international community. The 
outcome of the election was unsatisfactory for Noriega, as his political opponent Guillermo 
Endara won the election.822
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In response, Noriega cancelled the results of the elections and took control of the 
government by force, while President-elect Endara sustained injuries in attacks by groups 
close to Noriega. A few days later, Noriega declared himself the winner of the presidential 
election.823 The international community did not accept this anti-democratic coup, and US 
President George H.W. Bush stated that Noriega must honour the desires of Panamanian 
people and ensure the functioning of democracy. However, Noriega did not respond to these 
claims and international calls, and on 20 December 1989, the United States undertook a 
unilateral intervention in Panama involving approximately 28,000 troops under the 
justification of an invitation from Endara.824 The United States also announced its intention to 
stop drug smuggling, end a threat to US security and protect democracy, the Torrijos-Carter 
treaties and the Panama Canal. The United States launched the war under the codenamed 'Just 
Cause' as the Noriega regime declared war on the United States. A few weeks later, the 
United States announced the success of the military campaign and the arrest of Manuel 
Noriega.825
However, multiple parties of the international community denounced the US intervention. 
The OAS condemned the action in Resolution No. 1024 issued on 22 December 1989,826 and 
on 29 December 1989, the UN General Assembly approved resolution No 44/240, in which 
where 75 countries condemned the action and 40 objected, declaring it to be in violation of 
international law.827 The United States, France and the United Kingdom vetoed a Security 
Council resolution condemning the US invasion.828
However, the international community supported the interventions in Southern Rhodesia and 
the Dominican Republic, perhaps due to legal factors. The most important of these factors 
were as follows.
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1. The US justifications were broad and non-specific, and the lack of a specific reason to 
justify the intervention caused many parties of the international community to 
consider it a violation of the sovereignty of Panama. The United States defended its 
action as dealing with domestic security issues, including protecting the US borders 
from drug trafficking, maintaining the Torrijos-Carter Treaty and protecting the 
Panama Canal.829 The US also claimed that this intervention was intended to support 
and promote democracy based on an invitation from President-elect Endara.830
Therefore, the international interpretations and analyses naturally would be non-
specific and varied because the US administration gave more than one reason to 
intervene and did not focus on ensuring the Panamanian people’s democratic rights.
2. The US had no permission or legal justification to intervene, unlike the interventions 
in Southern Rhodesia and the Dominican Republic. This lack certainly made the 
international community more severely critical of this action. As well, the US 
administration did not give the Security Council sufficient opportunity to undertake 
legal procedures to resolve these issues before it intervened, and the US intervention 
was swift and surprising to some parties of the international community.
This intervention did achieve positive results in accordance with the international trend to 
protect of human rights, in particular to promote democracy.831 Importantly, the legitimate 
Panama government had asked the United States to intervene in order to restore 
democracy.832 It should be noted that the US intervention occurred after a coup and the 
cancellation of the official election results, although the threat to US security existed before 
the elections, particularly drug trafficking and danger to the Panama Canal. Consequently, the 
humanitarian aspects of the US motivations were more pronounced in its explanations for the 
intervention. This is evidenced in Bush’s 20 December 1989 statement that the entry of US 
troops into Panama was intended to defend democracy and human rights.833
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Finally, the Cold War contributed to restricting international resolution by dividing the 
international community into two camps, and it made it difficult to strengthen the right of 
political self-determination in the presence of this division. This is because each camp would 
not allow the other camp to intervene in its satellite states, under the concept of the principle 
of non-interference. However, this period witnessed an effective interval to promote the right 
of political self-determination. During that period, in the cases that have been reviewed, the 
international desire to promote and support this right are clear, whether this was through the 
intervention of  regional or international organizations or through a unilateral, such as what 
happened in Panama. In Southern Rhodesia, there was a clear strengthening of the right of the 
people of Southern Rhodesia in political self-determination by the Organization of African 
Unity and the United Nations. The same situation occurred in the Dominican Republic, where 
the Organization of American States and the United Nations sought to the end the illegal 
regime and restore this right for the Dominican people.
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5.3 International practices to promote the right of political self-determination 
and the principle of non-interference after the end of the Cold War
During the Cold War, international practices have found a place in the rules of international 
law, especially in the field of human rights. However, those rights become pronounced  and 
affirmation in the international community after the Cold War.834 International law in the 
post-Cold War era has seen significant progress, especially in the international decision-
making mechanisms.835 The concept of international peace and security has become more 
inclusive of human rights and freedoms. In 1992, the Security Council held a first meeting of 
heads of state and issued a statement that recognised that:
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure 
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the 
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace 
and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the 
appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these 
matters.836
In the wake of the Cold War, many international practices and interventions, such as those in 
Haiti and Libya, have endeavoured to promote the right to political self-determination. This 
chapter examines the importance of these international practices and interventions in the 
promotion of this intrinsic human right.
5.3.1. Haiti
In 1991, the leaders of Haiti decided to hold democratic elections in response to significant 
political struggles between 1988 and 1991. In 1990, a popular uprising forced against 
President Prosper Avril to resign and flee into exile. Hérard Abraham, a military commander, 
took control of the government but, a few months later, retired from the military and 
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government, handing power to President of the Constitutional Court Ertha Pascal-Trouillot.837
A few days later, Pascal-Trouillot called for the country’s first democratic elections to be 
held. They took place in late 1990, resulting in a victory by Jean Bertrand Aristide with 67% 
of the vote.838
Two months later, on 6 January 1991, Roger Lafontant staged a military coup, which failed 
as a result of a standoff with several military commanders within the country’s legitimate 
government. A second coup on the democratic and political legitimate Aristide government 
occurred in September 1991, led by General Raoul Cedras.839 This coup succeeded, and 
martial law was immediately imposed. In the first days of the coup, 3000 citizens were killed 
in the clashes. This coup led to Aristide’s to exit from the country and the imprisonment of 
Pascal-Trouillot, who had attempted to institute democracy in Haiti.840
The international community did not accept this coup against the legitimate, democratically 
elected government. The OAS was the first to act to defend democracy in Haiti.841 Three days 
after military coup, the OAS held an urgent meeting which condemned the coup in 
Resolution 1/91 (1991).842 The OAS demanded the immediate restoration of the rule of law, 
the democratic constitution and the legitimate government. The OAS called on its member 
states to sever all diplomatic relations with and isolate the coup-installed government.843
There is no doubt that the OAS’s decision marked strong and uncharacteristically strong 
support of democracy and popular political rights.844 The OAS later issued Resolution No. 
3/92 (1992), stating that efforts to restore Haiti’s legitimate democratic government would 
not be limited to the OAS, but the OAS would raise the matter with the UN Human Rights 
Council at the UN. The resolution declared that the OAS would take all necessary and 
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possible measures to restore democracy in Haiti. The OAS’s actions were the first specific 
threat against the military government in Haiti.845 In October 1991, the UN General 
Assembly responded to the OAS by passing resolution No. 7/46 condemning the illegal 
ouster of Haiti’s president-elect, the use of military violence and the violation of human 
rights.846
However, the Cedras government did not react to these international resolutions and 
maintained its illegal power. Any citizen who demanded political rights was suppressed with 
brutality and excessive force. As Cedras’s government became more dictatorial, the number 
of Haitian refugees grew. Most fled to the closest country, the US, which increased the 
complexity of the situation, especially in light of the OAS resolutions that sought to isolate 
the country.847
In late 1992, the international community began vigorous diplomatic attempts to resolve the 
crisis in order to spare the Haitian people the effects of economic sanctions and the use of 
military means. Aristide played a prominent role in these efforts, especially in the framework 
of the OAS. These efforts resulted in the US proposing an agreement that granted new 
democratic elections and amnesty and judicial immunity for the leaders of the military 
council.848
However, the military junta ignored the Washington Agreement, although it clearly would 
have easily resolved the crisis in Haiti. This response increased the anger of the international 
community. The United States then began to enact a new set of economic measures aimed at 
pressuring the Cedras government.849 This pressure led to a limited response by the military 
junta, accepting the OAS’s invitation to participate in a meeting on Governors Island. The 
junta sent a delegation to this meeting and signed the terms of the agreement.850
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Unfortunately, Cedras did not implement any of the items in the agreement, leading to the 
collapse and failure of the Governors Island agreement.851
In June 1993, the UN Security Council issue resolution No. 841 (1993)852 imposing a 
comprehensive ban on oil imports and the sale of weapons and tools used in the 
manufacturing of weapons to Haiti. In addition, the resolution expressed the council’s dismay 
that the international community efforts to restore democracy and the legitimate government 
of President-elect Aristide had not borne fruit.853 It must be pointed out that during the 
council’s discussion of this resolution, France, Canada, and Venezuela called for a 
comprehensive ban on all exports and imports to Haiti. The United States rejected this 
proposal and agreed only to a partial ban that would not have a large an impact on Haitian 
citizens.854
The Security Council repeated its demands upon the international community in subsequent 
resolutions—Nos. 861 (1993),855 862 (1993),856 875 (1993),857 905 (1994)858 and 917 
(1994).859 All those resolutions condemned the rejection of political rights and democratic 
legitimacy and urged the military group to peacefully resolve the situation to avoid hurting 
the Haitian people and risking collective international economics sanctions. Despite these 
actions by the OAS, General Assembly and Security Council, the military government 
continued to hold hegemony over Haiti.860
In July 1994, the Security Council issued resolution No. 940 (1994),861 which became famous 
for clearly calling for military intervention to restore Haiti’s democratic, legitimate 
government. The resolution condemned the government installed by the military coup and its 
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continued insistence on ignoring the previous UN resolutions, international conventions and 
international efforts to find a peaceful solution. The resolution stressed that the goal of these 
resolutions and international conventions was to restore both democracy and legitimately 
elected President Jean Aristide. The fourth paragraph of the resolution gave the international 
community legal permission to form a multinational force and carry out military intervention 
in order to restore democracy and the denied rights of the Haitian people.862
In addition, the tenth paragraph of resolution No. 940 (1994) addressed the right of political 
self-determination by inviting international forces and a team of observers and various UN 
organs to assist in organising free and fair elections under the auspices of the UN and OAS, 
who would cooperate to create an environment appropriate for elections. The resolution’s 
fifth paragraph authorises the formation of a control group of 60 to coordinate with the 
monitoring international forces and order to implement the international community’s desire 
to restore democracy.863
President Bill Clinton gave US forces the green light to participate in the operations, 
contributing the largest contingent of a 20,000-strong military force.864 On 19 September 
1994, the multinational force began operations with 19 countries participating, including 
Australia, Argentina, Bolivia, the Netherlands, and Britain, with logistical support from other 
countries.865 On 15 October multinational forces announced the end of military operations.866
On the same day, the legitimate president Jean Aristide returned to Haiti on US military after 
three years of forced exile and the denial of his constitutional right to rule.867
The United States effectively supported democracy in Haiti, establishing itself States as the 
source of democratic discourse in international interventions in South America. This followed 
the pattern established by US action in Panama, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and 
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Nicaragua.868 However, the US acted in Haiti with legal permission from the Security 
Council, whereas US intervention to support democracy in Panama and Grenada was 
conducted unilaterally.869 The ease of the democratic intervention in Haiti was perhaps due to 
the UN Security Council’s flexibility in issuing international resolutions after the Cold 
War.870 One must also not lose sight of the fact that Clinton had clearly stated during in his 
election campaign that supporting democracy and human rights is the highest priority for the 
president of the United States.871
The OAS similarly played a prominent role in supporting democracy in Haiti and other 
countries, such as the Dominican Republic.872 This support originates from the Declaration of 
Principles issued at the Summit of the Americas, proclaiming that democracy is the only 
political system which guarantees respect for human rights and the rule of law. As well, there 
is the conviction that holding free and fair elections is essential to protecting human rights 
because it represents mutual respect for all those within a state.873
The cooperation and participation of the international community in the implementation of 
the UN, OAS and US resolutions involving was unprecedented in international interventions 
to strengthen democracy. Even Cuba, which represents the socialist bloc and does not have a 
real democracy, joined other Security Council members in voting to approve resolution No. 
940.874 Countries that participated in the international sanctions sent clear signals to the target 
state in particular and to the international community in general that that a coup against 
democracy is unacceptable.875
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The element of cooperation achieved in these international alliances played a prominent role 
in the implementation of strategic goals for international interventions. If a state were 
convinced that this matter did not contradict international law, it would be impossible to 
undertake physical and military intervention.876 The measures taken by the international 
community demonstrated how this situation exceeded traditional stages in international law 
and reflected intellectual changes. The method of dealing with the crisis in Haiti showed 
importance of developing an effective mechanism in international law to strengthen 
democracy worldwide.877
By following UN Security Council resolution No. 940, the international community 
effectively eliminated a perceived threat to international peace and security. This 
demonstrated the council’s ability to develop new standards focused on the welfare of human 
beings. The aim of the international intervention in Haiti was not to alter political or 
economic beliefs but, rather, to change the ruling regime and enable the Haitian people to 
exercise their right to democratic, free, fair elections under international supervision. These 
facts suggest that the principle of non-intervention was ineffective and did not affect the 
promotion of the right to political self-determination.
5.3.2 Sierra Leone
The history of the conflict in Sierra Leone dates to March 1991, when the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) from the country’s east of the country, near the border with Liberia, 
launched an attempt to overthrow the civilian government. The Sierra Leonean army engaged 
in a fierce war against the RUF lasting for a full year. The civilian government and the Sierra 
Leone army found support from the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS).878
                                               
876 The state’s relationship with its citizens is no longer solely internal; thus, the state cannot prevent other 
countries from interfering in its internal affairs, especially if the state’s behaviour towards its citizens leads to 
humanitarian disasters. The importance of the traditional concept of national sovereignty, which was an 
obstacle to international intervention to protect and promote human rights, has begun to decline in the face 
of the international community’s attention to those issues. In addition, we recognize the need to respect the 
authorities in a state and the rights of its citizens while still paying attention to cases of humanitarian, political, 
economic and social injustice.
877 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, London: Routledge, 2002, pp 408-
409.
878 Sierra Leone—UNAMSIL—Background’ (UN 2005) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html> accessed 14 March 201.
198
After a relatively short period, military leaders overthrew the civilian government in a coup. 
However, this did not stop the fighting or bring stability to the people of Sierra Leone.879 In 
mid-1995, the UN and the OAS called for free and fair elections in an attempt to achieve a 
comprehensive peace through democracy. In February 1996, the organisation of democratic 
elections resulted in the victory of Ahmed Tejan as president and removed the army removed 
from power. However, the RUF did not participate in the elections and later announced that it 
did not recognise the results, resulting in the continuation of fighting.880
The UN and OUA again tried to stop the fighting between the army and the RUF. On 20 
November 1996, a peace agreement was signed in Abidjan between President Tejan and RUF 
leader by Foday Sankoh in an attempt to restore democratic legitimacy.881 According to the 
terms of the Convention Abidjan, UN Secretary-General Annan suggested a comprehensive 
peace plan, which included a roadmap to get out of the crisis. The plan would last 8 months 
and required sending 720 soldiers, 60 military observers and 276 civilian employees at a cost 
of $47 million.882
However, the agreement was derailed by another military coup by the Army in concert with 
the RUF.883 President Tejan was ousted, and his government sent into exile in Guinea.884 The 
UN sent special emissaries, including Francis Okelo and other representatives of the 
international community, to negotiate with the junta in Sierra Leone, but they failed to 
persuade the junta to give up power and return power to Tejan.885
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The Organisation of African Unity condemned the military coup and explicitly called for the 
restoration of democracy. In the final statement from the 1997 summit Harare,  the Council of 
Respect for Constitutional Legality in Sierra Leone called for a quick end to the crisis and the 
restoration of democracy. In the same vein, ECOWAS formed a pentagonal committee to 
seek to restore democracy in Sierra Leone.886 On 23 October 1997, the committee met with 
the military council in Conakry and later announced the signing of a ceasefire agreement. On 
5 November 2006, Tejan issued a statement accepting the agreement and announcing his 
government’s readiness to cooperate with ECOWAS and the UN.887
However, the junta abandoned its commitment to the agreement, later protesting some terms, 
although they already signed the agreement.888 Moreover, the junta did not stop at this, but 
continued to affect the points outside the framework of the agreed peace.889 UN Security 
Council resolution No. 1132 (1997)890 condemned the delays by the military government in 
Sierra Leone891 and praised the Organisation of African Unity’s and ECOWAS’s efforts 
towards peace.892
Furthermore, the resolution demanded that economic sanctions be imposed on the military 
government, banning oil exports to Sierra Leone and trade with ships and aircraft flying the 
flag of Sierra Leone. In addition, the Security Council imposed a travel ban on members of 
the junta military and their families.893 Note that the Security Council resolution gave legal 
recognition to the ECOWAS’s initiative in the Conakry Agreement. This cooperation 
evidences a widespread international desire to restore a legitimate democracy in Sierra 
Leone.
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While UN Security Council resolution No. 1132 (1997 did not give international states 
permission to intervene militarily, it nevertheless supported the restoration of democracy
through means consistent with the requirements of the crisis. These steps also needed to be 
approved by the ECOWAS as the actor closest to and most knowledgeable of the conditions 
of the region and the particular circumstances of the dispute.894 Thus, all possibilities became 
available, enabling the Security Council to intervene should the military coup government 
fail to respond. In the case of an African group calling for military intervention, the UN 
Security Council would intervene whenever the conditions were suitable. Indeed, the 
ECOWAS continued to work to undermine Sierra Leone’s economy by imposing a strict 
blockade on the junta military. At the same time, the ECOWAS reviewed its military strength 
and readiness for all eventualities.895
ECOWAS did not depend on the UN Security Council for legal legitimacy but, rather, 
derived it from a protocol establishing the group which Sierra Leone signed in 1975.896
ECOWAS’s protocols emphasised that security is vital to create a suitable economic 
environment for the people of the ECOWAS and to achieve economic efficiency and 
comfort.897 The additional Protocol of 1995, for example, aimed to create collective security 
for the peoples of the region, respect their rights and establish a conflict prevention 
mechanism.898
It is uncertain whether ECOWAS’s intervention in Sierra Leone violated international law. 
Strong legal evidence enabled the group to conduct such measures with the approval of the 
UN Security Council. As well, Sierra Leone was a founding member of ECOWAS, and 
therefore, its government was required to ECOWAS’s decisions. In signing the ECOWAS 
Foundation protocols, Sierra Leone implicitly and explicitly acknowledging giving up some 
internal sovereignty in order to work within the framework of a collective.899 Thus, issues of 
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concern to the people of Sierra Leone also interested the ECOWAS. Consequently, the 
ECOWAS focused in supporting the Sierra Leone people’s efforts to restore democracy, 
achieve social justice and enjoy public freedoms.
In the next phase of the crisis, the ECOWAS continued to cooperate with the Organisation of 
African Unity and the UN.900 Thus began new negotiations spearheaded by the foreign affairs 
ministers of Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria to defuse the crisis and spare the people of Sierra 
Leone the effects of the crisis, exacerbated by military options.901 However, the junta 
continued to not –comply, ignored the voices of African and international forces and resisted 
international sanctions.902 It also continued fighting with Kamajors forces arose after the 
military coup. The Kamajors forces were stationed in rural areas and received military 
support from Niger and Liberia. As the battles escalated, the humanitarian crisis worsened, 
and soon, there were severe food shortages, especially in rural areas.903 These circumstances 
drove the ECOWAS to escalate to initiate more violent solutions, such as military means.904
The ECOWAS intervened militarily intervened in February 1998, and Nigerian troops 
arrested the leaders of the military junta and the RUF fighters. A month later, Tejan returned 
to Sierra Leone and took his office. The international community succeeded in restoring 
democracy to Sierra Leone through international cooperation in financial, military, logistical 
and diplomatic matters.905
In April 1998, UN Security Council resolution No. 1156 (1998)906 welcomed the return of the 
democratically elected president. The council praised the ECOWAS’s efforts to restore 
security and peace to Sierra Leone, demonstrating that the council did not oppose the military 
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measures.907 Even within the ECOWAS, there was no opposition to the military procedures 
by its members.908
It can be argued that UN Security Council resolution No. 1156 did not legitimise ECOWAS’s 
role in the restoration of democracy, instead simply stated that the ECOWAS had achieving 
security and peace in Sierra Leone.909 However, the first paragraph of the resolution 
explicitly stipulates that the Council welcomes the return of the legitimate and democratically 
elected government. This is clear recognition from the council that the objectives of the 
intervention were to restore democracy in any shape and orientation. More importantly, in the 
sixth paragraph of the resolution, the council promised to continue to cooperation with the 
group in operations to maintain the security of the democratic government in Sierra Leone. 
In this context, it should be noted that Security Council resolution No. 1156 ended the 
economic embargo imposed on Sierra Leone in Security Council resolution No. 1123. And 
there, the Council clearly described the international efforts, particularly by the ECOWAS, as 
aimed at restoring democracy in Sierra Leone. Thus, resolution Nos. 1165 and 1132 are 
linked in matter and form. 
Notably, the international community treated the use of military force cautiously. Initially, 
strong diplomatic attempts were made to restore democracy, followed by the application of 
economic sanctions. Only when these approaches failed did the international community 
resort to the use of military force. This pattern mirrors events in Haiti, except Haiti resulted in 
a clear decision to explicitly permit the use of armed force. However, the Security Council 
supported the ECOWAS’s use of military force, giving it legal recognition through resolution 
No. 1165.910
There is no doubt that these measures and decisions aimed to restore the right of political 
self-determination to the people of Sierra Leone. However, in another sense, they was not 
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consistent with the principle of non-interference. This means that the Organization of 
ECOWAS and the African governments, who went on to override the principle of non-
interference, did not consider that the principle had a legal value. The most exciting was how 
the Security Council welcomed the results of these interventions through Resolution No. 
1156 (1998).911
5.3.3 Libya
Gaddafi became leader of Libya in 1969 and ruled for 42 years. During these four decades, he 
is widely believed to have suppressed civil liberties with international and local recognition 
of these abuses of human rights.912 This regime was not the only dictatorship in the Middle 
East, where many governments acted similarly and brutally suppressed their people’s 
rights.913 Consequently, in late 2010, the Middle East experienced an outbreak of civil 
conflict collectively known as the Arab Spring, in which many populations across the region 
rose up against dictatorships. Those revolutions began in Tunisia on 17 December when fruit 
seller Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself in front of the police station after the unlawful 
confiscation of his fruit cart by officials.914
Subsequently, the Tunisian people rose up against the government of President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali, led by intellectuals and those interested in human rights and labour 
movements. Within a few months of the uprising, the Tunisian people succeeded in removing 
the repressive regime that had been the norm for more than 20 years.915 Following the 
Tunisian uprising, the peoples from other countries of the region began to move against their 
ruling dictatorships. In the second phase of the popular democratic movement, both Libya 
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and Yemen saw successful popular protest movements to remove dictators. The movement 
spread, next arriving in Syria.916
The revolutions in Egypt and Yemen did not result in a truly international intervention 
because their armies remained neutral. Even the political upper classes did not directly 
support dictatorial governments.917 However, there have been international calls to support 
the aspirations and wishes of the peoples. For example, on 30 January 2011, US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton called for the protesters organisers to be converted into the ruling 
regime in Egypt.918 On 31 January, Catherine Ashton, an EU High Representative for Foreign 
and Security Affairs in the EU, called on Mubarak to engage in immediate dialogue with the 
opposition and respond to the aspirations of anti-government protesters.919 Similarly, on 1 
February, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged Mubarak to step down and let the 
Egyptian people decide their political fate.920
There were similar international calls for the abdication of President Ali Abdullah Salehto of 
Yemen.921 However, this time a pivotal role was played by the UN Security Council played a 
pivotal, issuing resolution No. 2014 calling for Saleh to step down and ensure the transfer of 
power in a peaceful, democratic, free and fair elections.922 Earlier, there had been 
international requests for Saleh to resign in response to the desire of the Yemen people, as US 
President Barack Obama urged on 28 July 2012.923 That same day, British Foreign Secretary 
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William Hague asserted that Saleh must fulfil his international obligations to realise the 
Yemeni people’s desire to transfer power through democratic means.924
Note that the Security Council has given important legal support democracy in Yemen but 
not in Egypt. However, all of those international calls to support the popular revolts and 
achieve the wishes of the people represent legal recognition by the international community 
of the political rights of peoples. In particular, the right of the peoples to access democracy 
forms the basis for the achievement of social justice and human freedom. Thus, peoples 
should have access to a system that respects and promotes human rights. 
The situation of the Libyan people differs from that of their counterparts in Egypt, Yemen 
and Tunisia because they experienced real economic and military international intervention925
because the Gaddafi regime responded to the popular uprising with repression, murder and 
torture. The regime committed grave violations of human rights in Libya, which led the 
international community to condemn the regime for these violations.926
A revolution broke out 15 February 2012 after a peaceful demonstration in Benghazi calling 
for the release of Fathi Terbil, a lawyer of families of those incarcerated the political Abu 
Saleem prison.927 The majority of demonstrators were relatives of prisoners in Abu Saleem 
and demanded the immediate release of the prisoners and Terbil. They also wanted to know 
the location of victims’ bodies and the prosecution of those responsible for their deaths. The 
demonstration escalated into a violent clash with regime forces that faced protesters with 
repression and arrest. The demonstrators used stones and Molotov cocktails to defend 
themselves, and the first day of the revolution ended 38 deaths among the demonstrators.928
The government released Terbil and promised to free 110 other prisoners detained at Abu 
Salim for a few days. That same day, demonstrations took place in al-Bayda, asserting 
                                               
924 EU Wary of Extremism in Egypt (Euronews 31 January 2011) <http://www.euronews.com/2011/01/31/eu-
wary-of-extremism-in-egypt/> accessed 25 March 2013.
925 James Pattison, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, Ethics & International Affairs (2012) Vol. 
25 , No. 3 , pp 271-277.
926 Christopher Chivvis, Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
(2012) Vol. 54, No. 6, pp 69-92.
927 Jon Western, Selling Intervention And War: The Presidency, The Media, And The American Public, JHU Press, 
2005, p36.
928 Jean-Pierre Filiu, The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising, Oxford University Press, 
2011, pp 85-86.
206
stronger claims than the families of the Abu Saleem prisoners. These demands included the 
ouster of Gaddafi. In those demonstrations, three protesters were killed, and more than 200 
were wounded.929
On 17 February, a popular revolt was fully launched, labelled a Libya’s day of rage in cities 
across the country. Demonstrations took place in Benghazi, Tobruk, Derna, Ajdabiya, Kufra
and Zintan. The regime continued to repress the demonstrations and use excessive force to try 
to control the popular revolution in Libya.930 These events quickly evolved into violent 
confrontations, and demonstrators burned several government buildings in Benghazi. The 
death toll stood at 49 on this day alone. Libyan authorities began a series of arrests in Tripoli 
in anticipation of similar protests. At least 14 activists were arrested.931 The next day, a march 
in Benghazi mourned the dead from the previous two days; then, commandos fired upon the 
protesters with heavy weapons and anti-aircraft weapons, killing more than 300. In addition, 
al-Bayda saw nearly 150 people dead, and another person was killed in Misrata during the 
disbursement of a demonstration. On 20 February, unrest continued in Benghazi, with tens of 
thousands of demonstrators taking to the streets. They were met by the forces of the regime, 
with 50 protestors killed.932
After these clashes between government forces and demonstrators demanding civil and 
political rights and directed by detainees, some politicians and military teams announced that 
they were joining the popular revolt. Then, a number of government officials left, protesting 
the suppression of the Libyan people. Six Libyan ambassadors resigned, including Libya’s 
permanent representative to the Arab League.933
Several Libyan tribes similarly announced that they would support those demands and 
denounced the military force exerted in response to the popular demonstrations in various 
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parts of Libya.934 The clashes escalated, with the regime using heavy weapons against and 
bombing demonstrations and besieging Benghazi with tanks, artillery and rockets. Zintan 
witnessed fierce battles between rebels and government forces. One week after the popular 
uprising began, Gaddafi appeared on television threatening the revolutionaries and protesters 
with severe punishment.935
Human rights organisations condemned the excessive use of force by Libyan authorities, and 
the AU and Arab League condemned the systematic repression and gross violation of human 
rights. The Arab League played an important role in urging the international community to 
consider the Libyan case and raised the issue with the UN Security Council.936 The 26 
February 2011, Security Council resolution No. 1970 (2011)937 condemned the systematic 
attacks against Libyan people and noted very clearly that they amounted to crimes against 
humanity. The resolution referred the situation in Libya to the ICC under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute. Moreover, the resolution imposed a comprehensive ban on arms exports to 
Libya and a travel ban on a number of suspects in human rights violations.938
Less than a month later, the Security Council issued resolution No. 1973 (2011)939
authorising the international community to take all necessary measures to protect civilians 
and populated areas, provided that there were no foreign occupation force. The resolution 
also imposed a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace to protect civilians and legally permitted 
member states to enforce the ban by military force within Libyan airspace. As well, the 
resolution expanded economic sanctions on the Libyan government, freezing Libyan assets in 
financial institutions and prohibition transactions with the Central Bank of Libya.940
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Note that this resolution assigns the responsibility to protect civilians not only to Libyan 
authorities but also to the international community.941 This is a clear legal recognition that the 
Security Council does not embrace the doctrine of national protection but, rather, distributes 
this responsibility throughout the international community under the framework of collective 
security and collective responsibility.942 In addition, the council response quickly to the 
Libyan situation and passed a resolution on 17 March 2011, just one month after the start of 
the popular protests and their suppression.943 This speed is proof that the model of 
intervention goes beyond cases of self-defence and that the Security Council is concerned 
with the protection and promotion of human rights.944
The international community reacted swiftly to the UN Security Council and began military 
operations to enforce a no-fly zone. On 19 March 2011, international forces led by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) carried out sorties, targeting aircraft, flight corridors 
and missile sites. Those strikes hit areas surrounding Benghazi in order to protect civilians 
there from the fierce attacks of Gaddafi’s forces.945 Soon after, the National Transitional 
Council headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalilwas established and received international recognition 
as the legitimate authority in Libya.946 Moreover, large Libyan military split and formed the 
Libyan People’s Army under Brigadier General Abdel Fattah al-Obeidi to defend protesters 
and the Libyan people. The Libyan People’s Army forces quickly moved to the offensive.947
These forces progressed westward from eastern Libya under the protection of the NATO air 
forces and reached the outskirts of the capital Tripoli. On 20 August 2011, the rebels 
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succeeded in storming the city of Tripoli and took control of the Tripoli International Airport 
the next day. The National Transitional Council then claimed to have full control over the 
city of Tripoli, the capital and most important city in Libya. Two months later, the rebels 
announced the death of Gaddafi, full control over Libya and the end of dictatorial rule.948
Some might argue that the UN Security Council resolution No. 1973 did not fully provide for 
the promotion of the right of political self-determination. Although the resolution’s goal was 
to protect the Libyan people from human rights violations,949 the resolution sought to 
promote through support of the people’s revolution.950 This claim is evidenced by the 
following sources.
1. Statements about the successive international resolutions aimed at supporting 
democracy in Libya. For example, when the EU met in February 2011, Cameron said, 
‘I think it is the moment for Europe to understand we should show real ambition 
about recognising that what’s happening in North Africa is a democratic awakening, 
and we should be encouraging these countries down a democratic path’.951
2. International recognition of the National Transitional Council as legitimate and the de 
facto authority in Libya during the Revolution. Such recognition came from France 
and Qatar, for example.952 In addition, the EU opened a representative office in 
Benghazi, which was under the control of the Transitional Council.953
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3. There were series of UN Security Council resolutions supporting the promotion of the 
right of political self-determination in Libya. In resolution No. 2009, the council gave 
legal support to international efforts to promote democracy in Libya, noting the need 
for the UN to take charge of such attempts to establish a democratic state in Libya. 
Thus, in the case, the council acknowledged the legal importance of democracy.954 In 
addition, resolution No. 2022 welcomed the establishment of the National 
Transitional Council, demonstrating that the council would not fail to achieve the 
Libyan people’s aspirations to secure their political rights.955
4. The Security Council’s lifting of all economic sanctions through resolution No. 2016 
as soon as the National Transitional Council declared it had control of the country. 
The resolution welcomed the future of democracy in Libya and assured full respect 
for the basic rights of Libyan citizens. It also approved the National Transitional 
Council’s declaration issued 23 October 2011 and called for the international 
community to cooperate with the new power in Libya and end economic sanctions.956
Thus, the Security Council moved towards implicit acknowledgement of the democratic 
revolution by the Libyan people as acceptable to the international community. Conversely, 
the Libyan dictatorship did not receive such acceptance. Moreover, note that the Security 
Council resolutions give the impression that the motive of the international intervention in 
Libya was to help the Libyan people obtain their rights, not only to protect them.
Van Landingham argued that, despite the lack of clear legal rules in the UN Charter on the 
promotion and protection of human rights, resolution No. 1973 has created such a customary 
rule of law.957 The Security Council’s expansion of the justifications for intervention has also 
lead to positive developments in customary law.958 Additionally, the concept of the 
relationship between citizens and rulers, which is an internal competence issue, has gradually 
eroded.
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The international response to the crisis in Libya, particularly by the UN Security Council, 
came unusually quickly. The international intervention was not intended to stop ethnic or 
sectarian war between two states but, rather, to promote and protect the rights of the Libyan 
people from the oppression by their government.959 More importantly, the Security Council 
resolutions in this case did not encounter opposition within the council but were passed 
without reservations about their content.
5.3.4 Syria 
The Syrian revolution is an extension of the Arab revolutions demanding an end to dictatorial 
rule and reaching the right of political self-determination, and coming on the heels of the 
success of those popular claims in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya to end the dictatorial 
regimes.960 The Syrian people began petitioning for an end to the regime of Bashar al-Assad 
in Syria in March 2011.The Assad family has had authoritarian control of the Syrian state for 
approximately four decades.961
The popular revolution in Syria differs from its counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen 
because the army or military authority in these countries stood in neutrality without 
interference.962 The Syrian revolution, however, approaches the case of Libya. The regime of 
al-Assad has met the demand for self-government with murder, torture and detention.963 The 
regime of al-Assad controls the Syrian military authority; he is the supreme commander of 
the armed forces, and his brother Maher is commander of important military units in the 
state.964 These data confirm that this regime will not relinquish power or give the Syrian 
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people the right of self-determination but will use military force to suppress these 
demands.965
The Syrian Revolution began on March 15 when some Syrian pupils wrote phrases that called 
for an end to the current system of government. Assad's forces arrested these children; 
tortured and killed a child called Hamza al-Khatib, and sent his dead body to his family.966
After this, several peaceful demonstrations to demand an end to the regime and were held to 
demand the right of political self-determination. The regime of al-Assad repressed these 
demands, killed thousands of demonstrators and threw thousands of others in prison. The idea 
of a self-determined government has gained popularity even with the continuation of the 
regime’s systematic repression.967 This repression contributed to organised splits that caused 
some members of the Syrian army to stand with the people.968 The dissident soldiers worked 
to support the popular demands, which contributed to the outbreak of armed conflict between 
the dissidents, or Free Syrian Army, and the forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad, mostly from the 
Alawite sect to which the regime belongs. The regime continued to use suppression, 
massacres and chemical weapons to stop the spread of the popular demands in almost all 
Syrian cities.969
In August 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council set up an Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian conflict.970 In November 2011, the 
Commission issued its first report, which stated that there was excessive use of armed force 
by the regime against the protesters.971 In August 2012, the Human Rights Council stated that 
the al-Assad regime regularly practiced systematic repression and accused the regime of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.972
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As mentioned earlier, the Syrian revolution is similar to the Libyan revolution in terms of 
form and content. The regimes in Syria and Libya have used repression, torture and murder to 
stop those demands for self-determination.973 However, there is a difference between the two 
cases. The Libyan case found effective international support through international 
intervention, based on U.N. Security Council resolutions Nos. 1970974 and 1973.975
Regarding the Syrian issue, both Russia and China have balked at Security Council 
resolutions that would support and protect the popular demand in Syria.976
The Security Council has failed to pass three strongly worded resolutions that aimed to end 
the conflict and the systematic repression. The first decision placed on the Security Council 
table was in October 2011. It intended to impose economic sanctions on the al-Assad regime 
in an attempt to stop the repression and murders. In February 2012, the Arab members in the 
United Nations decided to invite Assad to leave power and they implemented the Arab 
League initiative.977 The third attempt came from the United Kingdom, which offered a 
resolution calling for the international community to impose economic sanctions on the 
Syrian government unless it withdrew heavy weapons from populated areas within 10 
days.978 These attempts collided with Russia and China’s right of veto. The data received 
from the Russian and Chinese sides indicate that it must commit to the rules of international 
law.979 There is no doubt that the intent of this data is article 2/7 of the UN Charter,980 which 
is the objective basis for the principle of non-interference.981
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In the view of some international law scholars, such as Paul Williams, Trevor Ulbrick and 
Jonathan Worboys, the failure of the UN Security Council to take coercive measures to 
protect the Syrian people must be offset by activating the principle of the responsibility to 
protect.982 This opinion is resulting in a move to create specific criteria allowing for limited 
use of force when the Security Council fails to protect the Syrian people, such as the 
imposition of a no-fly zone or provision of safe havens for the Syrians. These standards are 
based on the principle of responsibility to protect, which holds the international community 
fully responsible for protecting the Syrian people if the local authorities fail in to do so.983
Despite the failure of the Security Council, the international community, through other 
international organizations, has sought to strengthen the Syrian Revolution’s demands and 
has tried to protect freedom seekers from oppression. For example, in November 2011, the 
Arab League imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on the Syrian regime. These 
sanctions did not stop the exchange of trade, but were imposed to inhibit senior leaders of the 
regime, to prevent them from entering other Arab countries and to freeze all the bank 
accounts.984 Moreover, the Arab League has voted to suspend Syria's membership in all 
political, economic and cultural activities.985
In December 2011, the European Union imposed economic sanctions on the Syrian regime 
and state-owned enterprises, targeting petroleum companies in particular. At the same time, 
the European Union imposed personal sanctions on the leaders of the regime involved in 
supporting or participating in the systematic repression.986 It does not just depend on the 
international organizations, however. Many states have adopted the same behaviours in the 
protection of repressed people. For example, in July 2012, Japan announced it had imposed 
sanctions on the Syrian regime, including freezing the assets of members of Syria’s ruling 
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regime and preventing Syrian aircraft from landing at Japanese airports.987 Turkey has also 
imposed economic and military sanctions. These sanctions include stopping the passage of 
any military shipments to the al-Assad regime. Turkey is suspending the security agreements 
between the two countries to protect the Syrian refugees in Turkey pursued by the Syrian 
regime.988
We note that the popular demand for an end to the dictatorial regime and the realization of 
the right of political self-determination is the foundation on which the Syrian Revolution is 
based. Also consider that the Syrian people continued protests and claims to achieve these 
goals in spite of the intransigence of the regime and its resistance through the use of murder, 
repression, displacement and chemical weapons.989 Therefore, the international attention on 
the protection of the revolution and on the protests of human rights abuses are evidence of the 
international community's support for these rights, providing additional legitimacy to the 
Syrian people’s demands. This means the revolution has attained the acceptance of the 
international community in terms of its goals and objectives, particularly the right to political 
self-determination.990
Moreover, many countries and international organizations have recognized the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and consider the organization a 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people.991 The Arab League, in a statement issued in 
November 2011, said it welcomes this coalition as the Syrian people’s representative.992 The 
League called on the international community and international organizations to recognize 
this coalition and regard it as the sole representative of the Syrian people. In addition, the 
United States and France recognized this coalition by agreeing to open representative offices 
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in their own countries.993 It is true that many countries and organisations have been silent 
about recognising the Syrian opposition coalition, but countries, such as Switzerland and
Netherlands, did not object to this recognition and did not prevent members of the coalition 
from traveling through their countries.994
International behaviour in promoting and supporting the Syrian people's right to political self-
determination exceeded the scope of the Security Council, and the international community 
went beyond the Security Council’s decisions.995 Numerous countries and international 
organisations have contributed to the creation of an international practice leading to a 
significant result—that in the case of the Security Council’s inability to keep up with the 
demand to protect human rights, the international community can create measures to promote 
and protect these rights. This does not mean that the legal force of the Council has become 
weak. It simply means that the international community, especially international 
organisations, can exercise an active role in the international arena.
This is what happened when a number of countries and international organizations took 
measures to protect the Syrian people and strengthen their demands. By doing so, the 
international community recognized the legitimacy of these demands without being bound by 
the views of Russia and China in dealing with the Syrian issue.
5.5 Conclusion
The practices and international interventions that have been reviewed in this chapter clearly 
show the attention paid to the promotion of the right of political self-determination. During 
the Cold War, the principle of non-interference was more powerful because the international 
interests of each camp were more important than concerns for human rights. However, the 
strengthening of the right to political self-determination found effective support through 
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international practices and interventions in Southern Rhodesia, the Dominican Republic and 
Panama. The international approach to promoting this right in these cases was walking in 
challenging with the principle of non-interference. Consider that people’s demands for the 
right of political self-determination is objective for this approach and for the promotion and 
support of these demands.
This does not mean that the principle of non-intervention was a weak effect in that period. In 
the case of Panama, for example, there is a rejection of many of the states of the U.S. 
intervention in Panama. The reason may be that this intervention was not by an international 
organization or international authorization, but it was unilaterally done by one state. 
However, this intervention has contributed to the promotion of this right. More importantly, 
the Panamanian people have contributed to this right, where the democratic governments 
continued successive in the administration of the country under the positive acceptance of the 
Panamanian people. Thus, promotion of the right of political self-determination was found 
effective in many cases. Despite the strength of the principle of non-intervention during the 
Cold War period, a result of its ease of use against international resolutions would contribute 
to the promotion of the right to political self-determination of people.
In the subsequent period of the Cold War, this approach involved taking steps without the 
influence of the principle of non-interference. In Haiti, the international community did not 
accept the coup against legitimacy; the legitimate government was the result of the struggle 
of the Haitian people to obtain the right of political self-determination. The UN Security 
Council resolution No. 940 helped restore this right to the Haitian people. The same thing 
occurred in the case of Sierra Leone, where the international community sought to restore the 
legitimate government, which had been chosen by the people and not by a military force. In 
Libya, the UN Security Council helped protect the popular demand for an end to the 
dictatorial regime and the realization of the right of political self-determination. In Syria, 
there is a conflict between the principle of non-interference and the efforts to promote and 
protect the popular demands, which is facing repression. This conflict became more 
pronounced when Russia and China refused to pass Security Council resolutions, which 
aimed at protecting those claims of repression. There are many organizations and countries 
however, that have subsided the Security Council and have taken measures to try to promote 
and protect the people’s demands. For example, the Arab League and the European Union, 
who have imposed economic sanctions on the Syrian regime.
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The objective criteria for international interventions are to protect and promote the popular 
demand for political self-determination or to restore this right and end dictatorial rule. 
Consequently, these criteria were not subject to the principle of non-interference when any 
intervention attempts were made. Ultimately, when using the principle of non-interference 
against any international resolution to promote and protect the popular demand for the right 
of political self-determination, the international community resorts to making similar 
decisions in different ways, such as by regional and international organizations. This means 
that the attention of the international community on the promotion and protection of the right 
to political self-determination, which collides with repressive regimes, should have more 
leverage from the principle of non-interference in actual practice.
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Conclusion
As described in the introduction of this dissertation, the main research question is as follows: 
Does the principle of non-interference impact on the path of the right to political self-
determination in international law? This dissertation showed that this right has become an 
integral part of contemporary legal ideology, which is based on concern for human rights and 
the rights of peoples. The right of political self-determination provides a perfect complement 
to other human rights, ensuring respect for and protection of those rights. The right of 
political self-determination stems from contemporary intellectual interests in upholding
human dignity, enforcing rights granted under international law and eliminating slavery and 
dictatorships. Arguably, this right not only complements but is more comprehensive than 
other human rights as it represents the popular will of all, or the majority, of citizens in a 
society. This dissertation explains the legal relationship between democracy and the right of 
political self-determination. Democratic government is considered an indication that peoples
have determined their own political destiny; thus, democracy has become an essential 
element of the right of political self-determination.
The right of political self-determination is supported by many international instruments, the 
most prominent being the 1946 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the eighth principle of the 1975 
Helsinki Convention. Moreover, many international practices support this approach such as 
the economic sanctions imposed on South Africa and on Syria by the EU and measures taken 
by the UN to support democracy in Haiti in 1994–1995. Legal jurisprudence has identified
two manifestations of the right to self-determination. The external manifestation is desire for
secession or independence from a colonial power or merger with another state, while the
internal manifestation is the freedom of a nation to arrange its own economic and political 
affairs and to grant social and cultural rights.
The study raised normative questions about the propriety of the right of political self-
determination with the concept of the statehood in international law. Specifically, the 
research examined state-building criteria in international law and how such criteria are 
linked to claims to this right. Results show that the right of political self-determination 
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is not in conflict with the traditional criteria of statehood, particularly in the criteria of 
the Montevideo Convention. Clearly, the right does not violate the objectivity and formal 
aspects of state-building criteria. Along with emerging themes in international 
law,specifically in the domain of human rights; the right of political self-determination in fact 
contributes to the development of such criteria. This argument can be made clear by 
making democracy a legal prerequisite for statehood, through which can ensure that 
harmony exists between the people and their government. Therefore, the right to 
political self-determination does not place any legal restrictions on state-building 
criteria. To the contrary, it adds new standards—the standards of agreement and 
integration between peoples and their governments.
As well, this dissertation demonstrated that popular demand forms the substantive basis for 
the right of political self-determination. Popular demand for this right differs from other 
claims connected to self-determination, such as demands for independence from colonialism 
or for secession from a mother country. Popular demand for the right of political self-
determination frequently arises in the context of dictatorial states and authoritarian regimes as
the main objectives of these claims are to achieve freedom from tyranny and to allow all 
people to participate in the selection of the government and means of running the country. 
Authoritarian regimes consistently use repressive measures to deny such claims and remain in 
power.
The dissertation explained that this repression pushes members of the international 
community, whether states or organizations, to adopt measures and interventions within the 
framework of international law to protect and promote these claims. There is no doubt that 
these measures are inconsistent with the principle of non-interference. However, this 
principle faces strong opposition, especially as it assumes the absolute sovereignty of the 
state. This opposition originates in recent principles and legal developments intended to 
protect and promote human rights, such as the principle of responsibility to protect, the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and international interventions on
many issues within the framework of international law. This opposition to the principle of 
non-interference has demonstrated that the sovereignty of the state is not an absolute but a 
dynamic concept, evolving within modern international law. States and governments can no 
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longer freely act against their people in ways that violate international human rights law and 
expect to be shielded by the concept of absolute sovereignty.
These factors have contributed to transforming the concept of non-interference from an 
absolute principle forbidding intervention under any circumstances into a relative guideline 
which permits international intervention when consistent with the objectives of contemporary 
international law. Specifically, such interventions may support and protect individual and 
collective human rights, especially against abuses committed by dictatorial governments 
against their own peoples. This transformation has not been limited to the principle of non-
interference but has extended to the concept of state sovereignty in general.
This dissertation revealed the various concepts and types of interventions in international law 
and identifies a broad and a narrow category of international interventions. These 
interventions promote the right of political self-determination under the broad concept 
that they do not depend only on military measures but also on political and economic 
measures. The reason for this is the purpose of the right to achieve security and stability 
for the people . Resorting to political and economic measures in an attempt to promote 
the right of political self-determination is therefore appropriate before resorting to 
military intervention, which may lead to disastrous effects. International interventions 
which protect human rights and those which promote the right to self-determination 
overlap and, in some ways, are homogeneous; the actions involved are similar, but the 
outcomes are different. These interventions could result in the protection of human 
rights or the fulfilment of popular demand for political self-determination, as in the case 
of Libya.
However, there are limitations to interventions that promote the right to political self-
determination. The first of these is coercion, while the second is UN General Assembly 
resolution no. 2131’s stipulation that the choice of a governmental system and approach to 
running a country is a local affair. This dissertation has argued that the absolute 
impermissibility of intervening for these reasons results in authorities being granted full 
freedom to violate human rights as a means of staying in power. However, international 
organisations monitor democratic procedures within states and seek to ensure the integrity of 
these procedures and their results. Moreover, coercion and domestic political affairs based 
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mainly on the principle of non-interference, as illustrated in this thesis, face stiff headwinds 
because of the need to protect human rights and the international community’s responsibility 
to provide such protection.
This dissertation showed that this elasticity in the principle of non-interference, in the modern 
approach, clarifies the priority of promoting the right to political self-determination when 
there are direct conflicts between them .This dissertation found that, in many cases, 
international promotion of the right to political self-determination triumphs . For example, 
when Russia and China vetoed the UN Security Council measures to protect the rights of the 
Syrian people, many organizations and countries—including the League of Arab States, the 
European Union, Turkey and Japan—worked outside of the UN to support the needs of the 
Syrian people.
In conclusion, one can say that in the face of international efforts to promote the right to 
political self-determination, the principle of non-interference has become more flexible and 
has not hindered the effectiveness of such efforts. The right to political self-determination has 
found support from many rules of international law and is consistent with contemporary 
human and legal thought. More importantly, the principle of non-interference has received 
repeated challenges, which have weakened it and supported the aspirations of contemporary 
legal thought to promote human rights and the rights of people.
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